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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms influence 
firm performance and efficiency in developing countries, with a specific focus on 
Jordan. From 880 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange, for the period of 2006-2016 and by using two measures of 
performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin’s Q) and two measures of agency costs 
(i.e., asset utilization and expense ratio), the empirical results suggest that Jordanian 
companies with a high percentage of outside independent directors are outperforming 
companies with a low percentage of outside independent directors.  
A significant positive relationship among the board independence in the form of 
the representation of outside independent directors, return on assets and the asset 
utilization ratio, has been found. The empirical findings of the relationship among 
board gender diversity, firm performance and firm efficiency, indicate that board 
gender diversity in the form of the proportion of women on the board of directors, 
cannot explain firm performance nor firm efficiency in Jordan. In addition, the findings 
of relationships among CEO duality, firm performance and firm efficiency, suggest 
that CEO duality as a proxy for the board leadership structure, can influence the firm 
performance positively and firm efficiency negatively.  
The differences to the findings from the previous studies, refer to the fact that 
corporate governance and its problems in Jordan may not be similar to other countries. 
Jordan’s specific characteristics in terms of the data when compared with prior studies, 
means that ‘one size does not fit all’, and one group of governance mechanisms may 
not be fitted for each country. Drawing on the empirical investigations and theoretical 
discussions, it is revealed that the practices of corporate governance in Jordan need to 
be improved. Hence, a further aim of this thesis is to help regulatory bodies in 
improving or framing the best practices of corporate governance for Jordanian 
companies. Remarkably, the majority of the earlier studies on Jordan, have looked at 
corporate governance issues and performance by using traditional financial measures. 
To revisit the corporate governance practices in a unique setting of agency relationship 
in the context of Jordan, this study use two measures of agency costs, namely the 
expense ratio and asset utilization ratio.  
Therefore, this study provides a new avenue of knowledge to academics and 
practitioners, by providing new evidence on corporate governance practices in a little 
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known institutional context. This study has also been conducted by using two theories, 
and thus contributes to agency and resource dependence theory literature, showing the 
suitability of these theories during a period of improvement in the Jordanian corporate 
governance code for shareholding companies. This study is one of the rare studies 
which examines firm performance and agency costs by using different measures. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The concept of organisation can be traced to ancient civilisations, where the 
different grouping of individuals (e.g., civic administration and armies) came to be 
shaped as social structures that would promote collaborative activities to accomplish 
the collectively desired aims. The industrial revolution in the 19th century triggered 
rapid economic and manufacturing growth, with emerging business models radically 
altering the pattern of working life from what had been individually or family run 
cottage industries (Campbell & Craig 2005). In the 19th century, the industrial 
revolution led to speedy economic and manufacturing growth. New styles of managing 
the business environment were needed. Notwithstanding the fact that all organisations 
can present similar features, individual business is restricted by factors such as its 
ownership structure, limited diversity and size, the nature of the business and the 
influences of the external environment. Figure 1 displays a subset of the business 
environment. In summation, it is fair to say that “organisations are social arrangements 
for controlled performance of collective goals” (Campbell & Craig 2005, p. 4). 
After the birth of the industrial revolution, the notion of the company initially 
developed as a form of business ownership for higher capital, or because of the 
ideology of the capitalist form of economic organisation whose prime aim is to make 
a profit. In the late decades of the 19th century, the United States of America (the U.S.) 
was the main source of many of the largest firms in the world. Table 1 provides the 
asset value of the 25 top firms, with the level of domestic income in the United State 
(US), Japan, United Kingdom (UK) and Australia.  
Due to removal of barriers between different countries, what is known as 
globalisation led to expanded international trade. Thus, the business world witnessed 
the tremendous development of corporations around the world. Furthermore, 
globalisation led to increased supranational activities through bodies such as the World 
Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Hence, 
the concept of a borderless world became more prevalent among countries, and firms 
attracted funds from beyond regional boundaries.  
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However, due to the voluminous extent of business operations in large modern 
companies, the perilous issue of the separation of ownership and management 
emerged, and this has led to the corporate operations becoming even more complex. 
Further, cases arose where the boards of directors were found to be either unaware or 
wilfully indisposed to addressing the complexity of such business procedures. In 
addition, it became apparent that corporation laws were not sufficient for directing 
companies. As a matter of course, the financial crisis of 2008 and many company 
collapses have occurred, for example, Enron, HIH Insurance, and WorldCom. Less 
than a decade earlier the world witnessed a similar collapse in the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997. Naturally, the financial failure of companies struck the  
Figure 1: The subset of the business environment 
 
 
 
 
           
           
           
           
           
           
     
 
Source: Harrison (2010, p. 5)     
global economy by harming shareholders and the global society as a whole. 
Consequently, shareholders’ concerns have increased. Hence, the corporate sector 
attracted the attention of individual investors, large shareholders, investment 
practitioners, communities, international and local bodies, and governments, and many 
reforms to improve governance were proposed. 
In the developed world, different bodies addressed this issue (e.g., Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 in the U.S. and Cadbury Committee Report 1992 in the U.K.). 
Governance reforms issues have been debated, reframed and renewed over and over 
again by relevant parties in the developed economies. However, the vast majority of 
governance reforms have been conducted in developed countries. Attempts have then 
Social Political  
The 
business 
environment  
Economic  Ethical 
Legal 
Technological  
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been made to impose such reforms in developing countries and emerging markets, 
which are typified, by slow economic growth, a weak institutional environment, and 
the prevalence of private and public corruption (Boubakri et al. 2005b; Adegbite et al. 
2012). Therefore, many significant questions may arise about the practice of corporate 
governance in developing countries, like Jordan, which is of interest in this thesis. Two 
such questions follow. Are there similarities between developing countries and 
developed countries concerning corporate governance problems? Do developing 
countries have the capability to address the problems of governance efficiently? These 
questions prompted further investigation and initiated the process of forming some 
formal researches’ questions, which are presented in Section 1.9. 
Table 1: The assets value of the 25 top-firms with the level of domestic income 
(US$M). 
Source: Boyce and Ville (2002, p. 9) 
Jordan is a developing country contiguous to the continent of Asia, in a region 
known somewhat Euro centrically as the Middle East. The concept of corporate 
governance is relatively new in Jordan, as in other Arab countries, so it is timely to 
shed light on this issue. This thesis attempts to promote the practice of corporate 
governance in Jordan, and assesses whether and to what extent the implementation of 
common corporate governance practices may improve firm performance and mitigate 
firm agency cost in that context.  
 
1.2 The history of the corporate governance revolution 
The practice of corporate governance is an old issue (Tricker 2000). It can be 
dated back to the nineteenth century (Vinten 1998) and came into existence with the 
appearance of limited liability companies. Scholars (e.g, Smith 1776; Berle & Means 
1932; Coase 1937; Jensen & Meckling 1976), have all had concerns about controlling 
and managing large firms for centuries. Smith (1776) in his seminal work (An Inquiry 
Countries 1910-
1918 
GDP (%) 1930-
1937 
GDP 
(%) 
1948-1954 GDP 
(%) 
American, 7938 10 17714 19 28840 11 
Japan, 616 10 1227 17 2397 15 
United 
Kingdom 
1399 11 7662 28 7480 18 
Australia 290 19 702 21 1269 16 
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into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations), stated that directors are involved 
in controlling other people’s money rather than their own. The issue of the separation 
of ownership has been recognised by Berle and Mean’s 1932 work (The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property). In the words of Means (1931, p. 82), "in time of 
crisis, however, or where a conflict of interest between the control and the management 
arises, the issue may be drawn and a proxy fight to determine control may demonstrate 
how far dependent upon its appointed management the controlling group has become". 
In the 1980’s, studies in the corporate governance area expanded following Jensen and 
Mackling’s work in 1976 (Denis 2001). As noted by Tricker (2000), the 20th century 
may be the corporate governance century. Governance in that period attracted a great 
deal of attention from researchers, regulatory agencies, managers, investors as well as 
shareholders.  
However, as stated by Denis and McConnell (2003), from the 1970’s to the 
1980’s, most of the governance studies have addressed U.S. companies. By the 
beginning of the 1990’s, research on corporate governance in other countries started 
to appear, with a new stage beginning in the mid-1990’s (Walker & Fox 2002) where 
it moved from the academic arena into the phase of institutional debate from which 
different measures were adopted by various governments (Alves & Mendes 2004). In 
the next section, the concept of corporate governance is traced from its inception, and 
its emergence as an area of international focus is outlined, with a brief contrast of the 
contexts of developed and developing countries.  
 
1.3 Corporate governance definition 
Recently, the concept of the corporate governance has become more commonly 
discussed from different viewpoints, such as those of academics, professional bodies 
and regulators. Due to increasing concerns about company fraud and misleading 
financial reports, the issue became more prevalent in both developed and less 
developed markets. There is a heated debate about the definition of corporate 
governance in the literature, but all definitions can be generally classified into two 
groups: narrow and broad definitions. 
Narrow definitions pay attention to satisfying the shareholders’ interests. Broad 
definitions are based on meeting the interests of the other stakeholders as well (i.e., 
customers, employees and suppliers) (Gillan 2006). For example, the corporate 
governance notion can be viewed from the shareholders’ viewpoint, which means the 
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shareholders’ motivation to maximise their wealth, or from the organisational 
viewpoint, focusing on controlling mechanisms to manage business operations. 
Therefore, the latter kind of definitions of corporate governance expand the narrow 
perspective of management for shareholder profit, and include regulations for the 
systemic control of corporations (Gillan & Starks 1998). 
Corporate governance embraces the association between different relevant 
parties in firms, such as the board of directors, the firm’s management, owners and 
other stakeholders (OECD 1999). The notion of corporate governance has its origins 
in a Greek word ‘kyberman’ which means to govern, steer or guide. This terminology 
passed from Greek to Latin as the word ‘gubernare’, and to the early French word 
‘governer’ (Abdullah & Valentine 2009; Abu-Tapanjeh 2009). The term, corporate 
governance, was used for the first time in 1962 by Richard Eells in his work ‘The 
Government of Corporations’ (Farrar 2005). According to Mees (2015, p. 195), “Eells 
was a manager of public policy research at General Electric and was particularly 
interested in the social role that corporations have as institutions in society – 
philanthropic, statesmanlike and what he called the ‘well-tempered corporation’ ”.  
Since 1962, the definitions and framing of corporate governance have 
mushroomed. One (narrow) definition of corporate governance, describes it as the way 
in which suppliers of finance to firms ensure that they will receive their investment 
return (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Another very pointedly definition, defines corporate 
governance as “a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves against expropriation by the insiders” (La Porta et al. 2000, p. 4). A further 
more generically phrased one, defines corporate governance as a result of the agency 
problems that originate from the separation of ownership and management in a 
corporation (Boubakri et al. 2005a). 
Broader definitions of corporate governance, refer to the construction of 
practices, rules, and incentives, to effectively align the interests of the agents (e.g., 
shareholders and managers) (Picou & Rubach 2006). Another view is framed in terms 
of the benefits and objective of corporate governance - that it increases the 
corporation’s economic efficiency and supports its growth, in addition to improving 
the confidence of investors, and providing a framework for setting goals that will serve 
the interests of shareholders (García‐Sánchez & García‐Meca 2018). Allen et al. 
(2018) interpreted corporate governance as the system whereby the managers are 
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evaluated. As well, there is a working definition: “the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled” (Cadbury 1992, p. 15).  
In a later work published in 1999, Sir Adrian Cadbury wrote to the World Bank, 
expressing the view that corporate governance seeks to create a balance between social 
and economic aims as well as between individual and collective objectives. Further, 
the governance structure, he claimed, exists to boost the efficient employ of resources 
and that the main goal of corporate governance is to align the interests of society, 
corporations and individuals. Hence, he reasoned, by adopting international 
governance rules, these rules will assist to achieve a corporation’s aims (World Bank 
1999).  
Likewise, corporate governance has been defined by Cadbury (1992) as the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled. Furthermore, the structure of 
corporate governance practices provides the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different related parties in corporations (e.g., the board of directors, 
shareholders, management and other stakeholders). Corporate governance also 
involves setting out the rules, laws, regulations and procedures, for decision-making 
and controlling decisions on firms’ affairs.  
From these earlier definitions, the following points can be noted. Firstly, the 
general definition of corporate governance is based on its organisational context. Put 
another way, this definition does not produce theoretical backgrounds that can build 
testable relationships or hypotheses. Secondly, the separation of ownership and 
management in modern corporations generates the need for a balance between social 
and economic aims as well as between individual and collective objectives. Thirdly, a 
broadly used theoretical framework to examine the association between corporate 
governance and firm performance is agency theory. This theory addresses the interests 
of the shareholders concerning a potential conflict between the management’s own 
interests and those of the shareholders (leading to an agency cost); the main aim of 
corporate governance according to this theory is value maximisation by mitigating a 
firm’s agency cost. Fourthly, this narrow definition of corporate governance highlights 
the interests of the shareholders. Thus, consistent with the aim of this thesis to examine 
the influence of corporate governance on firm efficiency and firm performance, both 
the agency theory and the narrow definition are more appropriate, since both present a 
direct linkage among corporate governance, firm’s agency cost and financial 
performance. Finally, it can be noted that corporate governance consists of the whole 
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set of mechanisms that help to encourage fair dealing amongst all the interested parties 
in a corporation, and encourage transparency, fairness and accountability. Therefore, 
the key goal of corporate governance is to control companies in order to ensure their 
higher performance, by aligning the interests of shareholders and different interested 
parties in the company.   
 
1.4 Why implement “good” practices of corporate governance? 
As mentioned earlier, there were many well-publicised corporation collapses in 
the late 1980’s and early1990’s. As a result, the improvement of corporate governance 
practices has appeared as an international issue. The OECD (1999) suggested that good 
corporate governance comprises the following; (i) a good structure of corporate 
governance aids to ensure that corporations employ their assets efficaciously, (ii) such 
a structure assists to ensure that boards are accountable to both corporations and their 
shareholders, (iii) it supports firms to act for the benefit of the whole society, (iv) it 
increases the trust of the domestic and foreign investors. Newell and Wilson (2002) 
suggested also that good governance includes transparent ownership, ownership 
neutrality, independent directors and independent audits and oversight. Cornelius 
(2005, p. 19) stated that good practices of corporate governance “are most valuable to 
investors where the disclosure and legal framework protecting shareholders is 
weakest”. Chen et al. (2009) reported institutional investors have tended to pay a 
premium of more than 20 per cent for shares, in corporations around the world with 
good governance practices, and this premium is higher in countries with poor legal 
protection for shareholders. 
Furthermore, as argued by Dayton (1984), good governance and the company 
management are indeed the two sides of the same coin. Good governance plays a vital 
role in enhancing a firm’s performance by loyally managing the corporation, and this 
eventually increases the firm’s value (Bosch 2002). Likewise, it is considered to be a 
main player in alleviating the potential for company fraud (Burton et al. 2004). As 
noted by Bourrel et al. (2018), good governance is a means to encourage sustainable 
development. Therefore, it can be said that good practice of corporate governance, 
may dynamically guarantee the shareholders’ interests by providing suitable 
mechanisms for the firm’s management.   
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1.5 The issues of corporate governance in developed markets 
Due to the fact that some senior directors abused their authority and power to 
increase their wealth, and conducted illicit accounting activities, the world witnessed 
many a corporation collapse in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As well, the late 
twentieth century saw more scandals appear with the collapse of corporations like 
Ansett Airlines in Australia, Cinar in Canada, Berliner Bank in Germany, Maxwell in 
the U.K., Penn Central Railroad, Enron and WorldCom in the U.S., Ferruzzi and 
Parmalat in Italy and Gazprom in Russia. These companies lost billions of dollars for 
owners and thousands of jobs around the world. Consequently, a heated debate grew 
on the topic of the corporate governance in developed countries, through which codes 
of governance as well as international models of corporate governance, developed, 
which is explained in Sections 2.8.3.1, 2.8.3.2 and 2.8.3.4 respectively. 
 
1.6 The issues of corporate governance in developing markets 
Generally speaking, the practice of corporate governance in developing 
economies is very weak (Nahuelhual et al. 2018; Borochin & Cu 2018; Nakpodia & 
Adegbite 2018; Nakpodia et al. 2018; Ciftci et al. 2019). The aforementioned studies 
summarise the salient features of the nature of corporate governance in developing 
markets, including unequal law enforcement, pyramidal business groups, high 
ownership concentration, dual class shares and a generally very weak institutional 
setting. Unfortunately, these factors provoked a further financial crisis, that of the East 
Asian financial market, on 2 July 1997 (Radelet et al. 1998). 
IMF noted that there were questionable practices in East Asian economies. The 
primary reason was that East Asian markets had laid themselves open to financial 
disruption because their financial arrangements were influenced by insider dealing, 
rampant corruption and weak corporate governance practices, which, in turn, led to the 
instability of the banking sector (Radelet et al. 1998). Stock and currencies markets 
stumbled, which in turn, prompted the central banks to defend their currencies by 
raising interest rates or buying forward, or both (Jackson 1999). The most important 
outcome of this crisis, was the shaken confidence of the foreign and domestic 
investors. Table 2 presents the influence of exchange rates for U.S. dollars with the 
relevant currencies during this period.  
The crisis occurred when the Thai government declared a “managed float” of the 
Baht, and called on the IMF for “technical assistance”. That day, the Baht fell around 
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20 per cent against the $US (Richardson 1998, p.1). During the first week of the crisis, 
the Malaysian and Philippines governments massively intervened to support their 
currencies. After a month, a currency meltdown occurred (Richardson 1998). 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, were the countries hardest hit. As well, this crisis 
affected other Asian economies, such as Singapore and Taiwan.  
Table 2: The influence of the crisis on exchange rates 
Country Currency June 1997 July 1998 
Thailand baht 24.5 41 
Indonesia rupiah 2,380 14,150 
Philippines peso 26.3 42 
Malaysia ringgit 2.5 4.1 
Korea won 850 1,290 
Source: Jackson (1999, p.2) 
In fact, concern for corporate governance implementation was triggered in 
developing countries after the scandal of the East Asian financial markets in 1997, 
involving the promotion of measures for transparency and accountability of the 
financial systems, and adopting some specific mechanisms, especially those pertaining 
to the Anglo-American model (Lemmon & Lins 2003; Machold & Vasudevan 2004; 
Uddin & Choudhury 2008; Shen et al. 2018; Yoshikawa 2018; Yu & Wang 2018). 
Bai et al. (2004) pointed out that the weakness of corporate governance led to 
further crises, such as minority shareholders’ expropriation of funds in Chinese 
corporations and the Satyam scandal (one of the most significant fraud cases in India). 
These financial collapses cost shareholders billions of dollars, governments’ large 
amounts of tax revenues, and employees their jobs. Hence, as argued by Oehmichen 
(2018), there is the necessity for effective control mechanisms, most especially in 
Asian emerging economies. Throughout the East Asian financial crisis, companies in 
some countries (e.g., the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) which 
presented a more favourable ownership structure and greater transparency, have 
produced higher protection for their minority shareholders (Mitton 2002), further 
arguing that weak corporate governance was one of the main causes of the crisis.  
Johnson et al. (2000) indicated that due to poor corporate governance in affected 
countries, worse economic forecasts resulted in more expropriation by managers, 
which, in turn, led to a substantial fall in asset prices. Oehmichen (2018) recognised 
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that a number of corporate governance issues caused the financial crises in Asian 
emerging markets: weak formal institutions, ownership concentration and board 
characteristics (i.e. CEO duality and limited board independence). Claessens et al. 
(2000) claimed that the performance of East Asian firms began to tumble before the 
Asian financial crisis, the main reason being firms’ high debt to equity ratios, and 
consequent dependence on external financing.  
 
1.7 Motivation for this study 
As mentioned earlier, governance research expanded during the 1970’s and 
1980’s. Governance scholars have made outstanding contributions to this research 
body and have especially confirmed how governance plays a vital role in 
institutionalising notions of the creation of shareholder value, however, the vast 
majority of this research has mainly focused on the governance practices of the Anglo-
American model across developed economies (Modell & Yang 2018). This model is 
generally found in the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand and is also 
termed by Denis and McConnell (2003) “international corporate governance”. The 
salient features of the Anglo-American model are the separation of ownership and 
control, dispersed ownership, protection of minority shareholders, an equity market 
having a central role (Oxelheim 2018), greater control rights offered to firms’ 
shareholders (Feils et al. 2018), and a regulatory and legal environment (Prowse 1990). 
This thesis’s overarching question is: to what extent is the international practice 
of corporate governance that primarily developed in developed markets relevant to 
developing markets, such as Jordan? The motivation for this thesis stems from the fact 
that the general features of the corporate sector in developing economies are different 
from those in developed economies. For example, in Jordan, there exists a unique 
setting of the agency relationship, one that features concentrated ownership and 
institutional differences in corporate governance practices in Jordan. The country’s 
economy is characterised by CEO duality, and high insider representation in 
boardrooms and family-controlled companies. Furthermore, the Jordanian market is 
still developing, so its financial market is trying to increase efficiency by activating 
the principles of equality and transparency (Abed et al. 2012). Jordan needs economic 
and financial reforms and a series of legislative actions (Abed et al. 2012).  
Jordan suffers from a lack of empirical evidence regarding corporate governance 
issues. To this end, further research is required to develop the Jordanian corporate 
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sector by establishing the concept of good corporate governance, evaluating the 
corporate governance practices in place, and ultimately, help to develop the Jordanian 
economy as a whole. In addition, this thesis attempts to investigate whether the 
practices of the corporate governance which are internationally acknowledged as good, 
are significant in enhancing Jordanian companies’ efficiency and profitability. Hence, 
the current thesis seeks to bridge an existing gap in the governance literature by 
exploring the factors affecting improved firm performance and reduced firm agency 
cost. All of these points are considered the main motivations for conducting this thesis.  
 
1.8 Statement of the problem 
Before the corporate governance concept became prevalent in Jordan, there was 
a serious financial scandal, the Petra Bank bankruptcy. Following this scandal, in 1989, 
the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar fell from USD 3.35 to USD 1.41 (Shbeilat & 
Abdel-Qader 2018). Further, Jordan witnessed financial collapses in the corporate 
sector (e.g., the Magnesia Company and the Phosphate Company) after the loss of 
millions of Jordanian dinars. In addition, malpractices conducted by the banking sector 
were revealed, such as providing financial facilities (millions of Jordanian dinars) to 
individuals without the necessary approvals. Consequently, in the 1990’s, the 
establishment of various corporate governance reforms have been an increasingly 
significant agenda item in Jordan’s pursuit of sustainable and strengthened economic 
growth. For example, the establishment of three new institutions, the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and the Securities Depositary 
Centre (SDC), have contributed to the development of the regulatory environment 
(Jaafar & El-Shawa 2009). 
Yet overall, the corporate governance issue and means to implement it, are both 
relatively new in Jordan. In 2005, the JSC issued the first Jordanian corporate 
governance code for firms listed on the ASE. However, the adoption of the code is not 
mandatory. Further, Jordan announced a new corporate governance code based on a 
“comply or explain” approach. In order to improve corporate governance practices in 
the Jordan environment, the JSC issued circular No. 12/1/4659 concerning a corporate 
governance code for listed firms on the ASE, which came into effect on 1 January 
2009. However, the Companies Control Department (CCD) in Jordan has pointed out 
that during the period from 2000 to 2011 there were 44 bankruptcy cases in Jordanian 
firms, including 26 cases in the industrial sector. Therefore, the governance practices 
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in Jordan are neither adequate nor comprehensive. The weakness of the institutional 
and regulatory environment plays a role in motivating firm managers to involve 
themselves in malpractice. It can be concluded that the operation of good corporate 
governance practices is an important factor to the financial health of Jordanian 
companies.  
Another dilemma in the Jordanian corporate sector is corruption, which is a key 
obstacle for companies operating or planning to invest in Jordan. Corruption is 
considered to refer to “any situation in which a public position is being misused for 
private gain” (OECD 2016, p. 12). For example, a middleman system (wasta) is very 
popular everywhere in the country, and indeed the region, and is considered a 
necessary component of doing business. In 2018, Jordan witnessed its largest 
corruption case, which involved the illegal production and smuggling of fake brand 
cigarettes worth millions of Jordanian dinars.  
 
1.9 The research questions  
Besides providing ultramodern insights into Jordanian corporate governance, 
this thesis empirically investigates whether the different corporate governance 
mechanisms (board independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality and other 
mechanisms) influence firm performance and firm’s agency cost, the latter of which 
can also be considered firm efficiency. The activity of the board of directors is one of 
the most important of corporate governance mechanisms (Fama & Jensen 1983b; 
Baysinger & Butler 1985; Yermack 1996; Dalton et al. 1998; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; 
Arzubiaga et al. 2018). Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest three roles for the board: 
control, service and strategy. Board members are delegates of the shareholders, and 
their responsibility is to ensure that managers are acting in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Kuo & Hung 2012). Therefore, a company board is responsible for 
controlling the firm’s top management to mitigate the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. If these interests are completely aligned, this will alleviate 
the company’s agency costs and lead to better firm performance. As well, a board of 
directors may act as a link between the firm and its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978).  
Due to recent reforms and developments in the Jordanian market, the number of 
listed firms on the ASE has increased. The official bodies in Jordan, such as the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC), seek to 
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promote the effectiveness of Jordanian company’s boardrooms. Drawing on the 
Jordanian institutional setting (described in Chapter 2) and the relevant theoretical 
background (described in Section 1.12), the following key researches’ questions are 
formulated in this thesis:  
(1a) Does board independence in the form of the representation of ‘outside 
independent directors’, influence firm performance? 
(1b) Does board independence in the form of the representation of ‘outside 
independent directors’, influence firm agency cost/ firm efficiency? 
(2a) Does board gender diversity in the form of the representation of women 
on the board of directors, influence firm performance? 
(2b) Does board gender diversity in the form of the representation of women 
on the board of directors, influence firm agency cost/ firm efficiency? 
(3a) Does the presence of CEO duality impact firm performance? 
(3b) Does the presence of CEO duality impact firm agency cost efficiency? 
 
1.10 The thesis’s objectives  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the existing mechanisms of 
corporate governance impact firm performance and firm efficiency/firm agency cost 
in Jordan. Likewise, this thesis seeks to inform policy guidelines for reforms in order 
to boost the Jordanian governance environment. The specific aims of this thesis are:  
1. To provide an ultramodern understanding of corporate governance in Jordan. 
To this end, this thesis describes the corporate governance in Jordan, 
shedding light on the different internal factors (e.g., legal institutions, 
historical background, cultural aspects and economic environment) that may 
play an important role in shaping Jordanian corporate governance.  
2. To reveal knowledge of some weaknesses in the relevant institutions and 
identify the main challenges and issues of corporate governance at the 
company level.  
3. To identify an appropriate model to explain the issues of corporate 
governance in Jordan.  
4. To provide complementary evidence about whether the mechanisms of 
corporate governance (such as board independence, board gender diversity 
and CEO duality) and other variables, influence firm financial performance 
and firm agency cost in Jordan.  
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5. To help the regulatory institutions in improving and/or framing the Jordanian 
corporate governance practices.  
 
1.11 Thesis significance  
Some relevant studies have been conducted in the context of Jordan (e.g., Bolbol 
et al. 2003; Al-Shiab & Abu-Tapanjeh 2005; Boubakri et al. 2005b; Abu-Tapanjeh 
2006; Al-Khouri 2006; Zeitun & Tian 2007; Abu-Tapanjeh 2009; Jaafar & El-Shawa 
2009; Zeitun 2009; Abu-Serdaneh et al. 2010; Al-Najjar 2010; Tomar & Bino 2012; 
Al-Smadi et al. 2013; Hamdan et al. 2013; Taani 2013; Al-Amarneh & Yaseen 2014; 
Al-Beshtawi et al. 2014; Al-Najjar 2014; Al-Ramahi et al. 2014; Al Sawalqa 2014; 
Alhazaimeh et al. 2014; Makhlouf et al. 2014; Zedan & Abu Nassar 2014; Zeitun & 
Tian 2014; Abbadi et al. 2016; Al-Daoud et al. 2016; Alabdullah 2016; Alsoboa 2016; 
Alzoubi 2016; Ibrahim & Hanefah 2016; Al-Rahahleh 2017; Alkurdi et al. 2017; 
Almustafa 2017; Haddad et al. 2017; Makhlouf et al. 2017; Nawaz 2017; Abu Zraiq 
& Fadzil 2018; Alabdullah 2018; Alqatamin 2018; Bataineh et al. 2018; Ghosh 2018; 
Jarbou et al. 2018; Mohammad et al. 2018). These studies have addressed various 
aspects of corporate governance (e.g., the board practices, ownership structure, capital 
structure, audit committee and compensation of board and executive members), and 
its effect on firm performance, earnings management, firm dividend policy, disclosure 
and corporate social responsibility. It is noted that all of these studies have used 
accounting and marketing measures: the return on assets, return on equity, return on 
sales, return on capital, Tobin’s Q, earnings per share, return on investment, dividend 
to asset ratio, dividend per share to earnings per share, stock price return, market value 
of equity to the book value of equity, dividends yield and profit margin.  
However, it is argued that accounting and market measures are relatively noisy 
(Dalton & Dalton 2011; Pham et al. 2011). It is confirmed that profits determined by 
accounting can be manipulated. Accounting profit is prepared within the management 
team’s guidelines, and therefore managers are more likely to employ specific 
accounting methods to promote performance (Barth et al. 2005). Market measures, in 
contrast, should reflect the real value of the corporation (Lindenberg & Ross 1981). 
However, as noted by Bacidore et al. (1997, p. 11), market-based measures “may not 
be an efficient contracting parameter because they are driven by many factors beyond 
the control of the firm’s executives”. As well, in markets with poor protection of 
minority shareholders, such as Jordan’s, these measures are more likely to be 
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inconsistent depending on the concentration of the firm’s ownership. According to 
Claessens and Djankov, such market-based indicators “lead to a downward bias in the 
relationship between concentrated ownership and firms’ valuation” (1999, p. 502). 
Thus, such measures may not be effective in developing economies.   
The current studies constructs two measures (i.e., asset utilisation ratio and 
expense ratio) as reliable proxies for firm efficiency/firm’s agency cost, in addition to 
one accounting and one market measure, namely ROA and Tobin’s Q, respectively, as 
proxies for firm performance. Therefore, the present studies have some significant 
differences from prior studies of corporate governance practices in the context of 
Jordan.  
This thesis provides more comprehensive insight, and empirically investigates if 
corporate governance mechanisms affect firm efficiency and firm performance in the 
unique setting of the agency relationship prevalent in Jordan. The thesis’s proposed 
policy guidelines may assist in instigating structural changes in the Jordanian firms 
sector. Thus, this approach may guarantee efficiency and enhance transparency and 
accountability as well as preventing the problems that have been suffered in other 
countries. Likewise, these studies contribute to the ongoing governance literature in 
developing countries, and also contribute to alleviating the scarcity of studies on 
corporate governance in developing economies like Jordan.    
 
1.11.1 Corporate governance practices in developing countries   
Financial crises such as the East Asian one, induced widespread concern over 
the issues   of corporate governance in developing markets. To date, studies addressing 
this topic are relatively few (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Gibson 2003; Tsamenyi et 
al. 2007), compared to those focusing on developed countries, (e.g., the U.S, Germany, 
Japan and the U.K.), although some concerning Jordan have been listed above in the 
section preceding this one. Developing countries have unique features, such as low 
investor protection, underdeveloped equity markets and weak bankruptcy regulations 
(Sarkar & Sarkar 2000). In these contexts, more attention to corporate governance 
research, such as this study, is warranted as the findings from developed countries 
(while mixed) do not pertain to a context with the same features as those in emerging 
economies. 
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1.11.2 Diversity of results in the previous studies  
As indicated, most of the prior studies on the relationship among corporate 
governance practices, firm efficiency/agency cost and firm performance, are mixed 
and non-conclusive. Several studies provide evidence for the view that mechanisms of 
corporate governance lead to enhanced firm performance and ameliorate firm agency 
cost, while others suggest that there is no such association. The main reasons behind 
the diversity of outcomes can be explained by differences in the theoretical views used, 
methodologies of research, and performance measures (Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2001).  
Further, as argued by Denis (2001) and Vafaei et al. (2015), the issue of 
endogeneity can cause this diversity, however, few works on corporate governance 
have addressed the endogeneity issue (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003). It is confirmed 
that the expected association between endogenous variables and error terms may lead 
to inconsistent and biased estimates (Elsayed 2007). Hence, prior research could not 
provide decisive findings on the associations among corporate governance, firm 
efficiency and firm performance. Hence, the current studies attempt to provide new 
empirical evidence for explaining the issues of corporate governance at the company 
level. Furthermore, these studies may reconcile some of the diverse outcomes of 
previous studies conducted in similar contexts.  
 
1.12 Theoretical framework 
A theory has been defined as “the coherent set of hypothetical, conceptual, and 
pragmatic principles forming the general frame of reference for a field of inquiry” 
(Hendriksen 1982, p. 1). Researchers such as Coase (1937), Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b), 
Eisenhardt (1989), Donaldson (1990), Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis et al. 
(1997), developed what have become the prevailing theories on corporate governance 
that illustrate the problems arising due to the separation of ownership and 
management. These are the agency theory, resource dependence theory, stewardship 
theory, stakeholder theory and transaction cost theory. These theories are explained 
below.  
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1.12.1 Agency theory  
As stated by Davis et al. (1997, p. 22) “at the heart of agency theory are 
assumptions of man that can be traced to 200 years of economic research”. The 
fundamental postulate of agency theory is that managerial behaviour (human) is 
opportunist and prompts self-interested actions. Davis et al. (1997, p. 27) claimed that 
in agency theory, the main focus is on extrinsic rewards: tangible, exchangeable 
commodities that have a measurable ‘market’ value.  
In modern corporations, there is a separation of ownership and control. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) pointed out that this situation leads to an association between 
owners (the principals) and managers (the agents), which is also termed the ‘agency 
relationship’. Such relationships lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers, in that the shareholders act in their own interest while the managers act in 
theirs. It is confirmed that the sacrifices to control such a conflict of interest will create 
agency costs, which is also known as ‘agency problems’. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
pointed out that agency costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs and the residual 
losses incurred. Monitoring costs are the costs incurred by owners for controlling the 
manager’s actions (e.g., for a financial audit). Bonding costs are the costs of setting up 
systems to make sure that managers act in the best interests of the shareholders. 
Residual losses, also known as indirect agency costs, occur because of the failure of 
bonding and/or monitoring costs.   
Due to the corporate governance problems differing among companies (Bebchuk 
& Weisbach 2010), agency problems can be categorised into two groups as noted by 
Lei et al. (2013). These are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, and 
agency conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, 
agency theory is recognised as one of the most important theories elucidating the issues 
of corporate governance.  
 
1.12.2 Resource dependence theory  
The primary premise of resource dependence theory is the need for corporations’ 
access to external resources like capital and expertise. According to this theory, 
corporate governance structures (e.g., the board of directors) influence company 
access to essential resources for firm performance (Pfeffer 1973). Similarly, Carpenter 
and Westphal (2001) stated that boards act as strategic consultants to management, 
rather than exercising the role of independent control. Resource dependence theory 
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usually focuses on boards with a higher proportion of outside directors, due to the 
broader knowledge and expertise they can offer, as well as their improved networking 
with the external environment and the enhancement of the firm’s reputation, which 
they provide. These are all seen to add to firm performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003; 
Haniffa & Hudaib 2006). According to Pfeffer (1972), Pfeffer (1973) and Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), the board’s diversity and the  knowledge and expertise of its outside 
directors are essential elements in managing firms, satisfying their need for any capital 
in the future and controlling environment contingencies. Pearce and Zahra (1992) 
confirmed that the diversity of boards assists the corporation’s survival by varying the 
firm’s resources and its environment.  
Emerging markets are underdeveloped, volatility exists in their economic 
position, and capital costs are high, due to the low availability of capital (Hitt et al. 
2000). To overcome these problems, developing economies should have links with the 
external environment. Thus, resource dependence theory considers that the operational 
environment of corporations is reflected in their board composition. Therefore, the 
appointing of directors on corporate boards should be according to directors’ ability to 
access the required resources, both capital and knowledge-based. 
 
1.12.3 Stewardship theory  
Stewardship theory is based on assumptions about psychological and 
sociological styles of supervision. Stewardship theory is designed around the premise 
that managers as stewards are motivated to act in the best interest of the shareholders 
(Donaldson & Davis 1991; Davis et al. 1997). According to Davis et al. (1997, p. 21), 
that “stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives 
of their principal”. Tricker (1994) recognised that the theory of stewardship is the 
theoretical framework for firms’ legislation and regulation. Stewardship theory holds 
that an insider-dominated company board is more effective and efficient. Such boards 
have more knowledge of the corporation’s operations, such as technical expertise and 
data (Muth & Donaldson 1998).  
Accordingly, CEO duality makes the leadership structure, particularly regarding 
decision making and strategy, more consistent and therefore may contribute to higher 
effectiveness (Donaldson & Davis 1991). Under stewardship, the separation of 
ownership and control is not viewed as problematic. Hence, there are no agency 
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conflicts between shareholders and managers. An optimistic perspective about 
managers is consistent with stewardship theory.  
 
1.12.4 Transaction cost theory 
The theory of transaction cost clarifies the same issues of managerial behaviour 
as agency theory but using different wording (Solomon 2007, 2010). Transaction cost 
theory is “an interdisciplinary alliance of law, economics and organization” 
(Williamson 1996, p. 25). This theory is derived from a philosophical position 
assuming as fact that “firms have become so large that they, in effect, substitute for 
the market in determining the allocation of resources” (Solomon 2010, p. 13). Further, 
transaction cost theory supports the idea that the managers (the agents) are 
opportunistic by nature (Williamson 1979; Solomon 2007, 2010). Opportunistic 
behaviour is described as self-interest seeking (Williamson 1979) with guile (Solomon 
2010). Therefore, both transaction cost theory and agency theory are similar, in terms 
of showing a rationale for managers to be controlled by owners.  
 
1.13 Studies’ methodology  
The current studies investigate whether the mechanisms of corporate governance 
(i.e., board practices such as board independence, board gender diversity and CEO 
duality) influence firm performance and firm efficiency in industrial and services firms 
listed on the ASE over the period 2006 to 2016. As it examines whether the 
independence of the board in the form of the representation of outside independent 
directors improves performance and alleviates agency cost, it relies on agency theory. 
Likewise, because this study examines whether board gender diversity in the form of 
representation of women on the board of directors influences firm performance and 
firm efficiency, it relies on resource dependence theory. As well, due to this study 
investigating the influence of CEO duality as a proxy for the effect of board leadership 
structure on firm performance and firm efficiency, also known as firm’s agency cost, 
it relies on agency theory. (These three aspects of the researches design are further 
described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively).   
This thesis investigates the influence of corporate governance on the firm 
performance and firm agency cost of Jordanian industrial and services firms. In 
particular, it takes a governance viewpoint to examine the effect of the board of 
directors (i.e., board independence, board gender diversity and CEO duality) on firm 
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performance and firm agency cost. The following section outlines the researchers’ 
philosophy and methodology adopted to test the thesis’s framed scope of investigation. 
 
1.13.1 Studies’ philosophy  
As argued by Burrell and Morgan (1979), the researchers should choose the 
appropriate paradigm for their studies. The key issue of any study in social sciences is 
its philosophical assumptions. Burrell and Morgan (1979) discussed four sociological 
paradigms. These are: interpretive, functionalist, radical structuralist and radical 
humanist (Figure 2 shows four paradigms). These scholars pointed out that these 
paradigms are founded upon mutually exclusive perspectives of the social world, and 
these are based on various assumptions about the nature of social science, applying a 
subjective-objective axis nature of the society of regulation-radical change, which 
yields a 2*2 matrix.  
The scientific view for the radical humanist paradigm is subjectivistic, while the 
social view for this paradigm focuses on radical change, conditions of domination and 
conflict (Alvesson 1987). A radical humanist believes that reality is socially generated 
and sustained (Ardalan 2000). In contrast, the paradigm of the radical structuralist 
believes that reality is objective (Ardalan 2000). The interpretive paradigm assumes 
that there are no global rules, e.g., of financial management and finance (Ardalan 
2000). A functionalist paradigm holds that society has a solid structure and follows a 
specific order.  
It classifies phenomena based on an ‘objective view’ that may provide a real 
explanatory power and a predictive knowledge of reality (Gioia & Pitre 1990; Dillard 
1991). Further, this paradigm articulates knowledge by using a group of philosophical 
assumptions, the associations between practice and theory and the empirical world. It 
investigates the regularities that bring out generalisations and global principles (Chua 
1986). Via functionalism, theories can be evaluated objectively through reference to 
empirical evidence and the deductive approach is employed in theory construction, 
working with a review of the previous literature and operating out of earlier theories 
about the structure of organisations. A hypothesis is determined by selecting a group 
of variables as likely explanations of some effect. As well, data is gathered with 
instruments and modes designated in keeping with the formulation of the hypothesis. 
The analysis procedure is quantitative. Thus, the hypotheses of a thesis are tested 
through statistical analysis (Gioia & Pitre 1990). Chua (1986) and Dillard (1991) 
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discussed the philosophical assumptions (presented in Table 3) underlying the 
functionalist paradigm, and the radical humanist paradigm regarding epistemology, 
ontology, methodology and human nature.  
It is essential to establish a proper research approach concerning the research 
issues (see e.g., Punch 1998). There are two types of approaches (i.e., the quantitative 
and qualitative methods) used around the world by researchers. Quantitative research 
is an approach for testing objective theories by investigating the associations among 
variables. These variables can be measured, commonly via instruments, so that 
numbered data can be analysed using a statistical analysis (Creswell 2014). Hence 
quantitative research contains three main components: design, measurement and 
statistics (O'Dwyer & Bernauer 2013). Further, the quantitative tradition is 
characterised by precision, objectivity, logical reasoning, empiricism, replication and 
verification, parsimonious explanation, generalisability, and conditional conclusions 
in the interpretation of results (O'Dwyer & Bernauer 2013). With a qualitative 
approach, researchers have assumptions about testing theories deductively, working 
against bias, controlling for alternative interpretations and being able to generalise and 
replicate the research’s results (Creswell 2014). Qualitative research is an approach 
for understanding and examining the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a human 
or social problem. This thesis includes procedures and questions emerging during (not 
simply before)  the investigation, data is usually gathered in the participant’s setting, 
the analysis inductively starts from particular to general themes and the researcher 
makes explanations of the meaning of the research data (Creswell 2014). 
Table 3: Philosophical assumptions 
Radical Humanist Philosophical 
assumptions 
Functionalist 
Nominalism 
Anti-positivism 
Voluntarism 
Ideographic 
Radical change 
Ontology 
Epistemology 
Human Nature 
Methodology 
Societal 
Realism 
Positivism 
Determinism 
Nomothetic 
Status quo 
Source: Dillard (1991, p. 11) 
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Figure 2: The paradigms in research as adopted by Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 29) 
 
Because of the nature of the data available for selection and the numerically 
derived variables of interest, the current researches use a quantitative approach. It 
investigates whether the mechanisms of corporate governance impact firm 
performance and firm efficiency/agency cost. It explores the actions of people as they 
affect firm performance and firm efficiency. Because of the commonalities in the 
theories, the functionalist paradigm is the basis of these studies’ theory. The studies’ 
hypotheses are formulated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, and the analysis processes are 
conducted on a quantitative approach.  
The studies’ data are available from the sources discussed in Section 1.13.7. In 
present studies, the methodology is drawn from prior research in the arena of 
accounting, especially corporate governance practices.   
 
1.13.2 Methodology and method of researches  
The term of methodology clearly has its origin from the Greek word ‘logos’ 
which means ‘the logic of’ (Gough 2002). The concept of methodology indicates the 
The sociology of radical change 
Subjective Subjective 
The sociology of regulation 
Radical 
humanist 
Radical 
structuralist 
Interpretive 
Functionalist 
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underlying logic of the research method (Jackson 1992) and refers to a set of methods 
and their basis as instruments and techniques for gaining knowledge (Dillard 1991). 
Likewise, it involves theory concept selection. Further, it explains the research 
approach choice (quantitative and/or qualitative).  
 
1.13.3 Studies’ hypotheses  
This thesis investigates if the tools of corporate governance influence the firm 
efficiency and the firm performance in the unique institutional setting of Jordan, which 
shares some characteristics typical to emerging economies. It particularly examines if 
specific features of the board of directors (i.e., board independence, board gender 
diversity and CEO duality) affect firm efficiency and firm performance (further details 
are present in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Appendix 2 shows a summary of the studies’ 
hypotheses. The researcher’s questions posed in this chapter are devised to test the 
studies’ hypotheses in conformity with the theory developed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
correlating the mechanisms of corporate governance practices, firm performance and 
firm efficiency/ firm’s agency cost.  
 
1.13.4 Studies’ period  
The current studies consider a sample of firms listed on the ASE, Jordan, over 
the period 2006-2016. Therefore, eleven (11) years of data from 2006-2016 are 
considered in the current studies. It is argued that a single year does not provide the 
whole picture from which to make judgements (Fosberg 1989).  
 
1.13.5 The sample construction  
The major types of data that are usually available for empirical analysis are time 
series, cross-section and panel data. In time series data, the values for one or more 
variables can be observed during a period of time. For  cross-section data, the values 
of one or more variables are gathered for several units and entities at the same points 
in time. With respect to panel data, one or more variables’ values are gathered for 
several units and entities at several points in time (Gujarati 2003). In other words, 
panel data combines the characteristics of time series data and cross-section data 
(Greene 1997), and can be seen as a more streamlined way for gaining time series data. 
Most earlier studies have used panel data (Greene 1997) as do these studies. Hence, 
the data for the current research is collected from companies in different industries for 
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various years, by using a sample of 80 listed firms at the ASE. As of 31st December 
2016, there were 224 listed firms on the ASE (details are further discussed in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5). 
 
1.13.6 The sample description   
As mentioned earlier, the sample of these studies covered 80 companies from 
different industries. The studies’ sample represents 35.71 per cent of the total of listed 
companies on the ASE at the end of the data collection period. Thus, the sample of 
studies can be considered as sufficient and representative of the studies’ population 
(More detalis are offered in chapters 3,4 and 5 respectively). 
 
1.13.7 The data source  
The data wrere collected from the following sources: 
1. Bloomberg database provided details for firms’ accounting information (such 
as assets, liabilities and operating expenses). Bloomberg database "is fairly 
comprehensive" (Sergi et al. 2018, p. 61). It is a financial services system that 
provides accurate financial information (current and historical information) 
that covers all markets in the world. Following prior studies (e.g., Pessarossi & 
Weill 2013; Jizi & Nehme 2017; Nehme & Jizi 2018), Bloomberg database is 
used to gather financial information in this thesis. 
2. Firm annual reports were the basis for obtaining the corporate governance 
information which was manually collected (such as  directors’ ownership, 
institutional ownership, block holding ownership, board size,  board 
independence, board gender diversity and CEO duality).  
 
1.13.8 Variables definitions  
This thesis examines the influence of corporate governance practices on firm 
performance and firm efficiency by considering Jordan as a case study. For empirical 
examination, a number of hypotheses have been developed. As well, a number of 
variables (i.e., board independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality, ownership 
structure (directors’ ownership, institutional ownership and block holders ownership), 
board size, firm age, leverage, firm growth, free cash flow, research development and 
expenditures and firm size, are discussed throughout the chapters 3, 4 and 5 
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respectively. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the definitions of variables, and the 
means used for their measurement.  
 
1.13.9 The analysis  
The analysis of these researches is conducted by using Ordinary Least Square 
regression (OLS) and Instrumerntal Vrables (IVs) and Hausman Test. (Further details 
are presented in chapter 3, 4 and firve respectively). Table 4 displays a summary of 
the hypotheses and their related analysis methods.  
 
1.14 Contribution of the thesis to the governance literature 
       Due to corporate scandals around the world, there has been extensive research 
and public policy about the issues of corporate governance. However, most studies 
have been conducted within the context of developed countries. In contrast, there is a 
paucity of research on corporate governance in developing markets, in particular 
Jordan. As mentioned in Section 1.11, all studies conducted in the context of Jordan, 
have used accounting and/or market measures, and none covered insights into the 
practice of corporate governance in Jordan.   
Table 4: Summary about hypotheses and related analysis 
Hypothese 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Analysis 
Further 
Analysis 
H 1a: There is a 
positive relationship 
between board 
independence and 
firm performance. 
Board 
Independence 
ROA and 
Tobin’s Q 
OLS 
*Endogenity 
* Hausman Test 
H 1b: A company 
board’s 
independence will 
mitigate corporate 
agency costs. 
Board 
Independence 
AUR and 
ER 
OLS 
*Endogenity 
* Hausman Test 
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H 2a: There is a 
positive relationship 
between board 
gender diversity and 
firm performance. 
Board 
Gender 
Diversity 
ROA and 
Tobin’s Q 
OLS 
*Endogenity 
* Hausman Test 
H 2b: A company 
board’s gender 
diversity will reduce 
corporate agency 
costs. 
Board 
Gender 
Diversity 
AUR and 
ER 
OLS 
*Endogenity 
* Hausman Test 
H 3a: CEO duality 
is negatively related 
with firm 
performance.  
CEO Duality  
ROA and 
Tobin’s Q 
OLS 
*Endogenity 
* Hausman Test 
H 3b: CEO duality is 
positively associated 
with firm agency 
cost. 
CEO Duality 
AUR and 
ER 
OLS 
*Endogenity 
* Hausman Test 
 
This thesis has sought to introduce an understanding of Jordanian corporate 
governance by using company level data. It empirically examined whether the various 
tools of governance affect firm efficiency/agency cost and firm performance. This 
work was conducted at a time when there has been growing attention among relevant 
parties, such as practitioners, the academic community and regulatory agencies, about 
the concept and practices of the corporate governance in developing countries.  
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the governance literature in 
different ways. Firstly, it contributes to alleviating the deficiency of governance 
literature in Jordan. Secondly, it also provides an insight into common governance 
practices in Jordan which is of benefit to researchers, local and international investors 
and managers considering the roles of corporate governance systems. Thirdly, it may 
provide new empirical evidence whether governance features used in developed 
countries influences firm efficiency and firm performance in emerging economies such 
as Jordan. Finally, the results of this thesis may benefit many other developing markets 
with similar cultural, economic and environmental conditions.  
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1.15 Thesis outline  
This thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides the background to 
this thesis, outlines the importance of corporate governance, its recent history and 
issues pertaining to governance in developed and developing markets. It shows the 
contributions to the academic debate and governance literature. It explains the 
motivation for this work, the studies questions, and the importance and objectives of 
this thesis. As well, it also outlines the thesis structure.  
Chapter 2 presents an overall insight into corporate governance practice in 
Jordan. It starts by providing an overview of Jordan and moves to the evolution of 
Jordanian corporate governance. In particular, this chapter covers the institutional 
settings influencing the practice of corporate governance in Jordan, including company 
law and the regulatory regime. It provides an overview of the capital market in Jordan. 
Likewise, this chapter reviews the recent reforms of corporate governance in Jordan, 
and challenges to governance in that country (e.g., board practices, ownership 
structure, management, and CEO and family ownership).  
This thesis consists of three interconnected papers that examine the overarching 
purpose of this thesis: the influence of corporate governance practice on firm 
performance and firm efficiency/firm agency cost. Figure 3 shows the thesis structure, 
about which there are two important features. Firstly, all the empirical papers are 
interconnected, meaning that the whole thesis shows one story where each paper 
addresses a distinctive objective. Secondly, the contents of all papers are composed of 
an introduction, literature review, theoretical background, research hypotheses, 
definition of variables, model estimation, empirical results, further analysis, 
conclusion, implications and limitations. Chapter 3 (paper 1), the first paper of this 
thesis, examines the influence of board independence on firm performance and firm 
efficiency in Jordan. This paper provides an overview about board independence in 
Jordanian company sector. Chapter 4 (paper 2) addresses board gender diversity in 
Jordan and its effect on firm performance and firm efficiency. The final paper (chapter 
5) investigates the effect of CEO duality on firm performance and firm efficiency in 
Jordan.  
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Figure 3: The structure of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter 6, the results are summarised. As well, the implications and suggested 
policy recommendations of all papers are presented. In addition, the limitations of all 
papers are acknowledged and the area of future studies is proposed.  
 
1.16 Summary and conclusion of the chapter 
This is the introductory chapter to this thesis. It started with a discussion of 
general corporate governance concepts, with relevant corporate governance terms 
defined. As well, the importance of good corporate governance practices around the 
world was demonstrated. Likewise, this chapter illustrated the history of the corporate 
governance revolution, and how and why the international governance debate has 
appeared, including in developing countries. This chapter also showed the motivation 
for this work and outlined the thesis structure.   
 
Thesis aim: 
The influence of corporate governance practice on firm performance and firm 
efficiency: Evidence from Jordan. 
Chapter one: Introduction 
Chapter two:Institutional settings in Jordan 
Chapter three (paper 1): 
Board Independence and Alternative Measures of Firm Performance: Evidence 
from Jordan 
Chapter four (paper 2): 
Board Gender Diversity, Firm Performance and Efficiency in Jordanian 
Boardrooms: A Revisiting of Resource Dependence Theory Predictions 
Chapter five (paper 3): 
Does the Presence of CEO Duality impact firm’s agency cost and firm 
performance? Evidence from Jordan 
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Chapter Two: The Institutional Settings in Jordan 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This thesis provides a comprehensive view of corporate governance in Jordan. 
It empirically investigates whether various mechanisms of corporate governance 
influence the firm’s performance and firm agency’s cost/or firm efficiency in Jordan. 
Chapter 2 describes governance development in Jordan, highlighting many of the 
different internal factors, in particular, those associated with the institutional settings 
affecting the corporate governance in this country. Numerous institutional weaknesses 
are exposed and the key challenges and issues evident at the company level are 
highlighted.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview of Jordan. 
Secondly, an outline of the Jordanian economy and its privatisation program are 
offered in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Thirdly, the investment environment in 
Jordan is discussed with a general picture of its industries and service sectors in 
Sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. Fourthly, Jordan’s accounting profession is 
described in Section 2.7. Fifthly, various steps taken to develop Jordanian corporate 
governance are presented in Section 2.8, which explains its corporate governance 
codes, shows the features of its corporate governance model and some details 
concerning the assessment of Jordanian corporate governance. Finally, in Section 2.9, 
a summary of institutional factors affecting the corporate governance practice in 
Jordan is given. 
 
2.2 An overview of Jordan 
Jordan is a developing country whose inhabitants consider themselves to be 
located in western Asia although Europeans tend to think of it as situated in the Middle 
East. Jordan is located between 29° and 34° north in latitude, and 35° and 39° east in 
longitude. Its total area comprises 89,342 sq. km. Agriculture takes up about 11 percent 
of the total land area. Generally, Jordan consists of a desert plateau. It is bordered by 
Saudi Arabia to the south, Iraq to the east, Syria to the north and Palestine to the west 
(Albezuirat et al. 2018).  
According to the Jordanian Department of Statistics, at the end of 2017, its 
population stood at around 10,053,000, ranking Jordan 92nd in the world in terms of 
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population (Department of Statistics 2018). Nearly 4,226,700 of these people live in 
the capital, Amman, and surrounding cities. Arabic is the official language of the Arab 
world, including Jordan, however, English is its second language and is used widely 
in the media, education, and health sectors, the business environment and in trade 
(Salameen et al. 2015). The religion of Jordan is Islam, with 97 % being Muslim, and 
the remaining 3% Christian and other religions. All tertiary education is delivered in 
English, for which its secondary school system has prepared the foundation, and this 
is an indication of Jordan’s commitment to an international outlook. 
The Ottoman Empire governed Jordan for more than six centuries until the end 
of the First World War. The Emirate of Transjordan was established in April 1921 
under a British mandate, which lasted until 1946. Jordan appeared as an independent 
country on the 25th May 1946, after the end of the Second World War, after which its 
official name became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1952, its governing 
institutions were established through the Jordanian constitution.  
Executive power is vested principally in the hands of the King, Prime Minister 
and the Council of Ministers. Jordan is split into 12 governorates, each with a royally 
appointed administrative governor and ruled by a royal parliamentary system. The 
Jordanian legal environment belongs to family of the civil law. The Jordanian legal 
system developed from law codes that were laid down by the Ottoman Empire (and 
operate similarly to French law). The Jordanian policy environment consists of a 
bicameral legislature consisting of the Senate and House of Representatives. The 
Jordanian Senate comprises 65 members, all royally appointed. Membership of the 
House of Representatives involves conducting elections for its 130 members (Ryan 
2010).  
 
2.3 Jordanian economy- a brief sketch 
Jordan’s economy is classified as the smallest in the Middle East, with 
inadequate supplies of oil, water and other natural resources, apart from phosphate and 
potash. Hence, the Jordanian government relies heavily on external assistance (Al-
Qadi & Lozi 2017). In addition, the economy faces other challenges, such as high rates 
of poverty, a budget deficit, high rates of unemployment and a high rate of government 
debt. Overall, labour force participation decreased from 39.2% in Q3-2017, to 38.1% 
in Q4-2017. Likewise, the rate of unemployment was 18.4% in Q1-2018, compared to 
18.2% in Q1-2017 (World Bank 2018). On the other hand, Jordan’s debt increased to 
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US$38.5 billion at the end of 2017, which stood at a remarkable 95.9 per cent of its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – an increase of 0.8 per cent of the GDP, compared 
with 2016.  
A further significant challenge facing Jordan is to stimulate the local economic 
environment in the context of an unstable external environment. For example, the crisis 
in Iraq and Syria is the most important recent shock affecting the Jordanian economy. 
This led to a low rate of tourism and investment inflows, disrupted trade routes and 
increased the number of refugees. In addition, continued regional instability and 
reduced foreign assistance, will put Jordan under even more pressure (World Bank 
2018). The growth of the Jordanian economy remains low, with its gross GDP 
expected to increase by 2.4% by the end of 2018, and 2.5% in 2019, compared with 
2.1% in 2017 (World Bank 2018).  
In 2011, Jordan was influenced by what is known as the “Arab Spring”, with low 
level demonstrations requesting the government introduce economic and political 
reforms. The government’s response was to undertake some gradual reforms, with the 
parliament’s approval of some constitutional changes, in an attempt to promote the 
independence and integrity of the judiciary, and improve public accountability. In 
practical terms, Jordan works to reform accountability, transparency, private sector 
development and public finance management. As well, the Jordanian government 
emphasises public debt management and its budget, as well as efficiency in its public 
sector spending. 
Over the past decade, Jordan has entered into structural reforms in various 
sectors (e.g., education, industries and health). The Jordanian government has inserted 
systems of social protection and has reformed its subsidies, such as through the 
liberalisation of trade, investment plans, the elimination of trade obstacles, the 
promotion of private sector investment, the privatisation of previously-held 
governmental projects across most economic sectors (such as telecommunications, 
transport, electricity, tourism and electricity), the application of stronger copyright and 
trademark laws and the reduction of import tariffs (Jordan Investment Commission 
2018). In 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended arrangement under the 
Extended Fund Facility, to support the Jordanian economy and its program of financial 
reform. This program’s purpose is fiscal consolidation to reduce public debt, and 
structural reforms to promote the conditions for more inclusive growth (Al-Qadi & 
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Lozi 2017). These reforms create the appropriate conditions for both the public and 
private sector to act as partners for reforms in infrastructure and taxation. 
In brief, the private sector has become an essential engine of growth during the 
past decade, however these economic reforms have not always been matched by 
corporate governance reforms (International labour Organisation 2013). 
 
2.4 Privatisation in Jordan 
After the First Gulf War, Jordan became unable to pay its obligations. The 
Jordanian government therefore reached an agreement with the IMF to follow up its 
program of economic reform, and signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1994 (Al-
Akra & Ali 2012). In 1998, Jordan signed an agreement with the U.S. and Israel, to 
establish the Qualifying Industrial Zones. Jordan then joined the World Trade 
Organisation in 2000. This was followed by an improvement in relations between 
Jordan, the U.S. and other oil producing countries.  
At that time the Jordanian government had discussions with the IMF to adopt 
many of the economic reforms that would lead to a more open (market-oriented) 
economy (Al‐Htaybat 2018). Among these reforms were privatisation, one of the 
means used to activate the role of capital markets in allocating resources (Al‐Akra et 
al. 2010a). It can be defined as “the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) or assets to private economic agents” (Megginson & Netter 2001, 
p. 321). To promote the investment environment and economic growth, more than 100 
countries around the world have adopted a privatisation program (Al-Akra & Ali 
2012).  
In Jordan, the public sector companies were highly inefficient, and riddled with 
debt and corruption. In contrast, private sector companies were efficient, better 
performing and produced higher revenues, creating job opportunities (Al-Smadi et al. 
2013). Privatisation began in 1996 and ran to 2004, with the help of some international 
bodies such as USAID and the World Bank (Al-Akra & Ali 2012), and was far 
reaching in its scope. Before this, the government’s stake in these public shareholding 
firms was 15%, and involved 50 major corporations such as the National Airlines, 
Jordan Telecommunication, Jordan Cement Factories and the Royal Jordanian, which 
eventually led to an overall government share of only 6% (Al-Akra et al. 2009; Al‐
Akra et al. 2010a). The proceeds of privatisation amounted to approximately US$1,271 
million.  
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To guarantee a successful privatisation program, Megginson and Netter (2001) 
argue that it should include the process of ownership transfer to new owners. Hence, 
the legal protection of owners becomes vital to the program’s success. To this end, 
Jordan improved its practices of corporate governance (e.g., improved and developed 
Jordanian code of corporate governance practices), and updated its firms’ disclosure 
rules through the enactment of the Company Law of 1997, and the Securities Law of 
2002. These laws laid down the public framework of Jordanian corporate governance 
and required all Jordanian companies to adopt the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs) and the International Accounting Standards (IASs) - further details 
are presented in Table 10.  
 
2.5 Development of the investment environment in Jordan 
Since 2000, the Jordanian government has implemented many economic reforms 
in various sectors, all aimed at attracting external investment and integrating into 
regional and international markets. These efforts include the establishment of 
specialised government agencies to encourage investment and support export growth 
as well as the development of the economic zone. To this end, the Jordan Investment 
Commission (JIC) was established in 2014. The JIC is the successor of three previous 
former bodies (i.e., the Development and Free Zones Commission, the Export 
Promotion Department of the Jordan Enterprise and Development Corporation and the 
Jordan Investment Board). 
 According to Article 21 of the Investment Law (No. 30 of 2014), the JIC is the 
key agency for the implementation of government investment development policies 
and activities (Jordanian e-Government 2018). Its main vision is to stand out in 
encouraging investments, and contributing to the country’s economic growth. 
Therefore, the JIC’s key objectives are increasing the effectiveness of the Jordanian 
investment environment, promoting financial and solvency sustainability and 
enhancing institutional efficiency (Jordan Investment Commission 2018).  
The Investment Law (No. 30 of 2014) empowered it to be the only official 
agency in Jordan that is responsible for attracting foreign investments, promoting 
exports and providing a stable investment environment. This law gives it the required 
privileges to obtain and accelerate the centralisation of all relevant investment 
procedures, including the establishment, development and organisation of special 
economic zones. Such free zones help the transit of goods, encourage economic 
34 
 
activity and play a vital role in contributing to boosting Jordan’s position as a centre 
for trade.  
The law also provides a framework of benefits and incentives for investors as 
well as offering investment projects, both internal and external, to the existing special 
economic zones (also known as free zones). In addition, the law allows for an 
investment window that acts within the JIC, with authorised representatives who have 
the power to issue licences within a specified time. According to this law, other 
privileges are available as well, such as no constraints on foreign ownership except for 
some economic actions where a Jordanian partner is required, and no restrictions on 
capital transfers. Furthermore, for the aim of applying the provisions of this Law, both 
the non-Jordanian and Jordanian investor are offered the same treatment.  
In practice, the law also provides perfect opportunities for investors. For 
example, foreign investment in the free zones has a number of concessions. Firstly, 
exemptions exist from income tax on the earnings made from certain economic 
activities. Secondly, land and building tax exemptions operate, as well as exemptions 
from service charges for improvements, planning and street paving. Thirdly, 0% sales 
tax is in place on goods and services consumed by the registered organisation in the 
zone, for goods purchased to achieve business goals. Fourthly, there is income tax 
exemption for remuneration of foreign workers. Finally, customs duties are exempt 
(Jordan Investment Commission 2018).  
To access international markets, Jordan has signed numerous Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs): 55 bilateral investment treaties, 27 agreements about double 
taxation and seven agreements on free trade allowing access to regional and 
international markets. As well as belonging to the World Trade Organisation, Jordan 
is a member of the Agadir Agreement, the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, the 
Barcelona Declaration, and a party to the EU Association Agreement. It has also joined 
FTAs with the U.S.A. and the European Free Trade Association States (Norway, 
Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein), Canada and Singapore. This has led to open 
markets in 17 Arab countries, the European Union and Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, 
and Liechtenstein. According to the ASE (2018), the rate of non-Jordanian investments 
in listed firms on the ASE, was 48.1% by the end of 2017 (Figure 4).  
In a nutshell, the appropriate economic policies and the immediate 
implementation of fundamental reforms, will be necessary to overcome the country’s 
sensitivity to internal and external upsets and help revitalise the economy. Ultimately, 
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creating conditions for increased private investment by improving the investment 
environment and enhanced competitiveness will remain indispensable for Jordan, in 
order to foster new job opportunities. 
Figure 4: Non-Jordanian investments in listed firms on the ASE 
 
Source: ASE (2018) 
 
2.6 Industrial and service sectors in Jordan  
The Jordanian industrial sector comprises manufacturing, extractive industries, 
electricity and water sectors. Due to its multiple contributions to the achievement of 
economic development, this sector is considered to be one of the principal pillars of 
the Jordanian economy. The companies operating in the industrial sector have been 
divided into ten sub-sectors. These are therapeutic industries and medical supplies, 
construction, plastic and rubber, extraction industries, engineering, electrical and 
information technology industries, packaging, paper, cardboard, printing and office 
supplies, garments and leather, rations, food, agriculture and livestock, chemicals and 
cosmetics, wood and furniture  and crafts. 
 There are roughly 18,000 organisations widely dispersed throughout the 
Kingdom’s governorates. The industrial sector contributed about 24% of the GDP in 
2017 (Jordan Chamber of Industry 2018). Due to its relations with many sectors, such 
as insurance, transport and others, it can be concluded that the industrial sector plays 
a vital role in which it directly or indirectly contributes about 40% of GDP (more 
details are offered in Table 5). Furthermore, it also maintains the stability of the 
Jordanian dinar exchange rate, through supporting Jordan’s official reserves of foreign 
currency to the tune of more than US$8 billion a year. In addition, it supports the 
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Kingdom’s financial stability by providing the treasury with more than 1 billion 
Jordanian dinars a year in direct or indirect taxes, where dinar invested in this sector 
provides the treasury with more than eight taxes pennies.  
Table 5: The indicators of the industrial sector 
Indicators Ratio % 
Direct contribution to GDP 24% 
Indirect contribution to GDP 40% 
Number of employees 240000 
Contribution to the national workforce 15% 
Number of industrial organisations 18000 
Industrial exports (US$ billion) 3.6 
Contribution to the national exports 91% 
Source: Jordan Investment Commission (2018) 
In developed economies, the service sector is the fastest growing worldwide, and 
is now ranked first in terms of the global GDP, contributing more than 50%. Especially 
service innovation which represents the principal way to create revenues (Al-Badarneh 
et al. 2018). The service sector contributes 66.5% to Jordan’s GDP compared to the 
industrial and agricultural sectors, which provide only 24% and 3.7%, respectively 
(Al-Badarneh et al. 2018). Moreover, the service sector is the largest contributor to the 
labour market, employing about 80% of workers. In Jordan, the service sector consists 
of commercial, educational, health, media s, technology s, transportation, utilities and 
energy services. Tables 6 and 7 show some indicators of tourism and information, and 
communications technology sectors, respectively. 
Table 6: Some indicators of the tourism sector 
Indicators Ratio % 
Tourism contribution to GDP 12.2 % 
Tourism income (JOD million) 2476.6 
Number of employees 50060 
Source: Jordan Investment Commission (2018) 
Despite the various economic and social contributions provided by the industrial 
and service sectors, there are many challenges, internally and externally, which hinder 
their performance and diminish their competitiveness. These can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Once the Jordanian economy began to recover from the consequences of the 
financial crisis that hit the countries’ economies around the world, the “Arab 
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Spring” significantly influenced industrial exports due to the loss of some 
major export markets. 
2. Issues persist related to employment, particularly in light of poor education 
and vocational training centre outputs, and their limited relevance to the 
actual needs of the Jordanian labour market, especially in the industrial and 
service sectors. 
3. Increasing costs of energy and production have led to the raising of 
electricity charges which constitute inputs for production, which in some 
industrial sectors, reach about 60% of total production costs. Furthermore, 
the energy bills have risen because of the suspension of the oil supplies from 
Iraq, and gas from Egypt. 
4. There is a shortage of liquidity and difficulty in obtaining finance, especially 
for small and medium-sized enterprises which constitute more than 98% of 
business organisations. 
5. The Jordanian industrial and service sectors face high tax rates either as sales 
or income tax. 
6. Jordan experiences limited benefits from trade agreements, excessive 
government bureaucracy and high transport costs.  
Table 7: Some indicators of the information and communications technology sector 
Indicators Ratio % 
ICT contribution to GDP 12 % 
ICT revenues (US$ billion) 2.12 
ICT revenue growth 7.23% 
ICT exports (US$ million) 207.4 
Current investments (US$ million) 302 
Number of employees 17412 
Source: Jordan Investment Commission (2018) 
 
2.7 Accounting and auditing professions in Jordan  
Generally speaking, accounting is considered one of the most important 
professions that influence the economy as a whole, and has a foundation in the 
Jordanian legal system, which is a combination of Islamic legal principles and civil 
law, the latter having some historical associations with French civil law (Haddad et al. 
2017) . The accounting profession has been in existence for centuries in Jordan, 
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although not without its intricacies as Jordan and its surrounding countries have 
witnessed various accounting patterns as many countries over time have occupied the 
region (Al-Akra et al. 2009).  
Furthermore, the emergence of these countries as Islamic states has played a 
pivotal role in the development of their respective accounting systems. It is argued 
that, before the adoption of Arabic numerals, accounting and recording procedures 
started in order to meet religious needs, particularly, for the practice of ‘zakat’, a 
compulsory religious tax imposed on Muslims (Zaid 2004). Furthermore, as noted by 
Güvemli and Güvemli (2007), during the 8th century, an accounting method existed 
called the Merdiban Method. This was then adopted by the Abbasid Empire, the 
Ottoman Empire and the Ilhans State. The Merdiban Method was applied by the 
Ottoman Empire until 1879, and then became  modified to form double-entry 
bookkeeping, a method of worldwide importance even today (Güvemli & Güvemli 
2007).  
In Transjordan, commercial issues were managed by the Ottoman Commercial 
Code issued between 1849 and 1850, however, this code was replaced after 
independence. In 1964, Jordan enacted its first company law, which was applied to 
both the East and West Banks of Jordan. Following that, Jordan passed its first 
commercial law in 1966 (Sections 2.9.1.1, 2.9.1.2 and 2.9.1.3 show detailed accounts 
of these laws) (Al-Akra et al. 2009).  
 
2.7.1 The accounting profession in Jordan 
Since 1961 in Jordan, the accounting profession has been strictly controlled by 
the Accounting Professional Council when this was codified in law  (Al-Akra et al. 
2009). This law allowed accountants who have been practising for two years to be 
licensed. In 1985, this law was altered by establishing an Audit Bureau to manage 
entrance examinations and the practice of the accounting profession in Jordan (Solas 
1994).  
Accounting in Jordan is primarily affected by the educational level of its 
practising accountants who have studied in Jordanian universities, the U.S. and the UK 
(Nassar et al. 2013). As codified by Law No. 42 of 1987, Jordan established the 
Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) (Atmeh 2016), which 
became a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in 1992. 
However, JACPA has had no authority to set accounting or auditing standards, its main 
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role being JACPA. Up until 1997, there was no independent official or legal body 
paying attention to developing accounting and auditing standards in Jordan (Al-Akra 
et al. 2010a; Nassar et al. 2013), these professions having been regulated by the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade with a limited role for JACPA (Al-Akra et al. 2010a). 
Around the turn of the century, this situation was significantly changed by two 
innovations, with extensive consequences. In 1997 and 2002, Jordan issued the 
Company Law and the Securities Law, respectively, which require all Jordanian 
shareholdings to adopt the full versions of the international accounting regulations and 
standards known as the IASs and IFRSs (Table 8 offers the date of adoption of IASs 
and IFRSs in Jordan) (Al-Akra et al. 2010a; Al-Akra & Hutchinson 2013; Haddad et 
al. 2017). This was followed in 2003, by the enactment of a new law which aimed to 
promote the accounting and auditing professions, and ensure that IASs and IFRSs are 
implemented in the Jordanian environment.  
 
2.7.2 The auditing profession in Jordan  
In 2004, the Jordanian government established the High Council for Accounting 
and Auditing, which encouraged the role of JACPA, which by this stage had been 
attached to the Public Auditing Profession Board. In this way, JACPA obtained more 
powers and authorities (e.g., the responsibility to formulate by-laws) (Al-Akra et al. 
2009; Haddad et al. 2017), and grew in its status as an independent organisation. 
However, the Accounting Profession Law of 2003 places minimal emphasis on the 
independence of the auditor, and any relevant code of ethics, notwithstanding the fact 
that auditing practices in Jordan are taken for granted as being in line with the 
international auditing standards and the code of ethics issued by the IFAC.  
The shortcomings of this situation have severe ramifications in that there is an 
apparent absence of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, the majority 
of Jordanian firms are family-owned, which may influence which auditor is appointed 
for them - another factor which could help to lessen the independence of the auditor. 
Hence, it can be concluded that in general, there is insufficient independence in the 
status of auditors in Jordan.  
Now that its compromised functioning has been explained, it is necessary to 
backtrack some half a century to trace Jordanian auditing in terms of its form. In 1944, 
the first audit firm was established. Foreign audit companies like Whinney Murray &  
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Table 8: The date of adoption IASs and IFRSs in Jordan 
Standard 
No. 
Name Date  
IAS 1 Disclosure of accounting policies 1997 
IAS 2 Inventories 1997 
IAS 4 Depreciation accounting 1997 
IAS 5 Information to be disclosed in financial statements 1997 
IAS 7 Cash flow statements 1997 
IAS 8 Net profit or loss for the period, fundamental errors and 
changes in accounting policies 
1997 
IAS 9 Research and development costs 1997 
IAS 10 Contingencies and events occurring after the balance sheet 
date 
1997 
IAS 11 Construction contracts 1997 
IAS 12 Accounting for taxes on income 1997 
IAS 13 Presentation of current assets and current liabilities 1997 
IAS 14 Reporting financial information by segment 1997 
IAS 15 Information reflecting the effects of changing prices 1997 
IAS 16 Property, plant and equipment 1997 
IAS 17 Accounting for leases 1997 
IAS 18 Revenue 1997 
IAS 19 Retirement benefit costs 1997 
IAS 20 Accounting for government grants and disclosure of 
government assistance 
1997 
IAS 21 The effects of change in foreign exchange rates 1997 
IAS 22 Business combinations 1997 
IAS23 Borrowing costs 1997 
IAS 24 Related party disclosures 1997 
IAS25 Accounting for investments 1997 
IAS 26 Accounting and reporting by retirement benefit plans 1997 
IAS27 Consolidated financial statements and accounting for 
investments in subsidiaries 
1997 
IAS 28 Accounting for investments in associates 1997 
IAS 30 Disclosures in the financial statements of banks and similar 
financial institutions 
1997 
IAS 31 Financial reporting of interests in joint ventures 1997 
IAS 32 Financial instruments: disclosure and presentation 1997 
IAS 33 Earnings per share 2002 
IAS 34 Interim financial reporting 2002 
IAS 35 Discontinuing operations 2002 
IAS 36 Impairment of assets 2002 
IAS 37 Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets 2002 
IAS 38 Intangible assets 2002 
IAS 39 Financial instruments: recognition and measurement 2002 
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IAS 40 Investment property 2002 
IFRS 2 Share-based payment 2004 
IFRS 3 Business combinations 2004 
IFRS 4 Insurance contracts 2004 
IFRS 5 Non-current assets held for sale and discontinued operations 2004 
Source: Al-Akra et al. (2009, p. 179) 
Co., started work in auditing in 1950, by opening new branches in Jordan. In 1961, 
Jordan enacted the Auditing Profession Practice Law No. 10, which enabled the 
approval of accountants who have been auditing for two years or more to be authorised 
to practice auditing in Jordan without taking into account their academic qualifications. 
Significantly, this law did not require job seekers to undergo a professional exam to 
practice auditing.  
There was no attention by official bodies to accounting and auditing standards 
or to the relevant professional ethics, and it is fair to say that the auditing profession 
was loosely governed by Law No. 10 of 1961 (Al-Akra et al. 2009; Haddad et al. 
2017). In 1985, Jordan issued Auditing Profession Practice Law No. 32 which has been 
considered an essential step at improving the profession by supporting the later 
establishment of JACPA, which emerged, as earlier mentioned, through Law No. 42 
of 1987. The Auditing Profession Practice Law No. 32 (1985), also helped to later set 
up the High Council for Accounting and Auditing by making membership of JACPA 
mandatory for auditors, thus the law was intended to, in some way, organise and 
monitor the auditing profession in Jordan, at the very least in terms of identifying who 
was operating within the profession.  
 
2.7.3 Disclosure in Jordan  
Disclosure requirements differ between developing and developed countries. 
There are various ways by which corporations’ information is communicated to all 
related parties, such as letters to shareholders, interviews, newspapers and telephone 
conversations. However, the disclosure literature has suggested that annual reports are 
one of most important tools used by corporations to disclose information to the public 
(Uyar & Kılıç 2012; Hajek et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2018). It is consistently argued that 
these annual reports are more credible and timely sources, compared to other channels 
of information. For example, Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996) indicated that the vast 
majority of users rely on a company’s annual reports for their decision-making. In 
Jordan, there are three types of disclosure process: mandatory disclosures, voluntary 
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disclosures and disclosures of the companies’ social responsibility. These are 
explained in detail below.  
In 1976, the Amman Financial Market (AFM) law addressed the information 
disclosure requirements for Jordanian companies, in generalised terms. No statement 
of any specific disclosure requirements for annual reports exists for firms listed on the 
ASE. In addition, there is no specification in Jordan in terms of the period and the kind 
of presentation required for published financial statements (Al-Khouri 1997).  This is 
because enforcement mechanisms are almost non-existent to guarantee compliance 
with these disclosure requirements.   
Whilst, before the introduction of these standards in 2003, the quality of 
disclosure in Jordanian companies sector has been described as  unsatisfactory (Abu-
Nassar & Rutherford 1996; Naser 1998), by 2012 the situation is  explained in terms 
of poor disclosure, with an  incomplete set of accounting and auditing standards 
applied by such companies (Al-Akra & Ali 2012). Al-Akra and Ali (2012) further 
argued that the accounting standards in Jordan were enigmatic and lacking any 
guidelines for disclosure. Haddad et al. (2017) more recently claimed that the legal 
requirements for disclosure practices were very limited for shareholders in Jordan. 
Hence, it is clearly shown that the legislation environment has failed to precisely 
specify or enforce the details of disclosure for listed firms.  
In an attempt to ensure that the companies comply with all disclosure 
requirements, Jordan enacted the Directives of Disclosure and Accounting and 
Auditing Standards by the Temporary Securities Law of 1997, with particular terms 
relating to the form and content of annual reports of companies. The intention of this 
move was to seek to improve investors’ trust and encourage responsibility, 
transparency, fairness, and accountability in the capital market, in compliance with 
international accounting and auditing standards. As has been seen, without 
enforcement though codified sanctions, the law was ineffectual. Later, this was 
replaced by the Securities Law 2002, giving the ASE, JSC and SDC (more details are 
present in Section 2.9.2.3) further authority to enhance disclosure requirements and 
requiring all listed firms to provide the JSC with their annual reports, during a period 
not surpassing three months from the end of the fiscal year.  
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2.7.3.1 Mandatory disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure includes all information which is needed to be published 
according to laws, regulations and instructions in Jordan. These comprise company 
law, bank law, securities law and their relevant directives for disclosure requirements. 
In the context of Jordan, many previous studies have identified a gradual improvement 
in compliance with mandatory disclosure. For example, Naser (1998) indicated that 
the level of compliance of disclosure requirements of Jordanian non-financial listed 
companies, was 63% in 1994, and Naser et al. (2002) documented this as at 63.51% in 
1998. For 2007, Hassaan (2013) found the average of compliance with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements by firms listed on the ASE, was 76%. Mardini et al. 
(2013) reported that based on an analysis of 67 firms’ annual reports for segmental 
items specified in 2009, the level of segmental disclosure provided was 60%. 
Omar and Simon (2011) examined the disclosure behaviour of listed firms in 
Jordan after significant changes to accounting regulations for the year 2003, reporting 
that 83% of the mandatory and voluntary disclosures requirements were fulfilled. By 
using a sample of 80 non-financial, listed Jordanian firms for the years 1996 and 2004, 
Al-Akra et al. (2010b) investigated the impact of accounting disclosure regulation, 
ownership changes, governance reforms and resulting from privatisation on mandatory 
compliance of disclosure requirements with IFRSs. That study revealed that disclosure 
compliance with the IFRS was significantly lower in 1996 than that in 2004, at 54.7% 
and 78.98% respectively.  
It is concluded that the improved mandatory disclosure can be attributed to the 
wave of reforms adopted by the Jordanian government, such as the new regulations 
that commenced in 1997, however despite this consistent improvement, not all firms 
completely comply with the regulations surrounding disclosure requirement. It is 
argued there are loopholes in the regulations. As well, the deficiency of qualified 
accountants or auditors, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the weakness of 
regulatory bodies, account for this situation.  
 
2.7.3.2 Voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as “free choices on the part of company 
management to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the 
decision needs of users of their annual report” (Meek et al. 1995, p. 555). In other 
words, this constitutes any additional financial or non-financial information provided 
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by a corporation in their annual report, regardless of what is required by any standards 
and guidelines (Eng & Mak 2003). To adopt a relatively recent definition in the context 
of Jordan, “voluntary disclosure items are defined as those items that are not regulated 
by Jordanian reporting forces” (Al Shattarat et al. 2010, p. 40). Such Jordanian 
reporting forces, as explained above, include the Securities Law of 2002, the 
Companies’ Law of 1997 and IFRSs and IASs accounting regulations. Similarly to 
mandatory disclosure, overall, the average levels of voluntary disclosure in Jordan 
have improved with time. Al‐Akra et al. (2010b) argued that this can be attributed to 
the success of Jordan’s privatisation program.  
Al Shattarat et al. (2010) evaluated the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of non-financial, Jordanian companies listed on the ASE for the year 
2006, finding that the average extent of voluntary disclosure was 28.95%. Haddad et 
al. (2009) showed that the average voluntary disclosure for the year 2004, was 28%. 
Furthermore, as noted by Haddad et al. (2015), the average voluntary disclosure for 
the year 2004 was 26.1% for the items that covered the disclosure index (such as 
background and strategic disclosure, financial information disclosure and Non-
financial disclosure) in the Jordanian companies sector. Al Sawalqa (2014) 
investigated the level of compliance of voluntary disclosure in the Jordanian banking 
sector, by employing a sample of 13 banks listed on the ASE for the year 2012. That 
study indicated that the level of compliance was 61.3%.  
 As mentioned earlier, the improvement in disclosure is attributable to the wave 
of reforms adopted by the Jordanian government since 1997, and to Jordan’s recent 
economic development. However, it is clear that the improvement in mandatory 
disclosure significantly exceeds that of voluntary disclosure. Haddad et al. (2017) 
argued that the social and cultural environment play an important role for voluntary 
disclosure. Furthermore, societies in developing countries, such as Jordan, are 
expected to be “more secretive, conservative and based on statutory control, with little 
professional judgment compared to their counterparts of developed countries”, 
(Haddad et al. 2009, p. 289), which, therefore leads to low levels of compliance in 
terms of voluntary disclosure.  
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2.7.3.3 Companies’ social responsibility disclosure 
The appearance of corporate social disclosure can be traced back to the 1960’s 
and 1970’s in industrialised countries (Rashid & Lodh 2008). Corporate social 
disclosure has become a well-known topic in the social accounting and governance 
literature. Numerous earlier studies have been carried out in the context of developed 
countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand (Guthrie & Mathews 1985; Ness & Mirza 1991; Deegan & Gordon 1996; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Stanwick & Stanwick 2006). Corporate social disclosure 
provides a solution to promote accountability for societal matters, and has become a 
global issue (e.g., with reference to climate change and global warming) (Hall 2002). 
As Gray et al. (1987, p. ix) described, social responsibility is “the process of 
communicating the social and environmental effects of organisations’ economic 
actions to particular interest groups within society, and to society at large”.  
Generally, corporate social disclosure includes information on human rights, 
community relations, labour rights and consumer protection. It is argued that the firms 
should embrace a more holistic view regarding their responsibilities, to a broader range 
of stakeholders (Deegan 2002). Therefore, corporations with a good reputation which 
are always seen to support the external environment, may create good relationships 
with their suppliers, creditors and customers, due in part to this perception.  
In the context of Jordan, by using a sample of 173 firms listed on the AFM for 
1997, Abu-Baker and Naser (2000) documented that the banks and financial 
corporations disclosed a weighted average number of 67% pages. In contrast, the 
averages of disclosure of manufacturing firms and service and insurance firms 
(combined), were 52% and 20% pages, respectively. Al-Khadash (2003) employed a 
sample of Jordanian industrial shareholding companies over the period 1998 to 2000, 
finding 74% disclosed social and environmental information.  
Further, Suwaidan et al. (2004) evaluated social responsibility disclosure 
practices in the financial reports of Jordanian industrial firms in 2000, and reported 
that the firm disclosed about 13% of the items included in the index. By using a sample 
of the annual reports of 60 firms in the manufacturing and service sectors in Jordan for 
the year 2006, Ismail and Ibrahim (2008) investigated the extent of environmental and 
social disclosures, with  85% of the firms somehow disclosing such information, with 
an average of 22 sentences in each report. Abu Qa’dan and Suwaidan (2018) found 
that listed Jordanian manufacturing firms disclosed 30.8% of the 42 items of corporate 
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social responsibility information included in the disclosure index, during the period 
2013-2015.  
In 2006, Jordan enacted the Environmental Protection Law, which made 
evaluation of a corporation’s effect on the environment compulsory and to be reported 
in its annual report. However, Jordanian companies’ commitment to environmental 
protection is still weak (Jahamani 2003). This is due to the insufficient items of 
information required by Jordanian laws, regulations and instructions on social and 
environmental disclosure. For example, the instructions of corporate governance for 
shareholding-listed companies for the year 2017, addressed the concept of corporate 
social responsibility. These instructions required each firm to develop its policy 
regarding social responsibility for the local community and the environment, yet they 
do not determine the specific form or content of disclosure information concerning 
corporate social responsibility activities.  
 
2.8 The environment of corporate governance in Jordan  
The mechanisms for corporate governance have become one of the most 
important issues that are discussed in both developed and developing markets. Due to 
the worldwide financial crises and failures of corporations, the Jordanian government 
can be justifiably worried about these corporate scandals, and has taken into 
consideration different actions to protect and promote the country’s financial 
environment.  
 
2.8.1 Corporate governance in Jordan: An overview 
The development of corporate governance in Jordan is relatively new (Jaafar & 
El-Shawa 2009). The establishment of the AFM in 1978 was an important defining 
moment for the activity of firms in Jordan. In 1997, the passage of Securities Law No. 
23 marked a turning point for the Jordanian capital market. Three institutions emerged 
out of what had been the AFM till 1997 – namely, JSC, ASE and the SDC (JSC 2012). 
Due to increased interest in corporate governance practices in Jordan by 
international donor agencies such as the OECD, the IFC and the World Bank, in the 
1990s, various corporate governance reforms have been an increasingly significant 
agenda item in Jordan’s pursuit of sustainable and strengthened economic growth. The 
establishment of three new institutions, the JSC, the ASE and the SDC, has contributed 
to developing the regulatory environment (Jaafar & El-Shawa 2009). Accordingly, the 
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ASE witnessed increases in the number of listed companies from 1998 to 2011, 
however from 2012, the number companies began to decrease gradually. It is 
confirmed that the Jordanian companies sector witnessed a number of bankruptcy 
cases, including 26 cases in the industrial sector (Zureigat et al. 2014).  
 To improve corporate governance, Jordan has issued several corporate 
governance codes. These are instructions of corporate governance for shareholding 
listed companies, for private shareholding firms, for limited liability firms and non-
listed public shareholding companies, for banks, corporations, and insurance 
companies. These are further elaborated on below. 
 
2.8.2 Jordanian corporate governance codes    
The OECD and its partners have played a central role in the strengthening of 
corporate governance codes in different countries around the world (Abu-Tapanjeh 
2009;  Koldertsova 2011). These aim to provide the principles of good practice of 
governance for regulators, policymakers, and all markets participant in supporting the 
institutional, legal and regulatory framework that underpins corporate governance, 
with a specific focus on publicly traded firms. Further, they also provide practical 
instructions for investors, corporations, stock exchanges and all related parties who 
have a central role in the developing of good corporate governance. Therefore, these 
principles assist in building an environment of accountability, trust and transparency, 
necessary for encouraging long-term investment, business integrity and financial 
stability, thereby supporting stronger economic growth and more inclusive societies. 
The OECD principles for corporate governance were established in 1999 (OECD 
2004). These principles have become the global benchmark for the practice of 
corporate governance, with 30 countries around the world directly adopting these 
OECD principles (Abu-Tapanjeh 2009).  In 2003, the OECD commenced a 
comprehensive review of these 1999 principles (OECD 2004) after which updated 
principles of corporate governance practice were released and adopted in 2004 
(Jesover & Kirkpatrick 2005). However, these principles are non-binding in nature, 
and it is up to related parties, such as governments, regulators and policymakers, to 
choose how they wish to include them in their own frameworks (Abu-Tapanjeh 2009). 
This revision consists of six main principles: ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework, the rights of shareholders and key ownership 
functions, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate 
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governance, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the board. Table 
9 displays these principles and its explanation (OECD 2004).  
For example, these OECD principles were, in part, an attempt to establish an 
effective system of balances and checks between the board of directors and top 
management. As argued by the OECD (2004), a company’s professional managers 
(meaning the board) play a vital role in modern companies, including effective 
monitoring, but not of the  day-to-day system. Furthermore, the board of directors is 
accountable to company owners. Therefore, these owners should be able to exercise 
their ownership rights, such as appointing or removing members of board. The 
effective use of these rights to monitor the company board, needs fundamental 
standards of transparency and disclosure (OECD 2004). 
These OECD principles define the board’s responsibilities: ensuring compliance 
with standards and laws, oversight of internal control mechanisms for financial 
reporting, formulation and disclosing remuneration policy and establishing a code of 
company’s ethics (OECD 2004). Likewise, the principles focus on a general term, 
board independence. It is argued that “the board should review related party 
transactions using independent board members” (OECD 2004, p. 190).  
Table 9: The OCED principle with its explanation 
Principles Explanation 
Ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework 
The corporate governance framework should 
promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly 
articulate the division of responsibilities 
among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities.  
The rights of shareholders and key 
ownership functions 
The corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights.  
The equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. All shareholders should have 
the opportunities to obtain effective redress 
for violation of their rights. 
The role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance 
The corporate governance framework should 
recognize the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual 
agreements, and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and 
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stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises.  
Disclosure and transparency The corporate governance framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of 
the company. 
The responsibilities of the board The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, 
the effective monitoring of management by 
the board, and the board’s accountability to 
the company and the shareholders. 
Source: OECD (2004, p. 185) 
To regulate a corporation’s behaviour and ensure accountability, responsibility, 
transparency and integrity, Jordan adopted an international code of corporate 
governance, based on these OECD principles. The JSC issued the first Jordanian 
corporate governance code for firms listed on the ASE, in 2005, however as this was 
not mandatory, a new code was announced which came into effect on 1 January 2009. 
This code was based on a ‘comply or explain’ approach. This was Circular No. 
12/1/4659. In order to apply international standards of corporate governance, Jordan 
later issued new corporate governance directives for companies listed on the ASE, in 
2017, which are presented in more detail below.  
 
2.8.2.1 Instructions of governance for shareholding listed companies 
Based on Securities Law No. 18, for 2017, the Board of Commissioners of the 
Securities Commission issued new instructions to improve the practice of corporate 
governance and regulate Jordanian companies:  Instructions of Corporate Governance 
for Shareholding Listed Companies for 2017, which took effect on 22 May 2017.  
Several aspects of these instructions involve board membership. For example, an 
independent board member is defined as a member who does not belong to the firm or 
any of the board of director’s family or the senior executive top management, nor is 
an external auditor of the firm or any of its subsidiary firms in any material interest, 
nor has any relationships except that correlated to his or her ownership of stocks in the 
company. In addition, the new instructions state that the board of directors of such 
Jordanian listed companies, should consist of at least five members and not more than 
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thirteen, to be elected according to the cumulative voting method by the general 
assembly of shareholders of the firm, and by secret ballot. As well, one third of the 
board members should be independent. These instructions address the topic of CEO 
duality, and confirm that the position of the chairperson of the board of directors and 
any other executive position of the firm, may not be combined. The new instructions 
also prescribe the responsibilities and duties of the members of the board. Likewise, 
they set out that the board should form the four permanent committees: the governance 
committee, audit committee, nomination and remuneration committee and risk 
management committee. The first three should comprise at least three non-executive 
board of director members, two of whom should be independent members.  
The main responsibilities of the governance committee, include preparing a 
governance report and submitting it to the board of directors, developing written 
procedures for the application of the provisions of these instructions, reviewing and 
assessing their applicability annually, studying its own notes concerning the 
application of corporate governance in the firm, and following up on what has been 
done, and finally, guaranteeing that the corporation complies with the provisions of 
these instructions. This new code indicates that the board of directors should hold at 
least one meeting every two months, with at least six meetings throughout the financial 
year. The general assembly should consist of all shareholders of the company who 
have the right to vote, and voting should be held at an ordinary meeting at least once a 
year. The new code also focuses on other areas, such as related party transactions, the 
appointment and functions of the external auditor, disclosure, transparency and the 
general rights of shareholders. 
Under this code, the corporation shall prepare a governance report and include 
it in its annual report, provided that it is signed by the board of director’s chairman, 
and to include primarily the following: 
1- Information regarding the application of the provisions of this code and the 
rules of corporate governance in the organisation. 
2- Determining the names of resigning and current board members through the 
year, and whether each board member is independent or non-independent, 
and executive or non-executive. 
3- Determining the names of the board members’ legal representatives, and 
whether those representatives are independent or non-independent, and 
executive or non-executive. 
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4- Selecting executive positions in the corporation and determining the names 
of the individuals who occupy them. 
5- Stating all the memberships of other company boards held by a board of 
director’s members, if any.  
6- Determining the name of the governance liaison officer and the names of 
members of the board’s formed committees. 
7- Providing the name of the chairperson and members of the audit committee, 
with a complete description of their experience and qualifications in 
accounting or financial matters. 
8- Providing the names of the chairperson and members of the governance 
committee, audit committee, nomination and remuneration committee and 
risk management committee.  
9- Setting the number of meetings for each of the committees over the year.  
10- Setting the number of meetings of the external auditor with the audit 
committee during the year.  
 
2.8.2.2 Instructions of corporate governance for banks 
The Jordanian fiancial system is controlled by the ASE and Central Bank of 
Jordan (CBJ).  
The CBJ is considered an autonomous entity, and has played an important role in 
encouraging corporate governance in the Jordanian banking sector, having issued 
codes of practice for corporate governance. These include the  Bank Director’s 
Handbook of Corporate Governance for the Year 2004, the Corporate Governance 
Code for Banks for the Year 2007 and Amended Instructions on Corporate Governance 
for Banks for the Year 2016 (more details are discussed in Section 2.9.2.3.7).  
  
2.8.2.3 Jordanian corporate governance code 
The task of the Ministry of Industry and Trade is to help accomplish continuous 
economic growth by improving and implementing legislation and programs to 
promote the investment environment in Jordan. The CCD was set up in 2003 as an 
authority independent from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to conduct registration 
services and perform effective control mechanisms to ensure the good practice of 
corporate governance principles to encourage the national economy. Due to the CCD 
having a vested interest in the success of the Jordanian business sector, it has begun to 
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formulate a code for corporate governance specific to Jordan. To this end, the CCD 
has formed a national committee involving members representing the public and 
private sectors, to formulate this code which will be particularly applicable to private 
shareholding firms, private shareholding firms that are not for profit, limited liability 
firms, limited liability firms that are not for profit and non-listed public shareholding 
firms.  
 
2.8.2.4 Corporate governance instructions for insurance companies 
The board of directors of the Insurance Commission (IC) issued the Corporate 
Governance Instructions of 2006, based on Insurance Regulatory Law No. 33 of 1999 
and its amendments, applicable to insurance companies in Jordan. This code covered 
many aspects of corporate governance, such as board independence, the 
responsibilities of the board of directors, the knowledge, experience, qualifications and 
skills of board members and the company’s internal control and supervision system. 
According to these instructions, the board of directors is responsible for developing 
and setting plans to implement the corporate governance principles mentioned in these 
instructions, as well as reviewing and assessing the scope of their implementation 
annually.  
 
2.8.3 The features of corporate governance in Jordan 
Although the practice of governance has its roots in developed countries, each 
country has a unique structure of governance, which is formidably affected by insider 
and outsider factors (Short & Keasey 1999; Solomon 2007, 2010). Insider factors 
comprise its politics, historical background, culture, legal institutions and system of 
laws (La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 2000; Solomon 2010). Outsider factors can 
be classified into the climate of global economics, cross-border investments and 
foreign capital inflows (Solomon 2010). Many earlier studies (e.g., Prowse 1994; 
Franks & Mayer 2001; Lane 2003; Bhasa 2004; Goergen et al. 2008 and Rapp & 
Strenger 2015), compared two preeminent models of corporate governance in the 
world, the Anglo-American model and the German-Japanese model. 
This section of the thesis illustrates three models of corporate governance: the 
Anglo-American, German-Japanese and Asian models. The significance and influence 
of national factors in determining the regulations and enforcement of corporate 
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governance are explained, which may help in setting appropriate policies that promote 
transparency and accountability in Jordanian firms. 
 
2.8.3.1 The Anglo-American model 
The Anglo-American model is organised under a capital market based system 
(Moerland 1995; Lane et al. 2006), and is characterised by a prevalent regulatory and 
legal environment (Prowse 1996). Market-oriented models involve  companies with a 
widely dispersed ownership structure, supported by well-developed financial markets 
(Moerland 1995). Shareholders are protected through contracts, while managers are 
controlled by active external markets (Cernat 2004). In addition, this model is 
distinguished by a fiduciary relationship between owners and managers (Cernat 2004). 
Kaplan (1994) pointed out that outside independent directors predominantly govern 
the board of directors in Anglo-American countries such as Australia, the U.K, the 
U.S. and Canada.  
The diffused share-ownership and the ability of management control over a 
company, makes it very hard for shareholders to monitor a company’s management, a 
point underscored by Lane et al. (2006, p. 150), who argued that  “market model 
practices do not address the board’s ability to monitor management”. Consequently, 
the removal of management by shareholders is very difficult. Furthermore, due to this 
weak effect of shareholders on company management, the protection of owners’ 
interests is feeble.   
 
2.8.3.2 The German-Japanese model 
The German-Japanese model is governed by a bank-based (relationship) system 
distinguished by large scale closely held firms, group membership of companies and 
banks playing a central role in financing and monitoring the corporate sector 
(Moerland 1995). Under this model, corporations attempt to build long-term 
relationships with the banking sector (Levine 1997). The main banks in Germany, such 
as Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank, “act as suppliers not only of bank loans but also 
of equity capital” (Moerland 1995, p. 450). Therefore, this system enables corporations 
to use a high fraction of debt and of equity, in the same company (Aguilera & Jackson 
2003). Accordingly, ownership concentration is common under this model (Moerland 
1995; Sakawa & Watanabel 2018). Apart from Germany, this model is widespread in 
other European countries and in Japan.  
54 
 
It is considered that this system may operate as an alternative model of corporate 
governance for developing countries, where the legal environment, protection of 
investors, institutional setting are all very poor (La Porta et al. 2000). The Anglo-
American model (capital market-based model), and the German-Japan model (bank-
based model) is compared in Table 10 below. In addition to Table 10, Solomon (2013) 
stated the characteristics of the Anglo-American system or ‘outsider-dominated 
system’, and the German-Japanese system or insider- dominated system. Table 11 
compares the characteristics of the outsider-dominated system and the insider- 
dominated system, which has been quoted from (Solomon 2013, p. 196). 
Table 10: The comparison between Anglo-American and German-Japanese model 
Mechanisms 
Capital market-based 
model 
Bank-based model 
Ownership concentration Little High 
Industrial grouping Little High 
Bank orientation Little High 
Employee influence Little High 
Remunerative incentive High Little 
Monitoring board Little  High 
Stock market High Little 
Market for firms control High Little 
Source: Moerland (1995, p. 459) 
 
2.8.3.3 The Asian model 
Other Asian countries than Japan are economically volatile (Claessens & Fan 
2002). Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the economic growth in such 
countries was unparalleled, having run between 5 and 10% per annum for decades 
(Wade 2000). Wade (2000) also documented that since the 1980’s the Chinese 
economy grew at an average of 9% per annum. Since the mid-1990’s, the Asian region, 
including Japan, has accounted for a quarter of the world’s output and 50% of world 
growth (Wade 2000).  
Table 11: The characteristics of insider and outsider models 
Insider- dominated system Outsider-dominated system 
Companies owned predominantly by 
inside shareholders who wield control 
over company management.  
Large companies controlled by 
managers but owned predominantly by 
outside shareholders.  
System classified by little separation of 
ownership and control.  
System classified by separation of 
ownership and control. 
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The agency and its problems are rare.  The agency and its problems are 
common.  
The activities of hostile takeover are 
rare.  
The activities of hostile takeover acting 
as a disciplining tool on firm 
management.  
Ownership structure is concentrated in a 
small group of shareholders, such as 
state ownership, founding family 
members and other firms, through a 
pyramidal structure.  
Ownership structure is dispersed.  
Excessive control by a small set of 
insider shareholders.  
Moderate control by a large range of 
shareholders.  
The transfer of wealth from minority 
shareholders to majority shareholders.  
No transfer.  
Weak investor protection in 
corporation’s law.  
Strong investor protection in 
corporation’s law. 
The abuse of power by majority 
shareholders.  
Potential for shareholders democracy.  
Majority shareholders have more voice 
in their investments.   
Shareholders classified more by ‘exit’ 
than by voice.  
Source: (Solomon 2013, p. 196). 
However, the practice of corporate governance in most of these countries is very 
weak for three main reasons: a generally weak legal structure, weak government 
enforcement of property rights and finally, widespread corruption. Therefore, the 
ownership of firms’ shares is concentrated in the hands of a small number of owners 
(except in China) (Claessens & Fan 2002; Li 2003). Thus, the control of a company 
due to shares held by one family, is common in most Asian countries (Ho & Wong 
2001). Furthermore, due to the weak protection of other investors and their  monitoring 
of top management, company control mechanisms in that region are often insider 
oriented (Solomon 2007, 2010).  
It has been argued that weak corporate governance practice in Asian countries, 
was one of the most important reasons that led to the 1997 financial crisis 
(Detthamrong et al. 2017;; Yu & Wang 2018). Unlike the companies in Anglo-
American countries, Asian company activities depend heavily on personal 
relationships in what is known as a ‘relation-based system’, predominantly  between 
corporations and their dominant shareholders (Solomon 2013). The banking sector is 
the main source of direct loans to companies. Hence, there are a higher ratios of firm 
debt to equity in these countries, and consequently, a heavily reliance on external 
financing. 
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In addition, because of the relation-based system prevalent in these countries, 
finance can be obtained by the dominant shareholders. Due to the concentrated 
structure of ownership in Asian companies, the structure of corporate governance in 
Asia is also described as an ‘ownership-based model’.  
In summary, there is no globally accepted model of governance practice that may 
encourage accountability and transparency. Due to the variations in institutional 
settings and legal systems, there is no specific system of corporate governance practice 
best suited to a specific country. If a system is appropriate to one country, it may not 
be appropriate to another.   
 
2.8.3.4 The Jordanian corporate governance model 
In the context of Jordan, internal factors like legal institutions, laws and 
regulations, the historical background, culture, political and economic environments, 
play an essential role in constituting the regime of corporate governance. Due to the 
attenuated judiciary necessary to implement the existing regulations and laws, the 
Anglo-American model is not suitable for Jordan. Similarly to Asia, economic 
activities in the Jordanian companies sector, are based on personal relations. 
In Jordan, banks are the prime source of company financing (Al-Najjar & Taylor 
2008; Al-Najjar 2011; Zeitun & Tian 2014). The choice between bank financing and 
bonds depends on several factors, such as the macroeconomic environment and the 
firm’s particular characteristics. Due to the lack of legal and institutional 
infrastructure, debt in the form of corporate bonds is absent in Jordanian companies. 
It is argued that there is no financial institution with sufficient expertise to price and 
sell a corporate bond issue (Maghyereh 2008). It is worth noting that Jordanian 
corporate financing from the banks is  mostly ‘short-term debt’, similarly to 
developing countries in general (Booth et al. 2001), and the banking sector supports 
an arm’s-length relationship with their corporate customers and are not involved in 
monitoring the corporate activities of their borrowers (Brunello et al. 2001; Di Pietra 
et al. 2008). Therefore, many features of corporate governance align with the German-
Japanese model, in other words, the bank-based system. However, the Jordanian 
context contrasts markedly with the German and Japanese contexts; Jordanian banks 
have a very limited role in corporate governance.  
Similarly to firms in Germany and Japan, the mechanisms of firms’ control are 
often internally oriented in developing countries, including in Jordan (Zheng et al. 
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2017). In Jordan, there is a concentration of ownership by the firm’s founding family, 
leading to a high degree of ownership control (Alqatamin et al. 2017; Jarbou et al. 
2018). The ownership structure represents the major investors’ own huge stakes within 
a single company (also denoted as the ‘ownership control approach’ to firm 
management) (Xu & Wang 1999). These shareholders are the company’s board of 
directors. Therefore, the separation of ownership control from management is rare 
(Claessens et al. 2000).  
In Jordan, unlike the Anglo-American corporations (Meca & Ballesta 2009; Ngo 
et al. 2018; Rashid 2018), ownership concentration is intensely high (Zeitun & Tian 
2007; Jaafar & El-Shawa 2009; Zeitun 2009; Abu-Serdaneh et al. 2010; Al-Daoud et 
al. 2016; Alzoubi 2016; Ibrahim & Hanefah 2016; Yassin 2017). Therefore, these 
shareholders hold positions on the corporation’s board and in top management, leading 
to weak monitoring.  
As well, the structure of cross-shareholding is not very popular in Jordan, and 
individual shareholdings are very large. As a consequence, there are very limited 
takeover regulations (OECD 2004), a less developed equity market, and reliance on 
external sources of corporate finance (Sarkar & Sarkar 2000). Because higher 
transaction costs are associated with the takeover process, there is an apparent absence 
of some external control mechanisms, such as the market for Jordanian corporations’ 
control (Sarkar et al. 1998). Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) confirmed a lack of good 
practices for external governance in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries, including Jordan. Therefore, the firm’s governance is heavily affected by its 
dominant shareholders, and Jordanian corporate governance may be termed an 
‘ownership-based model’.  
Similarly to Anglo-American firms, the company boards in Jordan are organised 
under a one tier system (OECD 2004; European Bank 2017). Thus, the board chairman 
and CEO perform responsibilities together in one organisational layer, which is 
prevalent in Anglo-American countries (Maassen 2002). Therefore, CEO duality is 
likely to be greater in Jordanian firms. Indeed, it is argued that there is no distinction 
between the board and the management, because the chairman and CEO are the same 
person in Jordan (Shanikat & Abbadi 2011).  
In contrast, it is worth noting that outside directors play a pivotal role in 
monitoring the company management in Anglo-American countries. It can be argued 
that in Anglo-American countries, independent members work well because these 
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countries depend on laws and information disclosure to ensure owners’ rights (Rashid 
2018). Othman and Zeghal (2006) pointed out that there is higher controlling of 
management by outside directors, financial analysts and the financial press in Anglo-
American countries. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have a limited role in 
disciplining and controlling corporation management in Jordan. For example, there is 
a requirement in Jordanian firms that all directors should be shareholders, which is 
contrary to the independence of directors (OECD 2004; European Bank 2017). 
Furthermore, the government has a substantial impact on the corporation’s board 
structure and control of management. However, in the context of Continental 
European, such as in Finland, Germany and Netherlands (and excluding the  U.K., 
Spain and France), company boards have been organised under the two-tier structure 
(Collier & Gregory 1996; Maassen 2002) which strictly separates the chairman and 
CEO. 
Therefore, numerous institutional differences between the Jordanian market and 
developed markets are apparent in the discussion above. Because of dispersed 
ownership, corporations in developed markets have a greater tendency and eagerness 
to employ professional managers (non-family employees). Thus, dispersed ownership 
and professional managers being in control is very common (La Porta et al. 2000). 
Many of these professional managers do not have stakes of ownership within the 
companies. In contrast, executive directors (i.e. senior managers and board members) 
in Jordanian companies, are the family who own the company. Al-Azzam et al. (2015) 
stated that 90 per cent of Jordanian companies are controlled and owned by families. 
These shareholders have huge motivations to control, which mitigates against the need 
for performance based pay (Banghøj et al. 2010). As a result, long-term incentives in 
the form of ‘equity-based pay’ are absent in the Jordanian company sector (Ramadan 
2013; Olaniyi et al. 2017).  
In conclusion, the main problem for corporate governance in Jordan is its weak 
institutional framework; there is a lack of enforcement capability along with great 
dominance by certain firm-owning families. The existing institutional regulatory 
bodies fail to exert pressure on companies to follow the principles, laws, regulations 
and standards, detailed in the preceding sections. This failure is due to families 
hindering the work of governmental institutions in the enforcement of such principles, 
laws, regulations and standards. It is argued that the familial and political relationships 
which are a common characteristic of this country, are usually in direct contradiction 
59 
 
with the state’s rational and legal authority (Uddin & Choudhury 2008). In the context 
of Jordan, the main form of agency conflict is principal-principal agency conflict 
(Ahmad et al. 2017), which arises because majority shareholders can disregard the 
interests of minority shareholders (Dharwadkar et al. 2000).  
 
2.8.4 The assessment of corporate governance in Jordan  
The aim of this assessment process is to measure the state of overall compliance 
with corporate governance practices, such as the assessment of the gaps between 
national laws and regulations and international principles, and the effectiveness of 
implementation in the vital areas of corporate governance. It also provides a 
comparative analysis of both the effectiveness and quality of the local legislation for 
corporate governance. Likewise, it involves understanding to what extent, if any, the 
legal structure is linked with proper enforcement tools (e.g., sanctions). Furthermore, 
such an assessment highlights the significant weaknesses that should be addressed by 
legislators and all related parties, for developing a national framework of corporate 
governance. In Jordan, OECD (2004), Shanikat and Abbadi (2011), and the European 
Bank for Reconstructions and Development (2017), have each assessed Jordanian 
companies’ compliance with the corporate governance principles.  
OECD (2004) discussed Jordanian corporate governance, based on the degree of 
compliance with OECD principles, by classifying these degrees into five categories: 
observed (5 points), largely observed (4 points), partially observed (3 points), 
materially not observed (2 points) and not observed (1 point), with the following major 
findings. Firstly, the assessment of the rights of shareholders was largely observed. 
Shareholders have the right to investigate the documents and information relevant to 
the corporation. As well, they have the right to participate, vote and attend general 
meetings. Secondly, the assessment of the equitable treatment of shareholders was 
partially observed, although shareholders were observed to have the same rights and 
obligations. Furthermore, the general manager, directors and employees are not 
permitted to trade on internal information, or to show it to others with the aim of 
manipulating the price. Thirdly, the assessment of the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance was observed. The stakeholders of Jordanian companies have no specific 
rights to obtain information or to participate in decision-making. Fourthly, the 
assessment of disclosure and transparency was largely observed. Jordanian firms have 
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fully adopted IFRSs and IASs. Finally, the assessment of the responsibility of the 
board was largely observed.  
As mentioned earlier, Jordanian boardrooms are organised under a one tier 
system and directors must be shareholders. The functions of the board include working 
on behalf of the company’s shareholders, appointing management, investing the firm’s 
funds, making loans and preparing and submitting financial statements. 
 Shanikat and Abbadi (2011) addressed the assessment of corporate governance 
in Jordan based on the extent of Jordanian companies’ compliance with OECD 
principles according to the law and practice (Further details are presented in Table 12). 
The European Bank for Reconstructions and Development (2017) performed a 
comprehensive report of corporate governance in Jordan, identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of corporate governance in the Jordanian banking sectors. In doing so, the 
corporate governance framework has been divided into five main areas: board 
structure and functioning, transparency and disclosure, internal control, rights of 
shareholders and rights of stakeholders and institutions, each of which was further 
subdivided. The assessment is based on a five level rating (i.e., strong or very strong, 
moderately strong, fair, weak and very weak). The score ranges from one point (very 
weak) to 5 points (strong or very strong), for which definitions follow (See Table 13).  
Table 12: The assessment of Jordanian corporate governance 
Principles 
Assessment base 
Remarks In law In practice 
The rights of 
shareholders 
Widely 
covered 
Widely 
practiced 
Shareholders participate in 
most important decisions 
except main asset sales. 
Shareholders AGM rights are 
also mentioned, but there are no 
standard proxy forms and no 
provisions for postal voting. 
The equitable 
treatment of 
shareholders 
Partially 
covered 
Partially 
practiced 
The Controller sometimes acts 
on shareholders' complaints, 
but there is no formal 
complaint-resolution 
mechanism. There are solid 
regulations prohibiting insider 
trading. Related-party 
transaction rules are not clear. 
The role of 
stakeholders in 
corporate governance 
Covered Practiced 
Stakeholder rights are 
respected. Stakeholders have a 
number of legal 
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Protections, which are widely 
covered in the Company Law. 
Companies typically adopt 
performance enhancement 
measures, such as employee 
savings funds. Employees 
sometimes share ownership in 
some companies' issues.  
The disclosure and 
transparency 
Covered Practiced Annual and semi-annual reports 
are provided, but only the 
annual report is required to be 
audited externally. Monitoring 
is limited only to quantity rather 
than quality of disclosures. 
There are no comprehensive 
and mandatory rules for 
corporate-governance 
disclosure. Jordan has fully 
adopted the IFRS and ISA 
standards for accounting and 
audits. 
The responsibility of 
the board 
Covered 
partially 
Practiced The board is liable for ensuring 
compliance with the law. In 
practice, there is no difference 
between the management and 
the board; generally the 
chairman and CEO are the same 
person. Stakeholders' duties are 
not clear. The law and 
regulations determine specific 
standards related to functions 
that the board should fulfil. By 
the law, directors have a right to 
access all relevant information. 
Source: Shanikat and Abbadi (2011, p. 100) 
The strong or very strong rating indicates that corporate governance practices 
are fit for purpose and conform to best practice. Moderately strong means that 
company practices are fit for purpose but additional reforms are needed for some 
aspects of corporate governance. With respect to fair, this refers to some elements of 
company practices being good practice, however a few critical points suggest that, 
overall, these should be evaluated, with a view to their reform. A weak rating indicates 
that companies show few elements which are good practice, and generally, the 
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structure is in need of reform, whilst very weak means that company practices offer 
significant risks and the system is in need of considerable reforms.  
Table 13: An overall assessment of corporate governance in Jordan 
No. Key groups Rating 
1 The board structure and functioning Weak  
 Board composition  Fair/Weak 
 Gender diversity at the board Very weak 
 Independent directors Weak 
 Board effectiveness Weak 
 Board responsibilities Fair 
2 Transparency and disclosure Fair  
 Non-financial information disclosure Fair/Weak 
 Financial information disclosure Strong  
 Reporting to the market and to shareholders Fair 
 Disclosure on the external audit Fair 
3 Internal control Weak 
 Quality of the internal control framework Fair 
 Quality of internal and external audit Fair/Weak  
 Functioning and independence of the audit committee Weak 
 Control over related party transactions and conflict of 
interest 
Weak 
4 Rights of shareholders Fair 
 General shareholders’ meeting Weak 
 Protection against insider trading and self-dealing Moderately 
Strong 
 Minority shareholders protection and access to 
information 
Weak 
 Registration of shareholdings Weak 
5 Stakeholders and institutions Fair 
 Corporate governance structure and institutions Fair 
 Corporate governance code Weak 
 Institutional environment Weak 
Source: European Bank (2017) 
 
2.9 Institutional factors affecting practice of the governance in Jordan  
The institutional factors affecting corporate governance practices in Jordan, 
include the capital market, laws, regulations and instructions about Jordanian 
corporations, the ASE, JSC, the CCD, the SDC, the CBJ and the IC. These are 
explained in the following paragraphs. Whilst there may be some overlap with the 
preceding information, this section on institutional factors is designed to complement 
that information from the lens of the development of relevant Jordanian institutions. 
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2.9.1 The legal environment of Jordanian companies  
To understand corporate governance practice from a legal view in Jordan, it may 
be useful to provide a brief overview of the legal framework of the Jordanian 
companies sector, as the legal environment plays a vital role in formulating and 
enforcing the corporate governance principles. This consists of specific acts and 
numerous legislative tools, such as laws, regulations, instructions, rules, circulars and 
notifications, issued by the official bodies like the JSC, ASE, SDC, CCD and CBJ. 
Furthermore, the Jordan Chamber of Industry and other agencies in the private 
companies sector also form part of the regulatory and legal system for Jordanian 
corporate governance. The following paragraphs provide some details concerning the 
relevant legislation in Jordan.  
 
2.9.1.1 Company laws 
2.9.1.1.1 The company law of 1964 
In 1964, Jordan issued Company Law No. 12, its first company law, managed 
by the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Naser 1998). Unfortunately, this law was pretty 
limited in scope. Only two types of corporations were identified:  limited shareholder 
and partnerships firms (Haddad et al. 2017). Furthermore, there were no articles about 
disclosure requirements concerning the content or form of financial statements. This 
law required companies’ boards to prepare its profit and loss account and balance 
sheet, and have audited by a certified auditor. According to this law, the main role of 
the company’s auditor was to ensure the correct procedures were followed in preparing 
these two documents (Haddad et al. 2017). This law has undergone many amendments, 
especially in 1966, 1972, 1973, 1976 and 1978.  
2.9.1.1.2 The company law of 1989 
Company Law No. 12 of 1964 was finally replaced by Company Law No. 1 of 
1989 (Al-Akra et al. 2009), which took into account the establishment of the first stock 
exchange in Jordan (i.e., the AFM), and the increase in the number of Jordanian firms. 
This law required companies to show its stocks to the public and prepare financial 
statements in conformity to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
which were not determined by any law (Al-Akra & Hutchinson 2013) but were 
accepted international practice. The law required Jordanian firms to prepare annual 
reports with a balance sheet, a profit and loss statement, an auditor’s report and 
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explanatory notes, however, there was no specific form in which information was to 
be disclosed by companies in their financial statements (Abu-Nassar & Rutherford 
1996).  
 
2.9.1.1.3 The company law of 1997 
To promote the investment environment and to diminish routine procedures, the 
Company Law of 1997consisted of 289 articles, and the law applied to all types of 
companies: public shareholding companies, limited liability companies, private 
shareholding companies, general partnerships, foreign companies and limited 
partnerships, which operate in Jordan. The law required all firms to prepare their 
financial statements with figures comparative to those for the prior years. Furthermore, 
the financial statements had to present the true and fair value of the financial position 
of the corporate in keeping with international accounting and auditing standards 
(Haddad et al. 2017).  
The formulation and registration of corporations in Jordan was also realised 
under this law. Articles 132 203 dealt with public shareholding firms and covered the 
formation and registration procedures of firms, the capital of corporations, the 
minimum subscribed shares and the period for payment for the unsubscribed portion, 
underwriting of stocks by founders and principles for public subscription in stocks, the 
means of increasing and decreasing the firm’s capital, issues related to corporate 
bonds, the board of directors, representing the government and official institutions on 
the board of directors, financial reports, the meeting of the general assembly, 
circumstances for compulsory and voluntary liquidation and methods for 
transformation and mergers.  
It is to be noted that this law was issued for securities regulators, such as the JSC, 
ASE and SDC, and constitutes the present legal framework for the regulation of the 
securities market in Jordan. The law requires public shareholding firms to list their 
securities on the ASE, however, under Article 66 C, this law does not require private 
shareholding companies to list their securities on the ASE, and they may do so as they 
see fit.  
 
2.9.1.2 The temporary securities law of 1997 and its 2002 replacement 
Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 is considered the cornerstone of government 
reforms. The law constitutes the legal framework for the principal components of the 
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securities market. To restructure the capital market in Jordan, this law separated the 
regulatory function from the trading and technical side of the Jordanian market, by 
setting up three independent official institutions (i.e., the JSC, ASE and SDC). Another 
essential side of this law is related to the management of financial services, enabling 
the JSC to issue the Instructions of Financial Services Licensing and Registration 1999 
and the requirements for licensing and registering financial services, and specifying 
practitioners’ experience, and criteria for training and competence. As well, the law 
allows a broad set of financial instruments in the Jordanian capital market. The notion 
of securities is defined in Article 3, and is far reaching, including any rights or 
ownership, or any evidence local or foreign that is usually recognised as securities and 
considered as such by the board. This covers transferable and tradeable corporation 
shares, bonds issued by firms, securities issued by the government, municipalities and 
official institutions, securities depository receipts, investment units and shares of 
mutual funds, equity option bonds, forward contracts and spot contracts, and put and 
call option contracts.  
To regulate mutual funds and investment firms, this law allowed the JSC to issue 
its Instructions for Mutual Investment 1999. Furthermore, it awarded the JSC 
responsibility to control disclosure in the initial public offer period to remove 
informational asymmetry between investors and issuers. Through this law also, the 
JSC has adopted the IASs and the IFRSs which require firms to prepare and audit their 
financial statements in agreement with those standards.  
The issuance of Securities Law No. 76 in 2002, was a pioneering step in the 
process of government-led reforms. This law replaced Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 
and strengthened the independence of institutions and the authorities that operate in 
the capital market, particularly the JSC. It enhanced transparency and disclosure in the 
capital market by establishing an electronic disclosure system according to Articles 37 
and 40. Furthermore, the 2002 law established the Investors Protection Fund to 
improve investor trust. Some updates were made to this law with the issuance of 
Securities Law No. 18 of 2017.  
 
2.9.1.3 The commercial law of 1966 
The first law issued in 1966 was Trade Law No. 12 which required Jordanian 
firms to keep inventory records, a general journal and a correspondence register. The 
law covered four separate aspects: commercial contracts, bills of exchange, trade and 
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traders and creditors and bankruptcy. However, numerous supplementary laws were 
later passed to facilitate the implementation of Jordan’s economic policies (Al-Akra et 
al. 2009).  
 
2.9.1.4 Laws, by-laws and instructions of the Jordanian capital market 
In addition to the above laws, provisions in many other laws, by-laws and 
instructions, govern the capital market in Jordan. These have been issued by the JSC, 
ASE and SDC. Without going into extensive details about these provisions, some 
understanding of their intended scope is gleaned by a listing of their names which 
follows. These institutions have issued internal by-laws regarding the Central Bank of 
Jordan Law of 1971, Instructions for Criteria for the Solvency of Brokerage 
Companies Operating on the Stock Exchange in 1995,  the Banking Law of 2000, Data 
and Records of the Securities Depository Centre in  2003, Membership and Code of 
Conduct in 2004, the Securities Depository Centre’s Proceeds for 2004, Instructions 
for Investigating Violations of the Securities Law in 2004, Instructions for Issuing 
Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards in Year 2004, By-Law for 
the Amman Stock Exchange Fees, Charges and Commissions in 2004, Instructions for 
the Issuance and Registration of Securities in 2005, Instructions for Financial Services 
Licensing and Registration in 2005, Instructions for Dealing with Subscription Rights 
in 2006,  Instructions on the Accounting Principles and Standards Pertaining to the 
Preparation of Annual and Interim Financial Statements in 2007. 
Likewise,  Instructions on the Mandatory Policies and Standards for Re-
evaluation of Fair Value and for Disposal of Revaluation Surplus in 2007, Instructions 
on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing in Securities Activities in 
2007, Instructions for Conferring Share Options for Public Shareholding Companies’ 
Employees in 2008, the Credit Information Law of 2010, Instructions for the Issuance 
and Registration of Islamic Finance (Sukuk) in 2013, Instructions on the Disclosure of 
Information, Instructions for the Registration, Deposit, and Settlement of Sukuk  in 
2013, Sukuk Trading Instructions in 2013, Owners of the Islamic Finance (Sukuk) 
Committee Instructions in 2013, Instructions on Listing Islamic Finance (Sukuk) on 
the Amman Stock Exchange in 2014. 
 As well, Special Purpose Company Regulation in 2014, Islamic Finance 
(Sukuk) Contract Regulation No. 45 in 2014, Instructions for Share Buybacks by 
Public Shareholding Companies (Treasury Stocks) in 2014, Instructions for 
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Regulating the Operations of Selling Securities in the Implementation of Decisions of 
Competent Courts and Official Entities in 2015, the Electronic Transactions Law in 
2015, the Money Exchange Business Law of 2015, the Amended Instructions for 
Corporate Governance for Islamic (Sharia Compliant) Banks in 2016, Amended 
Instructions for Corporate Governance for Banks in 2016.  
In addition,  a Settlement Guarantee Fund in 2017, Instructions for Regulating 
the Dealing of Financial Services Companies at Foreign Stock Exchanges in Year 
2017, Instructions for the Registration, Deposit and Settlement of Securities in 2017, 
Instructions for Regulating the Dealing of Financial Services Companies at Foreign 
Stock Exchanges in 2017, Instructions for Securities Depository Receipts in 2017, 
Instructions for Margin Finance in Year 2018, Regulation of the Investors’ Protection 
Fund in Securities in 2018, Disclosure Instructions Applicable to the Amman Stock 
Exchange in 2018, Instructions for Dispute Resolution through Arbitration on the 
Amman Stock Exchange Company in  2018, Instructions for Investigation, Inspection 
and Auditing at the Amman Stock Exchange Company in 2018, Directives for Trading 
with Securities at the Amman Stock Exchange in 2018, Directives for Listing 
Securities on the Amman Stock Exchange company in 2018, Membership By-laws of 
the Amman Stock Exchange Company in 2018 and Directives for the Over The 
Counter Market at the Amman Stock Exchange Company in 2018.  
The laws, by-laws and instructions which govern the Jordan capital market, 
contain many separate provisions for disclosure, governance practices, transparency, 
accountability, compliance and audit, which allows for more oversight and the good 
practice of corporate governance in the financial institutions.  
 
2.9.2 Capital market in Jordan 
Broadly speaking, the capital market plays an important role in the growth of 
any country’s economy. In Jordan, some public company shares were previously 
traded in an irregular market, specifically, through private brokers who were used to 
sell, buy and track trading actions. They sold and bought shares using the open outcry 
system, which was inefficient, faulty and laborious. Furthermore, at that time, the 
trading volume was limited (Al-Khouri & Al-Ghazawi 2008). In 1930 and 1931, the 
Arab Bank and Jordanian Tobacco and Cigarettes were established, respectively. A 
similarly significant enterprise was introduced when Jordanian Cement Factories was 
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established in 1951. In the early 1960s, the bonds of Jordanian companies were issued 
and traded (Al-Khouri & Al-Ghazawi 2008).  
Economic growth and the increasing number of public companies ensured quick 
and easy trading and the need to protect investors, so the demand for a developed and 
organised Jordanian securities market increased. In 1976, the Jordanian government in 
cooperation with the IFC, established its first securities market, the AFM. This was 
the only stock exchange in Jordan and it finally began its operation in 1978. As the 
capital market grew, the number of its transactions increased. The Jordanian 
government concluded that further reforms of the market were needed to develop it to 
international standards. Among these reforms, the AFM was replaced by the 
establishment of three institutions, namely: ASE, JSC and SDC (more details are 
presented in Section 2.9.2.3).  
 
2.9.2.1 The key developments of the capital market in Jordan 
In the late 1990s, the Jordanian government embarked on a comprehensive 
reform policy of the capital market, which aimed at building on the previous 30 years’ 
experience, diversifying and expanding the national economy, enhancing the private 
sector and developing regulation of the securities market to reach international 
standards. Among the most prominent features of the new orientation were 
institutional changes in the Jordanian capital market, settlement and clearance systems, 
the application of international electronic trading, the elimination of barriers to 
investment and boosting capital market monitoring to achieve transparency and safe 
trading in securities, all in accordance with globalisation and openness to the external 
world.  
As mentioned earlier, the issuance of the Temporary Securities Law in 1997 was 
a landmark, a qualitative leap and turning point for the capital market in Jordan. The 
main purpose of this law was to regulate and restructure the Jordanian capital market. 
It is worth noting that the central point of this restructuring effort was the separation 
of the supervisory and legislative functions from the executive function of the 
Jordanian capital market. In setting up three new institutions to replace the AFM (i.e., 
the ASE, JSC and SDC), the AES and SDC played the executive function, while the 
JSC played the supervisory and legislative functions. 
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2.9.2.2 Divisions of the capital market in Jordan 
The securities market in Jordan consists of the primary and the secondary 
markets. The primary market includes the issuance of the securities by the 
corporations, including private placements. In contrast, in the secondary market, 
trading happens through the stock exchange (if listed) or off-market by other means.      
      
2.9.2.2.1 The primary market 
The primary market is also known as the issue market or new issue market. Any 
securities (stocks and bonds) issued by the government and companies are termed 
primary securities. These may be either initial public offerings or secondary offerings. 
An initial public offering is defined as “the first time that the general public is given 
the opportunity to buy stock and invest in a firm” (Hafer & Hein 2007, p. 38). This is 
usually a way through which to raise the capital to finance the growth of an already 
existing company. In Jordan, the initial public offering trend has been to generate 
finance for a start-up firm, which has no previous operations or track record, through 
an offering of stock at a price of 1 Jordanian Dinar (JD) per share.  
After issuing on the primary market, new stocks or bonds are traded in the 
secondary market. A secondary offering  may happen where a firm has already 
increased funds by initial public offerings but wants to issue more stocks and increase 
additional funds (Al-Tal 2014). Under the secondary offering, the corporation sells its 
stock to its institutional investors, existing shareholders and the general public (Al-Tal 
2014). The secondary offering is also known as a subsequent offering, seasoned 
offering and follow-on-offering (Al-Tal 2014). Therefore, initial public offerings and 
secondary offerings represent significant sources of funds for companies’ development 
and growth. 
2.9.2.2.2 The secondary market 
Unlike the initial public offering, a secondary market represents an exchange 
between two investors, one selling the shares and the other buying. Most investors do 
not buy shares at their initial public offering, but at some later date through the 
secondary market. The critical difference is that in a secondary market, the corporation 
for which the share represents an ownership obligation, does not receive anything from 
the transaction (Hafer & Hein 2007).  
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In Jordan, the secondary market is classified into three markets: the first, second 
and third markets. Trading takes place in securities, managed by special listing rules 
and regulations according to the directives for listing securities on the ASE (ASE 
2018). The listed securities are sold on the first and the second markets, and unlisted 
securities on the third. Furthermore, there are the bonds market (for development and 
corporation bonds), the right issues market (for rights issues listed on the ASE), and 
transactions off the trading floor (ASE 2018). Transactions off the trading floor 
involve inheritance and inter-family transactions (ASE 2018).  
According to the ASE (2018), the value of trading at the secondary market (first, 
second and third markets, the bonds market, the right issues market and the 
transactions excluded from trading) amounted to US$4,350 million over the year 2017, 
compared with US$4,449 million for 2016, a decrease of 2.2% (Figure 5 presents the 
stock price index weighted by free float market capitalisation by market).  
It is worth noting that during 2017, the third market was cancelled and six firms 
that met the conditions of listing in the second market, were transferred from it to the 
second market (ASE 2018). Furthermore, during 2017, the ASE delisted 29 firms that 
did not meet the requirements of listing in the second market or did not submit an 
audited annual report for 2016 on time, and therefore, transferred their shares to the 
over the counter (OTC) market.  
As Figure 5 shows, the index of the first market reached 1135.1 points by the 
end of year 2017, with a decrease of 96% against the 2016 closing figure. The second 
market index reached 915.7 points with a decrease of 6.9%. According to the ASE 
(2018), the third market index closed at 1249.5 points with a decrease of 5.8% 
compared to the 2016 closing position, until the 13th of April, which is when this 
market ceased to exist.  
Figure 5: Stock price index weighted by free float market capitalisation by 
market (Closing of 2012 = 1000) 
 
Source: ASE (2018) 
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2.9.2.3 The institutional structure of the Jordanian capital market 
As mentioned above, Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 is considered the 
cornerstone of government reforms. This law constitutes the legal framework for the 
principal components of the securities market. To restructure the capital market in 
Jordan, this law separated the regulatory function from the trading and technical side 
of the Jordanian market, by setting up three independent official institutions (i.e., the 
JSC, ASE and SDC) which are discussed below in more detail.  
 
2.9.2.3.1 Amman Financial Market (AFM) 
The AFM is a public financial organisation with administrative, legal and 
financial independence from the state (Omar & Simon 2011). In 1976, the AFM was 
established, and started its operations in early 1978, commencing with 57 listed firms 
with a market value of approximately US$400 million (Omar & Simon 2011). 
According to the Amman Financial Market Law No. 31 of 1978, the main aims of the 
AFM were:  promoting investments and savings in securities to meet the needs of the 
local economy, organising the process of issuance and dealing in securities to 
guarantee the ease, speed and soundness of financial transactions and to protect small 
investors, and collecting, classifying, analysing and publishing essential data and 
statistics to accomplish AFM goals. The AFM performs supervisory and regulatory 
functions in the market. The general meeting of the AFM is composed of the CBJ, 
public shareholding firms, specialised credit institutions, licensed banks and brokers.  
Until the early 1990s, the growth level of the AFM was very slow (Figure 6 
shows the level of growth of the AFM over 1979 to 1998). As noted by Al-Tal (2014), 
this was due to the political events in the region, such as the Iranian/Iraqi war and the 
Arab/Israeli conflict. After the First Gulf War in 1991, cash flows increased to the 
AFM. This led to an increased level of growth in market capitalisation, trading value 
and share price index of the AFM, until 1994 (Al-Tal 2014). Thereafter, the trading 
value became slow due to further political instability in the region (Al-Tal 2014).  
One of the most critical reforms in the Jordanian market, as emphasised above, 
is the issuance of Temporary Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 which aimed to restructure 
the AFM. As mentioned earlier, a basic feature of this reorganising process was the 
separation of the supervisory and legislative functions from the executive function of 
the Jordanian capital market. The executive function was conducted by the ASE and 
SDC, whereas the JSC performed the supervisory and legislative function.  
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Figure 6: The level of growth of the AFM from 1979 to 1998 measured by market 
capitalisation (JD in millions) 
 
Source: Al-Tal (2014, p. 22) 
 
2.9.2.3.2 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
Through Temporary Securities Law No. 23 of 1997, the ASE was established 
(Al-Tal 2014). It is considered a non-profit organisation with financial and 
administrative independence. Omar and Simon (2011) indicated that the key reason 
behind the ASE was the privatisation program. On March 11th, 1999, the ASE started 
its operations with 151 listed firms with a market capitalisation of about US$5,844.2 
million by the end of 1999 (ASE 2018).  
The ASE’s main aims are to perform trading actions in the Jordanian market 
under the oversight of the JSC. As well, it provides an organised, transparent, fair and 
efficient market for trading securities in Jordan, and a safe environment for trading 
securities to deepen confidence in the stock market and thereby serve the local 
economy. The vision of the ASE is to reach the latest international auditing and 
accounting standards in the field of financial markets, to provide an attractive 
investment environment. 
 As of now, the ASE is the only stock exchange in Jordan. During 2017, it was 
registered as a public shareholding company entirely owned by the Jordanian 
government under the name “The Amman Stock Exchange Company (ASE 
Company)”.  The ASE firm is the legal and factual successor to the ASE (ASE 2018). 
The ASE firm is managed by a board of seven directors appointed by the Council of 
Ministers, and a full time chief executive officer supervises day-to-day duties and 
responsibilities (ASE 2018).  
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The transformation of the ASE to a company, is expected to improve the role 
that the ASE plays in serving the local economy. Furthermore, it will enable it to offer 
better services, attracting new firms and new customers. It will also enter into regional 
and international agreements with different related parties, to increase its market share 
regionally and globally. 
Regarding the performance of the ASE, the trading value increased by 25.6% in 
2017 compared to 2016, where it amounted to JD2.9 billion (approximately US$4.08 
billion). The ASE general price index decreased by 2.0% compared to the 2016 closing 
figure, to settle at 2126.8 points, and the market capitalisation of the listed firms by 
the end of 2017 decreased by 2.2%, accounting for 61.8% of the GDP. Likewise, the 
total amount of ASE assets for 2017, was JD8.7 million (about US$12.2 million), 
where the total owners’ equity was JD7.6 million (approximately US$10.7 million). 
The total amount of revenue by the end of 2017 amounted to JD2.5 million (about 
US$3.4 million), whereas the total expenses reached JD2.0 million (approximately 
US$2.81 million). Accordingly, the ASE Company achieved a profit of JD468,000 
(about US$684,500) before tax (ASE 2018).   
The market capitalisation increased from JD4,137.7 million in 1999, to 
JD26,667.1 million, JD21,078.2 million, JD29,217.2 million, JD25,406.2, JD22,526.9 
million, and JD 21,858.1 million, in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. During these years, the Jordanian market witnessed the best performance 
since the commencement of the AFM in 1978. The market capitalisation went up to 
JD 26,667.1 million (in US$, about US$37,660.2 million), representing 326.6% of the 
GDP (ASE 2018).  
It is worth noting that the percentage of non-Jordanian ownership in the firms 
listed on the ASE has grown continuously. This was 43.1% of total market value by 
the end of 1999, 49.5% in 2010, 51.3% in 2011, 51.7% in 2012 and decreased slightly 
to 48.1% by the end of 2017.  There were many reasons for this. The privatisation 
program played an important role, with cash flows into the Jordanian market from the 
Gulf countries. Significantly also, after the Second Gulf War in 2003, Iraqi investors 
shifted their funds to the Jordanian market.   
Sectoral distribution of trading value confirmed that the financial sector ranked 
first, followed by the industrial sector and the services sector. The performance of the 
price index (weighted by market capitalisation of free float shares and involving 100 
of the largest and most active companies in the first and second markets) recorded a 
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decline at the end of 2017 by 2%, compared with the previous year, closing at 2126.8 
points. The price index, weighted by full market capitalisation, reached 4009.4 points, 
a decrease of 1.5%. Figures 7 and 8, respectively, give the detailed illustration of these 
movements. On the other hand, as a result of the changes in share prices and number 
of listed shares, the market capitalisation of listed firms decreased by 2.2% at the end 
of 2017, representing 61.8% of the GDP, as Figure 9 illustrates.  
Figure 7: Trading value at the ASE by sector for 2017 
 
Source: ASE (2018) 
Figure 8: Price index weighted by market capitalisation of free float shares (closing 
of 1999=1000) 
 
Source: ASE (2018) 
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Figure 9:  Market capitalisation of the ASE and its percentage of the GDP 
 
Source: ASE (2018) 
The performance of all Arab stock exchanges (ASEs) varied in 2017, with some 
ASEs witnessinga notable increase, whilst others ASEs declined, due to the political 
situation, and regional and global developments. The S&P AFE 40 Index, which is 
measured by S&P Indices in cooperation with the Arab Federation of Exchanges, rose 
by 2.0% by the end of 2017 (Figure 10). Over 2017, some price indices of ASEs 
denominated in national currencies, rose, compared to their 2016 closing positions. 
Figure 10: Market capitalisation of the Arab Stock Exchanges to GDP by the end of 
2017 
 
Source: ASE (2018) 
The Damascus Stock Exchange reported the highest increase of 269.9%, 
compared with the other ASEs. This was followed by the Egyptian Exchange, which 
increased by 21.7% and the Tunis Stock Exchange with 14.4%. As well, the price 
indices for the Bahrain Bourse, Kuwait Stock Exchange, Palestine Stock Exchange, 
Saudi Stock Exchange and Casablanca Stock Exchange, rose by 9.1%, 11.5%, 8.4%, 
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0.2% and 6.4% respectively. In contrast, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, the ASE, 
Iraq Stock Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, Qatar Stock Exchange, Beirut Stock 
Exchange and Muscat Securities Market, declined by 3.3%, 2.0%, 10.6%, 4.6%, 
18.3%, 5.3% and 11.8%, respectively. 
The ASE prepared its strategic plan for the coming three years 2018-2020, which 
corresponds with the projects and programs selected by the Jordanian government 
indicated in Jordan’s ten year plan document (2015- 2025). The reason for these 
projects is to preserve the achievements made so far, and improve the ASE’s work in 
all aspects. The plan comprises a large number of projects, the most important being 
applying a new Electronic Trading System, establishing a securities information 
centre, developing general applications for the ASE on smart devices, establishing an 
Islamic index, issuing a sustainability report, applying a new electronic disclosure 
system using XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) for listed firms and 
brokerage, launching a new website for the ASE and preparing corporate governance 
guidance for the ASE. Overall and through these means, the ASE contributes to 
corporate governance in Jordan, through strengthening shareholders’ rights. On the 
whole, the contribution of the ASE to Jordanian corporate governance, is to set the 
legal framework for all listed firms by requiring companies to adopt the Jordanian 
corporate governance code.  
 
2.9.2.3.3 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
The JSC is considered an official government body with legal, financial and 
administrative independence, and is connected directly to the prime minister. As 
indicated earlier, it was established through Securities Law No. 23 of 1997, to conduct 
the regulatory and supervisory functions of the Jordanian capital market, endeavouring 
to regulate and develop this market to ensure transparency, efficiency, and to protect 
it from any possible dangers and threats that it may face.  
The commission is subject to the supervision of internal and external audits and 
the Audit Bureau. As well, it complies with the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions standards. To achieve its aims, the Securities Law of 2002 gives the JSC 
the powers to regulate and control the issuance and dealings of securities and issues of 
licensing, registration and disclosure. In addition, the ASE, SDC, public shareholding 
firms issuing securities, registered persons, licensed financial services, corporate and 
mutual funds and investment firms, are subject to the supervision of the commission 
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in line with its instructions and other relevant regulations, laws and by-laws (JSC 
2012). The JSC is governed by a board consisting of five full time qualified 
commissioners, appointed for a five-year term renewable once, by a decision of the 
Council of Ministers, relying on the prime minister’s recommendation. Furthermore, 
the appointment is ratified by a royal decree. The chairman is the chief executive 
officer of the JSC and executes policies, authorises expenditure and is responsible for 
the JSC’s management.  
The JSC has a vital role in developing and improving the Jordanian code of 
corporate governance by issuing instructions to enhance corporate governance. In 
2015, the JSC has updated this code to be in keeping with the corporate governance 
principles of the OECD. The commission distributed the Balanced Scorecard for the 
year 2016 to public shareholding firms listed on the ASE to ensure their extent of 
compliance with applicable rules of the code of corporate governance. The main 
reason for these updates is to develop corporate governance practices and promote the 
protection of investors’ and minority shareholders’ rights. Likewise, to improve 
compliance with governance rules, an article has been added to the securities law that 
allows the JSC the authority and power to transform these into mandatory rules. 
 
2.9.2.3.4 Securities Depositary Centre (SDC) 
In 1999, the SDC was instituted by virtue of Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 as a 
non-profit entity with financial, legal and administrative autonomy. The SDC aims to 
protect the ownership of securities and to process registration of securities’ ownership 
amongst brokers. It seeks to reinforce investor trust, enabling investors to obtain 
information regarding their investments quickly and easily (SDC 2019). As well, it 
seeks to limit the dangers and threats in the settlements of trading transactions.  
To achieve its objectives, the SDC is authorised by the Securities Law of 2002, 
Article 76, to act in the Jordanian market under the JSC’s supervision. According to 
Article 77 of this law 2002, the SDC is the only entity in the Jordanian market to 
perform the following functions: firstly, register, safe-keep, and transfer ownership of 
securities; secondly, deposit securities; finally, clear and settle securities. The SDC 
registers and deposits the shares issued by the public shareholding firms, registers 
treasury bills, treasury bonds and individual savings bonds issued by the Jordanian 
government and registers Islamic Sukuk issued by the Jordan Islamic Sukuk Company 
for Financing Governmental Projects and the National Electric Power Company. SDC 
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membership is mandatory for public shareholding companies (i.e., banks and the 
insurance, services and industrial sectors), brokers, custodians and any other 
organisations as determined by the Commissioners’ Board of the JSC (SDC 2019).  
 
2.9.2.3.5 Insurance Commission (IC) 
By virtue of Insurance Regulatory Law No. 33 of 1999, the IC was established 
as a government organisation with a legal identity and with financial and 
administrative independence. The IC aims to monitor, regulate and improve the 
insurance sector and in doing so, to contribute to protecting the national economy. 
Specifically, the IC undertakes the following functions: 
1- Protect the rights of the insured and the beneficiaries of the insurance 
business, and oversee the solvency of firms to provide sufficient insurance 
coverage for these rights. 
2- Improve the efficiency of insurance corporations by creating a professional 
code of conduct and rules of ethics, to enhance the capability of the firm to 
provide better services for the beneficiaries, and therefore achieve 
competition between insurance firms. 
3- Provide qualified workers to exercise insurance business, including the 
establishment of an institute for this goal in cooperation with the Jordan 
Insurance Federation, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable 
legislation in the Kingdom. 
4- Increase insurance awareness and prepare research relevant to the insurance 
business. 
5- Encourage cooperation and strengthen relations with Arab and global 
insurance regulatory institutions. 
The IC issued its Corporate Governance Instructions in 2006 by virtue of the 
Insurance Regulatory Law No. 33 1999, Article 45(B), applying specifically to 
insurance firms, specifying the duties, responsibilities and roles of directors, the audit 
committee, executive management and internal auditors. As well, they deal with the 
establishment of risk management and internal control in insurance companies. The 
IC is responsible for following up insurance firms’ annual reports which must be 
checked by the firm’s external auditor and presented within specified times. 
Furthermore, insurance firms’ financial statements must be in line with prescribed 
standards. In 2003, the IC issued the Instructions of Accounting Policies to be adapted 
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by Insurance Companies, together with a set of forms required to prepare financial 
reports and statements for a standardised approach to the production of such 
information (Al-Tal 2014).  
 
2.9.2.3.6 Companies Control Department (CCD) 
By virtue of Companies Law No. 40, the CCD was established in 2003, as an 
independent entity to provide registration services and perform effective control 
mechanisms to ensure and activate corporate governance principles and to provide a 
secure growing investment environment to improve the national economy. The CCD 
is a government entity linked with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, whose key 
purpose is to register various types of companies in the Jordanian market and to control 
them by attempting to improve the procedures of company registration, and generally 
strengthen the mechanisms of internal and external control over them. As well as, it 
updates the principles of the law under which it was set up. The leading player of the 
control function is the General Controller of Companies.  
As indicated earlier in this chapter, according to Article 152.C, the board 
chairman of public shareholding corporations or any board member, may be appointed 
as the general manager of a firm or as his or her deputy or assistant, by a decision 
issued by a two thirds majority vote of members of the board. Therefore, this law 
allows the existence of CEO duality in the public shareholding companies. 
The CCD plays a pivotal role in developing corporate governance in Jordan. The 
CCD monitors public shareholding firms’ disclosures. Companies Law No. 40 grants 
the CCD authority to monitor the ownership and remuneration of the board of directors 
and public shareholding firms’ reports. According to the Article 138 A, the chairman 
and the board of directors members of public shareholding firms, the general manager 
and principal executive managers, must submit to the board of directors at the first 
meeting, a written statement of the firm’s shares held by each one of them, their 
spouses and any children who are minors. Furthermore, three days before the general 
assembly meeting, public shareholding firms must submit to the Controller a report 
which involves the salaries, travel and transport allowances, wages, remunerations, 
bonuses and privileges of the board of directors’ members and top executive 
management.  
Likewise, the CCD is responsible for monitoring the shareholders’ rights and the 
equitable treatment of shareholders. To improve the practice of the corporate 
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governance in Jordan, the CCD took the initiative to prepare the code of the corporate 
governance in 2012, which is specifically applicable to public shareholding firms that 
are not listed on the ASE, private shareholding firms, limited liability firms, private 
shareholding firms that are not for profit and limited liability firms that are not for 
profit. This code has five main sections: the board of directors (management 
committee roles and responsibilities), control environment, transparency, disclosure, 
and the rights of shareholders and stakeholders.  
 
2.9.2.3.7 Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) 
By virtue of the Central Bank of Jordan Law No. 4 of 1959, the CBJ was 
established in that year, starting its operations five years later in 1964. The CBJ is a 
public entity with financial, legal and administrative independence, which seeks to 
continue maintaining financial and monetary stability, and ultimately, contributes to 
the creation of economic and social growth in Jordan (CBJ 2019). Drawing on Article 
4 of Central Bank of Jordan Law No.23 of 1971, the CBJ tries to ensure the 
convertibility of the Jordanian Dinar, and to develop sustained economic growth in 
line with the general economic policy of the Jordanian government. Therefore, the CBJ 
is responsible for issuing and regulation of bank coins and notes in Jordan, managing 
and maintaining the gold and the foreign exchange reserves of Jordan, regulating the 
quality, quantity, and cost of credit to achieve the conditions for economic growth and 
monetary stability, adopting suitable measures to deal with national economic and 
financial issues, operating as a banker to licensed banks and to specialised credit 
organisations, controlling licensed banks to guarantee the soundness of their financial 
positions and the protection of the rights of shareholders and depositors and providing 
suggestions to the government about the the formulation and implementation of its 
economic and financial policy.  
In Jordan, there were 25 operating licensed banks by the end of 2017. Amongst 
these were 16 Jordanian banks, 3 of which were Islamic banks and 9 branches of 
foreign banks, including one branch of a foreign Islamic bank. Overall, these banks 
conduct their business within a network of 86 representative offices and 805 branches. 
The number of Jordanian bank branches operating abroad increased from 182 branches 
at the end of 2016, to 190 branches at the end of 2017. Also, the number of offices rose 
to 21, in addition to eight representative offices. Amongst these 190 branches, 95 
branches and 21 offices were working in the Palestinian territories (CBJ 2019). The 
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consolidated balance sheet of licensed banks rose by JD719 million (1.5%) in 2017, to 
reach JD49.1 billion, compared to an increase of JD1,250.3 million (2.7%) in 2016. 
In 2007, the CBJ enacted the Corporate Governance Code for Banks, relying on 
the principles of the OECD and the guidance issued by the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, to encourage good corporate governance practices in Jordanian 
banks. This code consists of four key features. Firstly, each bank must develop its own 
code of corporate governance. Secondly, each should act according to its own code by 
December 31, 2007. Thirdly, each must publish its own code in both its own annual 
financial report and on its website. Finally, each should attach to its annual financial 
report, a detailed report describing the extent of its compliance with its code and 
adopting a “comply or explain” system.  
Hence, it can be said that the CBJ granted the Jordanian banks the opportunity 
to set their code according to their own conditions. However, the CBJ identified the 
main following principles in order that these banks exercise the best practice of 
corporate governance: the equitable treatment of all stakeholders, disclosure 
requirements to assist stakeholders in evaluating the bank’s performance,  
accountability in relationships between the stakeholders and managers, and the 
determination of the board’s and senior management’s responsibilities.  
Furthermore, the CBJ monitors the compliance of the banks with disclosure 
requirements, and may publish the results as it deems suitable. It also oversees the 
board of directors’ responsibilities and duties. It supervises the board’s performance 
in setting and formatting the bank’s strategies, policies, plans and goals, and 
controlling their implementation. To improve the good practices of corporate 
governance in the banking sector, ‘Amended Instructions on Corporate Governance 
for Banks 2016’ were issued. These instructions further addressed a number of key 
areas of corporate governance, such as board composition, board overall 
responsibilities, conflicts of interest, stakeholders’ interests, disclosure and 
transparency.  
 
2.10 Chapter conclusion 
This thesis constitutes an investigation into whether the mechanisms of corporate 
governance influence firm performance and firm agency cost in developing markets, 
by considering Jordan as a case study. In doing so, it would be important to explain 
the institutional environment of this country. In this chapter, an outline of the main 
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challenges and issues in the existing structure of corporate governance and the unique 
features of Jordanian corporate governance have been presented. 
Jordan is a developing market with a small and open economy. The Jordanian 
economy suffers from a scarcity of natural resources, unemployment, external debt 
and regional instability, all of which influence the growth of the economy negatively. 
The capital market in Jordan is considered so far to be an active market. It plays a vital 
role in developing and managing the economy. To encourage the best practice of 
corporate governance in Jordan, the JSC, ASE, CBJ, CCD and CBJ have implemented 
many reforms, including issuing and updating codes of corporate governance in 
Jordanian companies.  
This chapter has addressed the challenges of corporate governance in Jordan, in 
particular, those related to the board of directors, ownership structure and CEO and 
management duality. It can be said that although some features of corporate 
governance are similar in developed and developing economies including Jordan, 
some are unique. The domination of internal control systems in companies, the 
predominance of family-owned Jordanian firms and weaknesses in the institutional 
settings for the current regime of corporate governance, lead to severe challenges to 
company level effectiveness of governance in Jordan.  
In addition, in this chapter, recent reforms of corporate governance in Jordan 
have been discussed. It is concluded that after the many collapses and scandals of 
corporations around the world, Jordan seems to be working to promote the corporate 
governance practices. Many guidelines have been issued both in the public and private 
sector, for example, instructions of corporate governance for shareholding listed firms, 
instructions of corporate governance for the banking sector, corporate governance 
instruction for insurance companies and Jordanian corporate governance code for the 
private sector. 
In a few words, this chapter has given an opportunity for academics, researchers 
and practitioners to obtain more insighs into the practice of corporate governance in 
developing countries, such as Jordan. 
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Board Independence, Firm Performance and Firm Efficiency: 
Evidence from Jordan 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study aims to investigate the influence of board independence in the 
form of the representation of ‘outside independent directors’ on firm performance and 
efficiency, also known as ‘agency cost’, amongst the listed firms and in the context of 
a developing country, by considering Jordan as a case study. 
Design/methodology/approach – By using data from 880 firm-year observations of 
non-financial firms listed on the ASE for the period of 2006-2016, and by using two 
measures each for firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q), and firm’s agency cost 
(asset utilization and expense ratio), this study uses ordinary least square regression 
models to test its hypotheses.  
Findings – The empirical results show that board independence in general has a 
significant positive impact on firm performance as indicated by the return on assets, 
and has a significant positive impact on firm efficiency as indicated by the asset 
utilization ratio. The findings also indicate that board independence has a significant 
negative impact on firm performance as shown by Tobin’s Q, and non-significant 
impact on firm’s agency cost using expense ratio. These results are robust to many 
robustness checks. Therefore, the results do not reject the predictions of agency theory, 
supporting outside directors as an effective mechanism.  
Research limitations/implications – This research is subject to several limitations, 
such as the requirement for appointing outside independent members in the Jordanian 
boardrooms, which was only mandatory from 2009. Hence, there may have been no 
outside independent directors before 2009, and this may have influenced the results of 
this study. 
Practical implications – The results of this study present valuable implications for 
policy makers, practitioners and non-financial sector management in developing 
countries including Jordan. Policy makers should formulate rules regarding the 
corporate governance of industrial and services-related firms. Rules that promote the 
adoption of independent members are important. There is a need to apply the true 
meaning of the ‘independent members’, as is the need to clearly define the members 
who serve as independent directors on the board of directors. 
Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on the practices of 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence in the context of 
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developing countries. 
Keywords – Agency theory, corporate governance, firm performance, firm efficiency, 
agency cost, independent directors, Jordan. 
 Paper type – Research paper
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Board independence, firm performance and firm efficiency: 
Evidence from Jordan 
 
1 Introduction  
Ideally, the interests of shareholders and managers should be completely aligned 
(Kim et al. 2007). However, because of the separation of ownership and control of 
modern companies, control functions are delegated to executive managers 
(professionals) by the legal owners of companies (Tosi Jr & Gomez-Mejia 1989; Seal 
2006; Chaddad & Iliopoulos 2013; Bernstein et al. 2016; Zhu & Yoshikawa 2016; Bao 
& Lewellyn 2017). It may be argued that the shareholders are incapable of looking 
after their own benefits (Kole & Lehn 1997). The effective separation of ownership 
(principal) from management (agent) in firms, leads to problems associated with this 
situation: so-called agency problems in terms of the contractual view of the corporation 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997). 
The agency problem is so significant that it has also been termed the ‘traditional 
agency problem’. The problem lies in the conflict of interest between shareholders 
(principals) and managers (agents) (Dharwadkar et al. 2000). In other words, whilst 
owners are interested in increasing their returns, managers are concerned with 
improving their wealth at shareholders’ expense (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Nazir & 
Afza 2018). Therefore, this will generate a conflict of interest between principles and 
agents, which may lead to agency costs (Ang et al. 2000). The appearance of agency 
problems in corporations, has made managers fabricate different kinds of costs and 
losses which are borne by owners (Henry 2004). Interestingly, there are mechanisms 
in place, such as the presence of outside directors on the company board, which can 
diminish the non-convergence of interests (Brickley et al. 1994).  
It is to be noted that scholars such as Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Fama and Jensen (1983), developed predominant theories on the practices of 
corporate governance (CG) that illustrate the CG problems that arise due to the 
separation of ownership and control. A number of monitoring mechanisms are 
proposed to mitigate agency problems and enhance performance. These comprise 
external ones, such as the market for corporate control (Bozec et al. 2004),  and internal 
ones, such as an ownership structure with large shareholders (Demsetz & Lehn 1985), 
and control by the board (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Zahra & Pearce 1989). 
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A board is the dominant internal CG mechanism of a company (Shin et al. 2018). 
In short, a company board’s purpose is to monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders (Chen 2011; Switzer et al. 2018). It is considered to be an essential 
mechanism for enhancing CG practices, and firm performance and value, and protects 
shareholders from self-interested managers (Kim & Ozdemir 2014; Chen 2015). The 
value added by a firm’s board of directors is twofold. Firstly, it protects suppliers of 
finance from management misbehaviour, facilitating access to external resources and 
decreasing their cost. Secondly, it may give the firm a competitive advantage by 
providing a network of contacts and good reputation (Bertoni et al. 2014). Hence, it is 
argued that boards may play a vital role in mitigating agency problems (Rose 2005). 
Yet, according to Baysinger and Butler (1985, p. 120), the “board of directors is only 
one of many institutional arrangements that have been invented for controlling agency 
cost”. 
In the governance literature, there is a heated debate about whether a company 
board is actually able to monitor management. The wave of company collapses, such 
as WorldCom, Adelphi, Tyco, Enron and HIH, has led to the appearance of an issue 
described as “question the board’s ability to monitor management” (Mizruchi 2004, p. 
614; Harris & Raviv 2006). WorldCom, Enron and HIH management were all engaged 
in controversial accounting practices that were not detected by their boards (Bhagat et 
al. 2008). Therefore, one of the main causes of these scandals, was the board’s 
inadequate monitoring and inability to provide independent advice (Ross 2005). 
As a consequence, there has been an increasing focus on boardroom reform. 
Among these is the idea of board independence. Reports on CG (e.g., the Higgs Report 
2003, the Cadbury Report 1992, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the Smith Report 2003 
and the Ramsay Report 2001), support many boardroom reforms (Rashid 2018), such 
as a general improvement in the skills of non-executive directors (Kirkbride & Letza 
2005). For example, the Cadbury Report (1992) recommended at least three non-
executive directors as board members. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required 
greater independence between the main related parties involved with the corporation, 
such as the board of directors and management, and explained the definition of 
‘independent’ as independent from the company (Gupta & Fields 2009). 
Worldwide, reforms to increase the number of independent board directors have 
been extensively adopted (Muravyev et al. 2014; Cladera & Fuster, 2014). Yet as a 
solution to agency problems, this proportionality on boards is recognised to be a partial 
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one. Board members’ attitude and capacity are also significant: “a board’s willingness 
and ability to responsibly monitor the enterprise is related to board members’ 
independence” (Dalton & Dalton 2011, p. 406). An empirical study by Gordon (2006) 
found that from 1950 to 2005, the percentage of independent directors of large public 
firms has risen from almost 20% to 75% in US boardrooms. Bhagat et al. (2008) 
described independent directors as a vital mechanism of CG for monitoring managers. 
Therefore, the inclusion of outside directors may constitute a significant CG 
mechanism to support resolving the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Maseda et al. (2015). Implicit in these arguments is the concept that 
board independence plays a pivotal role in alleviating agency cost and promoting firm 
performance. 
As part of this trend, in 2009, the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) 
required all listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to assure the 
presence of independent directors on a continuous basis.  
This study seeks to revisit agency theory by investigating whether board 
independence in the form of representation of ‘outside independent directors’, may 
enhance firm performance and ameliorate agency cost in developing countries, with a 
specific focus on Jordan. Jordan is an interesting setting to study the effect of board 
independence on firm performance and efficiency or agency cost for the following 
four main reasons. Firstly, Jordanian listed companies are characterised by a high 
ownership concentration while most previous studies have been carried out in the 
context of listed companies featuring dispersed ownership. Secondly, there are some 
institutional differences of CG practices in Jordan, for example, chief executive officer 
(CEO) duality and high insider representation in the boardrooms, and Jordan’s legal, 
financial, regulatory and political systems, internal controls and product factor market 
systems. It has been confirmed that institutional variations between countries are a 
significant factor influencing agency costs due to the separation of ownership from 
control (Ahmed et al. 2006). Thirdly, there is an important role for family-controlled 
companies. It has been confirmed 90 percent of Jordanian companies are controlled 
and owned by families (Al-Azzam et al. 2015). Therefore, executive directors in 
Jordanian companies are family-based owners. In other words, many of these 
executive directors have large ownership stakes within the firms. Finally, developing 
countries have been affected by the attention paid to CG practices by independent 
bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
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World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation (Solomon 2007; Jamali et al. 2008; Matten & Moon 
2008; Rashid 2012; Ngo et al. 2018). These bodies have also been working on 
improving a culture of investor protection in developing countries (La Porta et al. 
2000; Abdallah & Ismail 2017).  
The bulk of previous studies which examined the effect of board independence 
on firm performance, relied on traditional financial measures, such as the return on 
investment, return on equity, return on assets (ROA), return on sales, Tobin’s Q, 
earnings per share, shareholder returns, abnormal returns, market-to-book ratio, price-
to-earnings ratio, and profit margin, to identify the effectiveness of company 
performance (Dalton & Dalton 2011). However, there is a problem related to 
traditional financial performance measures. It can be argued that these are relatively 
noisy measures of firm performance (Pham et al. 2011). To revisit the notion of board 
independence in the unique setting of agency relationship in the context of Jordan, this 
study uses two measures of agency cost, namely- asset utilization ratio (AUR) and 
expense ratio (ER), as additional measures to ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
The remainder of this study is organised into the following sections. Section 2 
explains the context for board independence in Jordan. Section 3 discusses selected 
previous studies on independent directors and firm performance. Section 4 provides a 
justification of the theoretical foundation of this study. Section 5 develops the 
hypotheses for this research. In Section 6, the research method is described. Sections 
7 and 8 deal with the presentation and discussion of the results. The final section 
discusses a conclusion, the study’s limitations and implications. 
 
2 Board independence and agency environment in Jordan 
The topic of board independence arises from the context of Anglo-American 
companies in which boards are composed in one tier, whilst in continental Europe, in 
countries such as Finland, Germany, and Netherlands (but not Spain and France), they 
comprise two tiers (Maassen 2002). In one-tier boards, the board chairman and CEO 
perform their responsibilities together, whereas, in two-tier boards, there is a 
separation of the executive role of the board from its monitoring role (Maassen 2002).  
Unlike the firm boards in many countries of continental Europe, the boards in 
Jordan are organised under a one-tier system (World Bank 2005; European Bank 
2017). In this situation, there is no distinction between the board and the management, 
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because the board chairman and the CEO are the same person (Shanikat & Abbadi 
2011). Thus, Jordanian boards have little to do with controlling management as CEO 
duality is prevalent in many listed firms in Jordan. Therefore, the mechanisms of firm 
control are often internally oriented  in developing countries, including Jordan (Zheng 
et al. 2017). For example, there is concentration of ownership even though shares are 
listed on stock market, CEO duality and high insider representation on the board 
(Solomon 2007). 
It is worth noting that there are some distinct institutional differences between 
the Jordanian market and developed markets. For example, because of their dispersed 
ownership structure, corporations in developed markets have a greater tendency to 
employ professional managers (La Porta et al. 2000) who do not have a stake of 
significant ownership within the companies. In Jordan, 90 percent of companies are 
controlled and owned by families (Al-Azzam et al. 2015). Hence, with their significant 
ownership right, executive directors are able to exercise control over the company 
board. In practice, Jordanian boards are strongly dominated by owners who belong to 
one family. Thus, CEO duality and family duality in the Jordanian corporate sector is 
common. The latter case is where the father serves as board chairperson, and the son 
as the chief executive officer. Consequently, it seems that JCGC needs some reforms, 
especially the notion of board independence or ‘independent member’.  
Basically, the governance structure is designed to oppose the appointment of 
professional directors in Jordanian boardrooms, yet it has been argued that the 
requirement that board members should be shareholders, seems to be inconsistent with 
the concept of independent directors (World Bank 2005; European Bank 2017). 
European Bank (2017), noted that only two of the ten largest Jordanian listed firms 
disclosed the identity of the independent directors on their boards. Furthermore, it may 
be argued that in Jordan, as with many developing countries, institutional regulatory 
bodies fail to exert pressure on companies to follow CG principles and standards 
reliably. This is due to the fact that families hinder the work of governmental 
institutions in the enforcement of regulations and rules. As Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008) argue, the families’ political relationships are usually in direct contradiction 
with the state’s rational and legal authority.  
However, outside directors play a pivotal role in monitoring firm management 
in Anglo-American countries. It can be argued that outside board members work well, 
because these countries depend on laws and information disclosure to ensure owners’ 
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rights (Rashid 2018). Othman and Zeghal (2006) have pointed out that there is higher 
control of management by outside directors, financial analysts and the financial press 
in Anglo-American countries, with directors and managers basically acting as agents 
for owners and, therefore, maximising shareholder wealth. Furthermore, there is a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers in which managers tend to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour in the best interests of themselves at the expense of 
owners’ interests (Yang & Zhao 2014; Aktas et al. 2018). Thus, there may be 
information asymmetry between owners and management. This is the context in which 
board independence is played out in Anglo-American and continental European 
contexts. The independence of the board may act as a balancing mechanism between 
the board of directors and top management (Dalton & Daily 1999).  
Unlike in developed countries, the main problem of CG in Jordan is the 
weakness of an institutional framework, where there is a lack of enforcement 
capabilities along with great dominance by certain families. The existing institutional 
regulatory bodies fail to exert pressure on companies to follow principles, rules and 
standards as reliable guidelines.  Therefore, the differences in governance structure 
and regulatory systems between the developed countries and developing countries like 
Jordan, mean that the Jordanian corporate sector is potentially prone to inherent agency 
conflicts. 
To improve the practices of CG, in 2005, the Jordan Securities Commission 
(JSC) issued the first JCGC for firms listed on the ASE, the adoption of which, 
however, is not mandatory. In addition, Jordan announced this new CG code was based 
on a ‘comply or explain’ approach. Later, the JSC issued Circular No. 12/1/4659 about 
its CG code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE, which came into effect on 
1 January 2009. Special provisions were made for the banking sector. A publication 
entitled the “Bank Directors’ CG Handbook” was issued in 2004, which was 
strengthened by a CG code specifically for Jordanian banks in 2007, followed by CG 
instructions for banks in 2014. 
 More recently, Jordan also issued new CG directives for firms listed on the ASE, 
which came into effect on 22 May 2017. Among numerous requirements, it was 
recommended that at least one-third of board members should be independent 
members. According to JCGC, that independent member is not to be tied to the firm 
or any of its top executive management, affiliate firms and its external firm auditors 
by any financial interests or associations other than his owners in the firm that may be 
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suspected to bring that member benefit, whether financial or incorporeal or that affect 
member’s decisions. Apart from this, other regulations exist to address issues 
concerning boards. 
 
3 Literature review 
The concept of CG has been defined repeatedly. One working definition is “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury 1992, p. 15). As 
well, according to the governance structure, the main role of shareholders is to appoint 
managers (Cadbury 1992). Therefore, the board plays an important role in enhancing 
CG in their firms (Baysinger & Butler 1985). It is argued that the board of directors is 
a primary internal mechanism of CG that may impact firm performance and agency 
costs (Masulis & Mobbs 2011; Che & Langli 2015; Barka & Legendre 2017; Rubino 
et al. 2017). From a review of the literature, it appears that weak governance practices 
in firms, may lead to more agency problems on one hand, and, on the other, weak 
shareholder protection. Weidenbaum (1986) suggested that boards without outside 
directors work as a ‘rubber stamp’, and domination by the CEO may lead to a conflict 
of interests between shareholders and managers. Hence, the presence of an efficient 
board can assist in avoiding the opportunistic behaviour of directors, determining that 
their aims are aligned with those of the firm’s shareholders (Rubino et al. 2017). 
The idea of the board of directors as a mechanism of CG is to provide owners 
with some level of affirmation that their investments will be protected (Maseda et al. 
2015). Due to the corporation’s directors having access to valuable information 
associated with strategic management, the board of directors is the best way to monitor 
the management of the company’s resources and allows for the controlling of the 
CEO’s activities (Barka & Legendre 2017). To be more specific, agency theory asserts 
that the central role of the board of directors is to monitor the management team 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Romano & Guerrini 2014; Che & Langli 2015; Kumar & Zattoni 
2017). This theory treats the corporation as a nexus of contracts through which 
different participants transact with each other (Voordeckers et al. 2007). Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the board of directors may help in enhancing firm performance and in 
mitigating agency costs (Anderson & Reeb 2004). 
Broadly speaking, the board is divided into insiders (executive directors) 
including the CEO and other current members of the company’s (or its subsidiaries’) 
management and outsiders (non-executive directors). Outside directors may be non-
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affiliated or affiliated (Anderson & Reeb 2004; Dey 2008). Affiliated outside board 
members, such as lawyers or former executives, have personal links with the company 
(Pearce & Zahra 1992; Voordeckers et al. 2007; Jones et al. 2008). Non-affiliated 
outside board members are referred to as independent directors (Zahra & Pearce 1989; 
Pearce & Zahra 1992). Earlier studies propose that the board’s composition is a critical 
variable in understanding managers’ performance of their duties and boards’ 
contributions to ameliorate agency problems (Fama & Jensen 1983; Hermalin & 
Weisbach 1988; Kumar & Zattoni 2017). 
An abundance of studies has been conducted on boards in the fields of finance, 
management, economics and even law, with most carried out in developed countries 
and featuring diffuse ownership (Rashid 2015). Some studies investigating the 
company board based on four board attributes (i.e., composition, process, structure and 
characteristics) indicate that these attributes may directly affect the firm’s performance 
and agency costs (Zahra & Pearce 1989; Dalton & Daily 1999). Empirically, much 
work has been conducted on the relationships among board independence, 
performance and agency cost (Voordeckers et al. 2007; Rubino et al. 2017). Yet, 
findings of studies that addressed the relationship between the proportion of 
independent outside board directors and firm performance, have been mixed 
(Kryzanowski & Mohebshahedin 2016; Zattoni et al. 2017). This study attempts to 
provide complementary evidence about whether board independence should influence 
firm performance and agency costs of non-financial Jordanian companies. 
Again, on the positive side, in an investigation of 403 firms for the period 1992 
to 1999, Anderson and Reeb (2004) found the presence of outside independent 
directors to be positively related to performance and to mitigate agency problems. This 
is in line with Al-Najjar’s (2014) evidence from five Middle Eastern countries, and 
two Hong Kong studies (Leung et al. 2014; Cheng et al., 2012), Bathala and Rao’s 
(1995) research in the United States, the studies of Liu et al. (2015) and Zhu et al. 
(2016) in China, Barka and Legendre's (2017) research in France and Lefort and 
Urzúa’s (2008) findings in Chile. Kuo and Hung (2012) found outside independent 
directors mitigate the negative influence of family control on investment cash flow 
sensitivity. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) confirmed that the announcement of outsider 
directors’ appointments, increase the wealth of shareholders, and outside directors are 
a main source of inside director’s incentives.  
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Likewise, Rashid (2015) looked at the relationship between board independence 
and agency cost based on a sample of 118 non-financial companies listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange, for the period 2006 to 2011. The results indicated that board 
independence can alleviate agency cost in terms of the AUR measure. Gul et al. (2012) 
examined the influence of CG variables on agency cost, by employing a sample of 50 
listed firms on the Karachi Stock Exchange for the period 2003 to 2006. The authors 
indicated that a higher proportion of outside directors may lead to lower agency costs, 
as measured by AUR. Similar results were found by Hamdan (2018) in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Zhu et al. (2016) found a higher percentage of such directors is 
linked with less earnings management, and therefore improved firm value.  
On the negative side, Yasser et al. (2017) reached the conclusion that the 
appointment of outside independent directors may negatively affect a firm’s value. It 
may be argued that a higher percentage of such directors decreases market-based 
measures, such as Tobin’s Q (Song et al. 2017). Dey (2008) asserted that the 
companies with higher agency problems have better CG practices in place, most 
especially those related to the independence of the board. Additionally, Rubino et al. 
(2017) indicated that independent directors do not seem beneficial for resolving 
agency problems in family companies, based on Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Singh and 
Davidson (2003) maintained that independent outside directors do not seem to protect 
the company from agency cost. Muravyev et al. (2014) found that in Russia, 
independent directors are linked with a higher private benefit of control and thus do 
not seem to support better CG practices. Another study produced ambivalent results 
with no clear empirical evidence that outside independent directors are more or less 
valuable than other directors (Rosenstein & Wyatt 1990). Rashid (2018) investigated 
the association between board independence and firm performance in Bangladesh, 
finding that these do not positively influence each other, as measured by accounting 
and market performance measures.  
As well, studies carried out by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Christensen et 
al. (2010), Bird et al. (2018) and Zhou et al. (2018), claimed a significant negative 
association between independent directors and firm performance. On the other hand, 
McKnight and Weir (2009) looked at the relationship between agency cost and CG 
mechanisms, finding that the percentage of outside directors on a firm’s board has no 
impact on agency costs in a sample of United Kingdom firms from 1996 to 2003. 
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Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) stated numerous reasons for such differences 
in findings. These include not considering contextual factors (e.g., company strategy 
and life cycle), and not efficiently considering how members of a firm’s board interact 
to make decisions. However, despite these differences, they agree that in general, the 
board of directors may affect the performance directly by quality controlling 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996).  
It is to be noted that many of the earlier studies have employed accounting-based 
measures, such as ROA and return on equity, and market-based measures, such as 
Tobin’s Q (Dalton & Dalton 2011). However, it is confirmed that the accounting profit 
can be manipulated simply (Holthausen et al. 1995; Murphy 1999; Barth et al. 2005; 
Pham et al. 2011). Thus, this study addresses the CG and agency cost relationship for 
listed companies featuring highly concentrated ownership, by using two measures of 
agency costs, namely, AUR and ER, as additional measures to ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
4 Theoretical background   
Proponents of agency theory (such as, Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; 
Eisenhardt 1989) argue that there is a conflict of interest between the related parties, 
such as shareholders, and managers. Based on agency theory, that the managers are 
self-opportunist and self-interested, rather than unselfish. It can be argued that the 
managers will increase their wealth, more likely at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests. Supporting this argument, Solomon (2007), Qiao et al. (2017) and Lew et al. 
(2018), claim that the CEO duality (dual leadership structure) contribute to the 
aggregation of executive authority and power, which may help incursion of CEO by 
mitigating the effectiveness of monitoring roles of the board of directors. Elsayed 
(2007) indicates that the CEO duality has a negative effect on firm performance by 
reducing the monitoring function of the board of directors.  Moreover, Sheikh et al. 
(2018), (McKnight & Weir (2009) and Lin et al. (2014), note that the duality alleviates 
the board independence and boosts the executive powers over control decisions. 
Inferentially, the CEOs will conduct self-interested activities that could be hindered to 
the economic welfare of the shareholders, unless they are restricted (Deegan 2006). 
Thus, CEO duality is considered as an indication of inefficient CG in the agency 
theory.  
By contrast, stewardship theory contends that the agent is motivated to act in the 
interests of owners (Donaldson & Davis 1991), that “managers are not motivated by 
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individual goals, rather, they are stewards, whose motives are aligned with the 
objectives of their principals” (Davis et al. 1997, p. 21), and shareholders, because of 
their fiduciary responsibilities (Donaldson 1990). Therefore, there is no conflict 
between shareholders and managers. As Tricker (1994, p.3) argues, “classical 
corporate governance, derived from the mid-nineteenth concept of the corporation, is 
rooted in the philosophy that men  can be trusted; that directors can be relied on to act 
in the best interests of the company”. Stewardship theory states that fewer outside 
directors should be present on boards, owing to the mitigated need for a controlling 
purpose (Che & Langli 2015). Therefore, the principal mission of the board is to 
support the management team, rather than to supervise and monitor it (Barka & 
Legendre 2017). 
Drawing on resource dependence theory, the function of resource provision 
relates directly to the capacity of a board of directors to bring new external resources 
to companies. Johnson et al. (1996, p. 411) described the board “as a means for 
facilitating the acquisition of resources critical to the firm’s success”. Therefore, 
according to the resource dependence perspective, a board of directors can serve 
important other roles for corporations, such as providing resources for organisations, 
and outside directors are a crucial link for a corporate board to an external environment 
(Daily & Dalton 1994). It is also argued that outside directors could bring to the 
boardroom a diversity of expertise and perspectives that the company can draw upon 
in implementing the company’s strategy (Johnson et al. 1996). 
 This study is based on the assumption that the separation of ownership and 
management may lead to managers engaging in self-interested actions. It has been 
confirmed that board independence provides an essential monitoring function in trying 
to resolve agency problems (Bathala & Rao 1995). As this study investigates whether 
the independence of the board improves performance and alleviates agency cost, it 
relies on agency theory. It is argued that the independent directors will produce 
independent advice, which stewardship theory ignores (Nicholson & Kiel 2007). In 
addition, it is assumed that independent directors will offer alternative roles, such as 
monitoring and advice, which resource dependence theory ignores by focusing only 
on links to the external environment of corporations (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). 
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5 Research hypothesis 
Agency theory suggests that as directors exercise a controlling role in the 
company, these directors may be able to pursue acts that benefit themselves but not 
shareholders (Dalton et al. 1998). Board independence is usually associated with the 
existence of outside directors, who are not part of the management of the company, in 
contrast to internal or executive directors who are present on the management team 
(Uribe-Bohorquez et al. 2018). Kang et al. (2007) argued that the independence of the 
board is assumed to be closely linked to the support of the board. Due to outside 
independent directors having experience and qualifications (Fields & Keys 2003), they 
are viewed as a good mechanism for monitoring the performance of managers and 
inhibiting opportunistic activities as a result of the strong motivation of such directors 
and their interest in overseeing managerial operations, and thus adding value to the 
company (Fama & Jensen 1983). The representation of outside independent directors 
on the company board should offer a positive relationship to the firm’s performance 
(Fuzi et al. 2016).  
Empirically, prior studies (e.g., Luan & Tang 2007; Dahya et al. 2008; Liu et al. 
2015; Fuzi et al. 2016;   Shaukat & Trojanowski 2018) have reported a positive 
relationship between board independence and firm performance. The positive 
influence of board independence is justified by the fact that the higher financial and 
psychological independence of outside directors concerning managers, allows them to 
exercise their roles of monitoring, supervising and assessing the management team 
more effectively (Baysinger & Butler 1985). Therefore, this can effectively influence 
the financial performance and eventually add value to the company. Therefore, the 
relevant hypothesis is: 
H 1a: There is a positive relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. 
Promoters of agency theory argue that the central role of the board of directors 
is to monitor the activities of managers to protect the interests of shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen 1983; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Kaymak & Bektas 2008). From this 
perspective, the independence of the board will emerge from a balance of power 
between outside and inside directors. Ample earlier evidence suggests that the 
presence of independent directors protects owners when agency problems exist 
(Brickley & James 1987; Hermalin & Weisbach 1988). This is consistent with Che 
and Langli (2015), who pointed out that as conflicts of interest between shareholders 
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and managers are commonly found in listed companies, it is essential to have 
independent directors to control CEOs. 
However, it is worth noting that the outside directors work in tandem by acting 
either as a substitute for or complement to the ownership structure. It is argued that 
large shareholders have the ability to appoint independent directors to company boards 
by using their ownership rights to monitor management in order to mitigate agency 
costs between managers and shareholders (Kim et al. 2007).  It is argued that a 
company board has the legal power to monitor management activities, make 
contributions of objectivity and expertise, and evaluate the performance of top 
management (Byrd & Hickman 1992). Therefore, outside independent directors are 
“supposed to be guardians of the shareholders’ interests through monitoring” (Singh 
& Davidson 2003, p. 796). Further, outside directors tend to favour replacing a poor 
management (Byrd & Hickman 1992; Borokhovich et al. 1996). Therefore, this study 
considers that the proportion of outside independent directors will serve an essential 
monitoring function in trying to resolve agency problems (Chen 2011). This leads to 
the following hypotheses:  
H 1b: Board’s independence will reduce firm agency costs. 
 
6 Research method 
6.1 Sample selection 
Based on Bloomberg database and firm annual reports, 80 non-financial firms 
listed on the ASE for the period of 2006-2016, were considered, representing 35.71% 
of the total number of listed firms as of 31st December 2016. This excluded listed 
financial companies from the sample given the unique characteristics of their financial 
statements (Campbell & Keys 2002; Lemmon & Lins 2003). This sample consists of 
almost 36.19% of the market capitalisation of all listed companies as of 31st December 
2016. The total number of firm-year observations is 880. The data related to the CG 
variables were manually collected from firm annual reports. The Bloomberg database 
was the basis for obtaining the firm’s accounting information.  
The sample is composed of a variety of industries as per the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). Table 1 displays industry classification of the sampled 
Jordanian companies according to GICS. 
 
 
99 
 
Table 1: Industry classification of the sample 
 
6.2 Definition of variables 
6.2.1 Dependent variables 
In order to understand the multiple aspects of performance, measurement is an 
essential subject in studying CG, and is a great dilemma for researchers. There is a 
heated debate about the appropriate financial measures of performance (Johnson et al. 
1996). As a consequence, multiple measures of performance have emerged (Daily & 
Dalton 1993). As noted by Ghalayini and Noble (1996), there are two stages of firm 
performance measurement. The first is accounting-based and the second is market-
based.  
It is argued that accounting information provides a vital source of independently 
verified information about the performance of management in reducing agency 
conflicts (Sloan 2001). Furthermore, such information also provides relatively reliable 
financial information to relevant parties (Dai et al. 2013). Therefore, it helps 
shareholders to understand the firm’s activities and thus mitigates the information 
asymmetry between owners and managers (Dai et al. 2013), and ultimately alleviates 
agency problems. Accounting-based measures, such as ROA, are used as a proxy for 
firm performance in numerous related studies (e.g., Zahra & Stanton 1988; Kang & 
Kim 2012 and O’Connell & Cramer 2010; Rashid 2018).  
In line with these previous studies, both market-based and accounting-based 
measures are adopted in this study. According to Core et al. (1999), Salim and Yadav 
(2012) and Mangena et al. (2012), ROA is calculated as the ratio of profit (before 
interest and tax) divided by total assets. For Tobin’s Q, consistent with Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Rashid (2018), is defined as the ratio of the market value of the 
company to the replacement cost of its average total assets. 
Industries 
Number of firms in 
the sample 
Observed firm years 
Consumer Discretionary 19 209 
Consumer Staples 9 99 
Energy 1 11 
Health Care 3 33 
Industrials 19 209 
Materials 26 286 
Telecommunication Services 1 11 
Utilities 2 22 
Total 80 880 
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However, problems also exist with using both accounting and market 
performance measures (Dalton & Dalton 2011; Pham et al. 2011). Firstly, accounting 
profits can be manipulated simply (Healy 1985; Chakravarthy 1986; 
Wiwattanakantang 2001; Pham et al. 2011; and Nazir & Afza 2018). It is argued that 
these are prepared within the managers’ guidelines, and managers are likely to use 
particular accounting rules to promote firm performance (Barth et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, it may be contended that the accounting profit may be high even with the 
existence of agency cost (Nicholson & Kiel 2007). Furthermore, as Wiwattanakantang 
claimed, “not all agency costs are reflected in the accounting measures” (2001, p. 334). 
Secondly, to use market-based measures, the stock price of companies should reflects 
their market value. However, The Jordanian market is undeveloped; it is classified by 
thin and unregulated trading and more likely less well-informed investors (Bouri 
2015). Furthermore, most developing countries depend on ‘debt financing’ rather than 
finance from the stock market or ‘equity financing’, therefore, market-based measures 
do not represent true profits made by the shareholders on their investments (Kumar 
2004). Furthermore, Pham et al. (2011, p. 373) indicate that the measurement of 
Tobin’s Q is “subject to accounting treatment of balance sheet items”.   
To address these concerns, this study uses AUR and ER as reliable proxies for 
agency cost in addition to the performance-based measures of ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Ang et al. (2000) have had a prominent role in developing these agency costs measures. 
Subsequently, numerous studies (e.g., Singh & Davidson 2003; Florackis 2008; 
Wellalage & Locke 2012; Rashid 2013 and Rashid 2015) addressing the issues of CG, 
have employed these measures. According to Ang et al. (2000, p. 82), AUR is the 
“proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization”, and is 
calculated as the ratio of annual sales to total assets. Put another way, it measures 
management’s capacity to use assets efficaciously (Singh & Davidson 2003). Studies 
that have addressed agency cost have used AUR as a reliable proxy for it (Ang et al, 
2000; Singh & Davidson 2003; McKnight & Weir 2009). A low AUR has been 
interpreted to mean “that management is using assets in non-cash flow generating and 
probably value destroying ventures” (Singh & Davidson 2003, p. 799), and vice versa.  
ER is well known as a direct reliable proxy for agency cost. It is defined as the 
ratio of operating expenses to total annual sales, and refers to how effectively a firm’s 
management controls operating costs. This has been very frankly described by Ang et 
al (2000, p. 82): “this measure captures excessive expenses including perk 
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consumption”. A low ER indicates that the management is controlling the operating 
expenses. Therefore, a low ER should reflect lower agency costs (Singh & Davidson 
2003). 
As evidence of the mitigation of a firm’s agency costs, it is likely that there will 
be a negative association between board independence and agency cost as indicated 
by ER. Likewise, a positive relationship between board independence and agency cost 
is probable using AUR.  
 
6.2.2 Key independent variable 
In this study, the independent variable refers to the number of outside directors 
as a percentage of the total number of board of directors (BDIND), which is in line 
with earlier studies (e.g., Zahra & Stanton 1988; Bertoni et al. 2014 and Rashid 2018). 
 
6.2.3 Other control variables 
A number of control variables are included in this study based on the earlier 
literature on governance and firm performance. These are ownership structure, free 
cash flow (FCF), board size, firm size, firm age, sales growth, liquidity, leverage, 
research and development expenditure (R&D), years of operation and industry.  
Globally speaking, an insider ownership structure plays a pivotal role in 
disciplining a company’s management. Monitoring by outside members of the board 
is less critical for companies with high insider ownership (Prevost et al. 2002). Three 
ownership control variables are used in this study: director ownership (DIROWN), 
institution ownership (INSOWN) and largest block holding ownership (LBOWN). 
DIROWN is measured as the percentage of shares owned by directors. INSOWN, in 
line with Kula (2005) and Kholeif (2008), is defined as the percentage of shares held 
by financial institutions. It is argued that financial institutions may be in an informed 
position to monitor management’s actions and decisions (Kholeif 2008). The LBOWN 
draws on the ‘convergence of interest’ hypothesis, that monitoring shareholding may 
align the interests between shareholders and managers, and eventually promote firm 
performance and ameliorate agency cost (Jensen 1993). It is confirmed that the 
existence of shareholders holding a high percentage of the firm’s capital, is another 
method to reduce the effects of the separation of ownership and control on company 
value. As a consequence, more than 90% of corporations around the world have block 
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holders who hold >40% of the common shares in aggregate (Dai et al. 2017). LBOWN 
is measured as the percentage of shares owned by the three largest block holders. 
It is argued that to increase FCF, managers may invest in projects which are 
unnecessary or not economically feasible (Jensen 1986). In the present study, FCF is 
measured as the operating income before depreciation minus the sum of taxes plus 
interest expenses and dividends paid, scaled by the total assets. 
It may be argued that board size plays an important role in disciplining the 
company and monitoring its management. Therefore, board size may influence the 
capacity of boards to work efficiently (Coles et al. 2008). Similarly to Elsayed (2007), 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) and Fedaseyeu et al. (2018), in this study, board size 
(BDSIZE) is used as the total number of members on the board of directors. Large 
firms have been found to have a greater capacity to create internal funds, be more 
diversified and be less likely to make an omission regarding debt. However, they may 
also have higher agency problems. In line with Carter et al. (2010), Al-Bassam et al. 
(2015), Ararat et al. (2015) and Ducassy and Guyot (2017), firm size (size) is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the total assets.  
The performance of a firm may be influenced by a firm’s age; older firms have 
been found more likely to be more efficient and effective than younger ones (Ang et 
al. 2000). On the other hand, for young firms, this rating may not only indicate 
economic wealth but also the probability of survival (Czarnitzki & Kraft 2006). 
Consistent with Madanoglu et al. (2018) and Ngo et al. (2018), firm age (AGE) is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of years a firm has been listed 
on the stock exchange.  
It may be argued that firms with growing sales are likely to grow more quickly 
than those without (Durnev & Kim 2005). Therefore, the sales growth rate may 
indicate future firm performance. Borrowing from Short and Keasey (1999) and 
Ducassy and Guyot (2017), sales growth (GROWTH) is measured as the percentage 
of current year sales minus previous year sales, scaled by previous year sales.  
It has been confirmed that liquidity helps identify firm-specific attributes, “since 
the ability to manage working capital and acquire a greater quantity of cash balances 
relative to current liabilities, reflects superior skills” (Majumdar & Chhibber, 1999, p. 
296). Consistent with Al-Najjar (2014) and Connelly et al. (2017), liquidity (LIQ) is 
calculated by employing the current ratio, dividing current assets by current liabilities.  
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It is argued that debt is an essential governance tool because higher debt levels 
assist in decreasing the agency cost of FCF (Akbar et al. 2016). On the other hand, 
debt may ameliorate the agency problem of the debtholder and may affect performance 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Hence, it may be considered as a mechanism of CG. 
Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets (Ararat et al. 2015; 
Ararat et al. 2017). 
It is argued that firms with high R&D expenses are more likely to be high growth 
companies and may have a high valuation (Durnev & Kim 2005). Furthermore, R&D 
in production processes and technologies, may help in improving a firm’s performance 
(Akbar et al. 2016). R&D is calculated as R&D as a percentage of total expenditure, 
scaled by sales (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Choi et al. 2012; Farag et al. 2014; Ararat et 
al. 2017). 
Controlling for industry effects is an important consideration. It is argued 
industry effects may assist in identifying “unobserved heterogeneity at the industry 
level” (Elsayed 2007, p. 1207). On the other hand, the performance measures may vary 
amongst industries. In the current study, industry effects (GICS) are controlled for by 
the inclusion of dummy variables using the value of (1) if the firm is in the industry, 
or (0) otherwise. In addition, the regression equations are controlled for a time effect. 
This is done by adding ‘time dummies’ for the year in which the observations are 
made.  
 
6.3 Regression model 
For this study, the following model has been developed to test the association 
between board independence and firm performance: 
Yi,t=α+β1BDINDi,t+ β2DIROWNi,t +β3LBOWNi,t+β4INSTOWNi,t+β5 
BDSIZEi,t +β6      SIZEi,t + β7AGEi,t+ β8GROWTHi,t+ β9LIQi,t+β 10LEVi,t + 
β11FCFi,t + β12R&Di,t + ɛi,t 
where, Yi,t comprises the overall measure of performance, including agency 
cost, namely, ROAi,t, Tobin’s Qi,t, AURi,t and ERi,t. BDIND i,t is the proportion of 
independent directors to the total number of directors. DIROWNi,t is the percentage 
of shares owned by directors.  LBOWNi,t  is the percentage of shares owned by the 
three largest block holders. INSTOWNi,t  is the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions. BDSIZEi,t is the natural logarithm of the total number of board members. 
SIZEi,t is the natural logarithm of the total assets. AGEi,t is the natural logarithm of 
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the total number of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange. GROWTHi,t is 
the changes in sales. LIQi,t is the liquidity. LEVi,t  is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. FCFi,t is measured as operating income before depreciation, minus the sum of 
taxes plus interest expenses and dividends paid, scaled by total assets. R&Di,t  is 
calculated as R&D’s percentage to sales. α is the intercept, β is the regression 
coefficient and ɛ is the error term. 
For performing an accurate statistical analysis, there is a need to meet statistical 
analysis assumptions, such as multicollinearity, normality and heteroscedasticity. The 
assumption of normality requires that all observations should be distributed normally 
in the population. It is confirmed that the normality violations are of little concern 
when the size of a sample is high (higher than 30) (Coaks & Steed 2001). In addition, 
the Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test of the regression model provided a bell 
shape, conforming to data normality.      
Multicollinearity indicates high correlations amongst the explanatory or 
(independent) variables. In other words, when the explanatory or (independent) 
variables are significantly linked with one other. When there is a high degree of 
correlation between two or more independent or (explanatory) variables, these 
variables must be excluded.  Table 3 illustrates that there is no correlation between the 
independent variables, due to the correlation coefficients being either less than 75% or 
negative. Furthermore, based on Table 3, the variance inflation factors of all the 
variables of this study are less than 4 whilst it is confirmed that the variance inflation 
factor of higher than 10 is evidence of multicollinearity (Gujarati 2003). 
Under the assumption of heteroscedasticity, this indicates that the variance of 
the error is constant across observations (all levels of independent variables), or 
residuals of the dependent variables of the study are almost equal/constant. That is, the 
plot of standardized residuals ZRESID against the standardized predicted value 
ZPRED of the all study’s models, resemble a curve shape, pointing to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. The chi-square statistics and a corresponding p-value of the 
Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, indicate that heteroscedasticity is present in the 
regression model, which is adjusted employing a correction technique for unknown 
heteroscedasticity as proposed by White (1980).  
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7 Empirical results 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the examined variables are displayed in Table 2. The 
descriptive statistics include the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation. The table reveals that the averages of firm performances in terms of ROA 
and Tobin’s Q, are 5% and 110% respectively. It also shows that the averages of 
agency costs in terms of AUR and ER are 57% and 41% respectively. These results 
for agency cost are consistent with an expected high AUR and a comparatively lower 
ER. 
 On average, 52 percent of company board members are independent, and these 
range from 0% (no independence) to 100% of total directors. This number is consistent 
with the JCGC that recommended that at least one-third of board members should be 
independent. Furthermore, this number is fairly close to some standards of Anglo-
American countries. Brennan and McDermott (2004) pointed out that 61 percent of 
non-executive board members are outside independent directors of the listed 
companies on the Irish Stock Exchange. As well, as noted by Yermack (1996), the 
average percentage of outside directors in the largest United State public companies, 
is 54. Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) indicated that the average of independent directors 
is 41.2% in the Middle East and North African region, which includes Kuwait, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Tunisia, the UAE, Egypt and Qatar. However, this is 
low compared to Australian corporations where the average percentage of independent 
directors is 71.0% (Krishnamurti & Velayutham 2017).  
Based on Table 2, the mean board size is 8.47 members with a minimum of 3 
members and a maximum of 14. This is lower than the mean reported for large 
American public firms. Yermack (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Pathan (2009), 
produced corresponding means of 12.25, 12.3 and 12.92 respectively. In addition, 
Green and Homroy (2018) found that the mean number of directors in the Euro Top 
100 firms to be much higher, at 16.963. However, the mean board size of Jordanian 
listed firms is closer to that of the Australian figure of 8.63, as noted by Krishnamurti 
and Velayutham (2017). Likewise, in Malaysia, Germain et al. (2014) calculated the 
mean number of directors as between 7.5 and 7.8. In Jordan, the average percentages 
of director ownership, largest block holders and institutional investors, are 49%, 53% 
and 9% respectively. Table 2 presents an average of the mean debt ratio and R&D 
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measures of approximately 32% and 3% respectively. Table 2 displays descriptive 
statistics of the sampled Jordanian companies. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample  
 
In this study, regression model analysis was applied to measure the effects of 
board independence on firm performance and firm’s agency cost. Different models 
were constructed to examine board independence as an independent variable with 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, AUR and ER as the dependent variables. The results of the 
regression analysis of the influence of board independence on firm performance and 
agency cost of non-financial Jordanian companies, are presented in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 
7 respectively. 
The regression of coefficients of the relationship between board independence and 
firm performance are presented in panel A of Tables 4 and 5. It is noted that there is a 
significant positive relationship between BDIND and ROA as a measure of firm 
performance and a non-significant negative relationship between BDIND and the 
market-based measure of Tobin’s Q.  
Variables N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ROA 880 0.05 0.05 0.36 -0.28 0.10 
Tobin’s Q 880 1.10 0.86 4.45 0.21 0.82 
AUR 880 0.57 0.52 4.43 0.01 0.44 
ER 880 0.41 0.25 4.65 0.03 0.61 
BDIND 880 0.52 0.55 1.00 0.00 0.23 
DIROWN 880 0.49 0.47 0.99 0.01 0.27 
LBOWN 880 0.53 0.51 0.99 0.09 0.22 
INSTOWN 880 0.09 0.03 0.64 0.00 0.12 
BDSIZE 880 8.47 9.00 14.00 3.00 2.36 
SIZE 880 17.01 16.92 21.31 12.89 1.46 
LNAGE 880 2.72 2.83 3.66 0.00 0.75 
GROWTH 880 0.12 0.03 5.02 -0.82 0.69 
LIQ 880 2.81 1.69 29.04 0.07 3.99 
LEV 880 0.32 0.29 0.93 0.00 0.21 
FCF 880 -0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.33 0.07 
R&D 880 0.03 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.06 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively.  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIF 
1 BDIND 1.00 
           1.49 
2 DIROWN -0.53
*** 1.00           3.64 
3 LBOWN -0.38
*** 0.66*** 1.00          2.65 
4 INSTOWN 0.27
*** -0.45*** -0.03 1.00         1.57 
5 BDSIZE 0.07
* 0.12*** -0.22*** -0.11*** 1.00        1.63 
6 SIZE -0.17
*** 0.23*** 0.07** -0.06* 0.46*** 1.00       1.97 
7 LNAGE 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.07
** 0.11*** 0.14*** 1.00      1.13 
8 GROWTH -0.04 0.02 0.06
* 0.08* -0.04 -0.06* -0.19*** 1.00     1.07 
9 LIQ 0.04 0.10
*** 0.09*** -0.06* -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.19*** 0.11*** 1.00    1.38 
10 LEV 0.07
** -0.15*** -0.01 0.16*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.23*** -0.01 -0.44*** 1.00   1.64 
11 FCF -0.10
*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.04 0.07** 0.31*** -0.08** 0.06* 0.04 -0.21*** 1.00  1.32 
12 R&D 0.08
* 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.09*** 0.07** 0.07** -0.03 -0.14*** 0.27*** -0.13*** 1.00 1.12 
108 
 
Table 4: Board independence and firm performance (regression results) 
 Table 4 shows the summary of results of the effects of board independence on 
firm performance, as measured by ROA. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses. 
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Pane C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept -0.1936 
(-4.72)*** 
-0.1931 
(-3.24)** 
-0.1293 
(-1.43) 
BDIND 0.0296 
(2.70)** 
0.0390 
(3.19)** 
0.0289 
(1.75)* 
DIROWN 0.0462 
(3.50)*** 
0.0330 
(2.41)* 
0.0205 
(0.88) 
LBOWN -0.0219 
(-1.63) 
-0.0250 
(-1.82)* 
-0.0304 
(-1.30) 
INSTOWN -0.0067 
(-0.35) 
-0.0090 
(-0.48) 
-0.0203 
(-0.77) 
BDSIZE -0.0016 
(-1.41) 
-0.0022 
(-1.70)* 
-0.0033 
(-1.70)* 
SIZE 0.0140 
(5.41)*** 
0.0131 
(3.40)*** 
0.0132 
(3.10)** 
LNAGE 0.079 
(2.47)* 
0.0101 
(3.15)** 
0.0100 
(1.65)* 
GROWTH 0.0036 
(0.95) 
0.0031 
(0.81) 
0.0042 
(1.44) 
LIQ 0.0004 
(0.74) 
0.0006 
(0.81) 
0.0004 
(0.42) 
LEV -0.0649 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.0567 
(-3.73)*** 
-0.1014 
(-4.92)*** 
FCF 0.7820 
(11.41)*** 
0.7956 
(11.72)*** 
0.7543 
(19.58)*** 
R&D 
 
-0.1406 
(-5.17)*** 
-0.1374 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.0261 
(-0.64)*** 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.4623 0.4760 0.4310 
F-Statistics 46.12 21.00 23.10 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively. 
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Based on Tables 4 and 5, the results also confirm that BDZISE and R&D had a 
significant negative explanatory power in influencing ROA. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the small boards with outside independent directors are more effective 
in managing companies and enhancing their performance. In comparison, BDZISE 
had no significant effect on firm performance for Tobin’s Q. 
Table 5: Board independence and firm performance (regression results) 
Table 5 shows the summary of results of the effects of board independence on 
firm performance, when assessed by Tobin’s Q. The t-tests are displayed in 
parentheses. 
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Pane C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 1.724 
(3.30)*** 
1.747 
(2.37)* 
6.147 
(6.51)*** 
BDIND -0.0414 
(-0.34) 
0.0667 
(0.53) 
-0.2967 
(-1.94)* 
DIROWN 0.7730 
(4.73)*** 
0.7007 
(4.11)*** 
0.0917 
(0.42) 
LBOWN 0.1501 
(1.03) 
0.2815 
(1.77)* 
0.3152 
(1.45) 
INSTOWN 0.6550 
(3.24)** 
0.4230 
(2.13)* 
0.2161 
(0.91) 
BDSIZE 0.0354 
(2.32)* 
0.0165 
(1.03) 
0.0100 
(0.53) 
SIZE -0.0602 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0665 
(-1.65)* 
-0.2771 
(-6.34)*** 
LNAGE -0.0766 
(-2.00)* 
0.0094 
(0.23) 
-0.0608 
(-1.02) 
GROWTH 0.0471 
(0.91) 
0.0323 
(0.61) 
0.0211 
(0.80) 
LIQ 0.0193 
(1.82)* 
0.0232 
(2.10)* 
0.0186 
(2.00)* 
LEV -0.8146 
(-5.10)*** 
-0.7340 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.1822 
(-0.96) 
FCF -0.6001 
(-093) 
-0.5805 
(-0.92) 
0.4685 
(1.36) 
R&D 0.5030 
(1.36) 
0.9394 
(2.55)* 
0.9801 
(2.70)** 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
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Adj. R-squared 0.1693 0.2089 0.1300 
F-Statistics 20.97 18.78 5.37 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively 
The findings point out that LIQ had a significant positive explanatory power in 
influencing firm performance for the Tobin’s Q measure, but it shows no significant 
influence for the ROA measure. The LEV variable had a significant negative 
explanatory power in influencing ROA. SIZE had a significant negative explanatory 
power in influencing firm performance for Tobin’s Q; but it presents a significant 
positive relationship with ROA. LNAGE and FCF had a significant positive 
explanatory power in influencing firm performance as measured by ROA; whereas 
they had no significant explanatory power in influencing firm performance when using 
Tobin’s Q.  
The regression of coefficients of the relationship between board independence 
and firm agency cost/efficiency are presented in panel A of Tables 6 and 7. From the 
regression coefficients, it is revealed that there is a significant positive relationship 
between BDIND and firm’s agency cost of AUR. Likewise, it is noted that there is no 
significant relationship between BDIND and firm’s ER.  
Table 6: Board independence and agency cost (regression results) 
Table 6 shows the summary of results of the effects of board independence on 
firm’s agency cost for AUR. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses. 
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Pane C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept -0.8373 
(-3.17)** 
0.4322 
(2.00)* 
0.6115 
(1.60) 
BDIND 0.1460 
(2.17)* 
0.0580 
(1.10) 
0.1105 
(1.80)* 
DIROWN -0.0548 
(-0.65) 
-0.0264 
(-0.40) 
0.1090 
(1.25) 
LBOWN -0.1302 
(-1.31) 
-0.1813 
(-2.36)* 
-0.1020 
(-1.15) 
INSTOWN 0.1832 
(1.44) 
 
0.2071 
(1.83)* 
0.0801 
(0.84) 
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BDSIZE -0.0050 
(-0.68) 
 
-0.0007 
(-0.10) 
-0.0070 
(-0.91) 
SIZE 0.0560 
(3.62)*** 
0.0032 
(0.25) 
-0.0152 
(-0.85) 
LNAGE 0.0941 
(6.12)*** 
0.0674 
(4.87)*** 
0.2118 
(5.04)*** 
GROWTH 0.0360 
(1.88)* 
0.0375 
(1.80)* 
0.0596 
(5.60) *** 
LIQ 0.0150 
(3.13)** 
0.0034 
(0.90) 
-0.0019 
(-0.51) 
LEV 0.8104 
(7.00)*** 
0.3337 
(3.25)** 
0.2989 
(3.90) *** 
FCF 1.093 
(5.00)*** 
1.280 
(6.17)*** 
0.7768 
(5.60) *** 
R&D 
 
-1.822 
(-9.10)*** 
-0.9051 
(-5.15)*** 
-0.1460 
(-1.00) 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.2837 0.5234 0.20 
F-Statistics 14.00 24.60 8.31 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively 
Table 7: Board independence and agency cost (regression results) 
Table 7 shows the summary of results of the effects of board independence on firm’s 
agency cost, when measured by ER. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses. 
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Pane C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 1.830 
(6.21)*** 
2.133 
(5.24)*** 
3.505 
(5.52)*** 
BDIND 0.0140 
(0.17) 
-0.0211 
(-0.25) 
0.0584 
(0.46) 
DIROWN 0.3093 
(2.82)** 
0.1902 
(1.86)* 
0.2955 
(1.67)* 
LBOWN -0.1524 
(-1.45) 
-0.0746 
(-0.72) 
-0.0665 
(-0.40) 
INSTOWN 0.3477 
(1.56) 
0.2463 
(1.10) 
0.4535 
(2.22) * 
BDSIZE -0.0228 
(-2.40)* 
-0.0247 
(-2.57)* 
-0.0231 
(-1.54) 
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SIZE -0.0638 
(-3.80)*** 
 
-0.0645 
(-3.36)*** 
-0.1388 
(-4.52) *** 
LNAGE -0.1088 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.1066 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.1822 
(-4.10)*** 
GROWTH -0.1125 
(-3.13)** 
-0.1114 
(-3.07)** 
-0.1522 
(-6.36) *** 
LIQ 0.0153 
(1.25) 
0.0074 
(0.55) 
0.0017 
(0.22) 
LEV -0.1647 
(-1.50) 
-0.2216 
(-1.40) 
-.0271 
(-0.17) 
FCF -2.47 
(-4.16)*** 
-2.484 
(-4.25)*** 
-2.13 
(-7.00) *** 
R&D 
 
1.55 
(3.17)** 
1.410 
(2.81)** 
0.7814 
(2.43) ** 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.2076 0.2398 0.1801 
F-Statistics 8.05 11.00 7.35 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively 
From the results of the regression analysis, it can be noted that the BDIND are 
in expected directions. Therefore, it can be concluded that BDIND enhance firm 
efficiency and performance by controlling the best utilizing company resources and 
firm ROA.  
Concerning Tables 6 and 7, this is consistent with the idea that firm age, firm 
growth and FCF, may reduce agency cost. LNAGE, GROWTH and FCF seem better 
aligned to owners’ interests and management, and this was confirmed by the results, 
where LNAGE, GROWTH and FCF were positively related to AUR and negatively 
related to ER, with a higher AUR reflecting a firm’s lower agency cost, and with a 
lower ER reflecting alleviate firm’s agency cost. In addition, LEV had a significant 
positive explanatory power in influencing firm’s agency cost as measured by AUR. 
The findings also show that SIZE had a significant negative association with firm 
discretionary expenses. Hence, it can be said that debt ratio, firm’s age, FCF, firm size 
and firm growth, act as mechanisms to diminish the company’s agency cost. Therefore, 
these variables may be a substitute for other control mechanisms to promote firm 
value. 
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Overall, the results of this study point out the significant effects of the 
association between board independence, firm performance and efficiency, when 
measured by ROA and AUR. The findings of this study using the ROA and AUR 
measures support the agency theory. It is argued conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers are commonly found in listed companies; it is essential to 
have independent directors to control CEOs in order to resolve this problem (Che and 
Langli (2015), and thereby reduce agency problems. 
It has been argued that the knowledge and ability of outside independent 
directors may vary across companies and industries (Rashid 2015). Therefore, the 
relationships between board independence, agency cost and firm performance, may be 
industry or time specific. This may point to good control of a firm’s agency cost in 
some industries and years, and limited control in other industries and years. In addition, 
the need for advice and monitoring functions may vary across companies; therefore, 
there are probably significant variables driving the selection of company board 
members (Brickley & Zimmerman 2010).  
In line with this argument, the above model is modified. This was done by adding 
INDUSTRY dummies for the GICS codes which relate to the sector to which the 
company belongs, and TIME dummies for the year for which the observation was 
made. Therefore, the following model has been derived: 
Yi,t=α+β1BDINDi,t+ β2DIROWNi,t +β3LBOWNi,t+β4INSTOWNi,t+β5 
BDSIZEi,t +β6 SIZEi,t + β7AGEi,t+ β8GROWTHi,t+ β9LIQi,t+β 10LEVi,t + 
β11FCFi,t + β12R&Di,t +ΩYEAR+ γINDUSTRY+ ɛi,t 
The results after adding these industry and year dummies are displayed in Panel 
B of Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. The revised results of the regression coefficients indicated 
that many coefficients of variables altered from positive to negative and vice versa. 
Likewise, many coefficients of variables altered from a significant influence to a non-
significant influence and vice versa. Specifically, for firm performance, LBOWN and 
BDSIZE changed from non-significant to significant for ROA. R&D and LBOWN 
moved from non-significant to significant for Tobin’s Q. In contrast, BDIND, BDSIZE 
and LNAGE were modified from significant to non- significant for Tobin’s Q. For 
firm’s agency cost, BDIND, SIZE and LIQ changed from significant to non- 
significant using AUR. Conversely, LBOWN and INSTOWN were transformed from 
non-significant to significant for the same measure. Additionally, the dummy for 
consumer staples had a positive effect for ROA.  
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7.2 Endogeneity test 
Endogeneity is the association between any of the independent variables with 
the error term (Gippel et al. 2015; Rashid 2015). It is important that endogeneity is 
taken into account as any indication of evidence of unobserved influences is likely to 
create a degree of correlation between independent variables and the error term. This 
leads to biased estimates of the independent variables' coefficients.  In case it exists, 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is inconsistent. To deal with the endogeneity 
problem, the Instrumental Variables (IVs) techniques are used.  As proposed by 
Gujarati (2003), and following Elsayed (2011), Rashid (2013, 2015) Al-Najjar and 
Clark (2017) and Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2018), the F-test for the predicted value of 
board independence was not significant.  Specifically, using ROA as a proxy for firm 
performance, F= 0.4778 (P = 0.4896), and Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance, 
F = 0.0031 (P = 0.9554), and with AUR as a proxy for firm's agency cost, F = 0.2987 
(P = 0.5848), and with ER as a proxy for firm's agency cost, F = 0.0336 (P = 0.8544). 
These results point out that there are no signs of a potential endogeneity problem 
amongst board independence, firm performance and firm’s agency cost, suggesting 
both OLS and IVs are consistent. Following the earlier studies, such as Al-Najjar 
(2014), this research adopts the lag board independence as IVs.  
 
7.3 Robustness check  
As this research employed an unbalanced panel data (there are not 80 companies 
in all years), it may create some unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, there may 
be variation within a company and across the companies or to capture the company 
specific characteristics. To address this issue, the above model is run again by 
employing fixed-effect model or random-effect model, also known as panel data 
model. A ‘Hausman test’ is conducted to test the significance of the difference between 
the fixed effect and the random effect estimates.  
The coefficient of the ‘Hausman test’ indicated that the random effect model is 
consistent. The regression coefficients of the association between board independence, 
firm performance and agency cost under the random effect model, are displayed in 
Panel C of Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The revised findings of the regression 
coefficients pointed out that many coefficients of variables altered from positive to 
negative and vice versa. Likewise, many coefficients of variables altered from a 
significant influence to a non-significant influence, and vice versa. As well, the signs 
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of the coefficients of BDIND are changed from non-significant positive to significant 
positive using AUR. Also, BDIND are modified from non-significant positive to 
significant negative using Tobin’s Q. Thus, it can be confirmed that the variation 
across companies has influence on board independence, firm performance and firm 
efficiency.  
 
8 Conclusion, implications and limitations   
8.1 Conclusions 
The purpose of the current study was to empirically examine the predictions of 
agency theory with respect to the relationship between a board’s independence, a 
firm’s performance and a firm’s agency cost, based on accounting and market-based 
measures. AUR and ER were used as additional measures to ROA and Tobin’s Q, to 
capture the effectiveness of board independence in alleviating a firm’s agency cost. 
This responded to the call of earlier studies that there have not, as yet, been adequate 
studies of this nature conducted in the context of developing countries. This research 
involved collecting the related data on over 80 non-financial listed firms in the country 
context of Jordan.  
The results of this research are that board independence in the form of the 
‘representation of outside independent directors’, indicate that there is a significant 
positive relationship between board independence and firm performance, of return on 
asset, and a significant positive relationship between board independence and firm’s 
agency cost of AUR. These results are consistent with the findings of Al-Najjar (2014) 
and Rashid (2015). However, the results also report that there is non-significant 
positive association between board independence and firm efficiency of ER. This 
finding is consistent with earlier studies, such as Singh and Davidson (2003), 
McKnight and Weir (2009) and Rashid (2015). 
According to this, board independence does not fully serve as an effective 
mechanism to capture agency cost of corporates in general. In other words, it is 
revealed that the outside independent directors on boardrooms are concerned with 
employ of a company’s asset in a revenue generating venture, but they are not are 
concerned with controlling operating expenses of the company. The first explanation 
for this can be that, in the context of corporations with a high ownership concentration, 
such as the Jordanian case, the nature of agency conflict may be different from agency 
conflict in Anglo-American countries. In the Anglo-American context, there is a 
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conflict of interest between dispersed shareholders and company management whereas 
countries with a high concentration of ownership may face another type of conflict, 
that is, a conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Sun et al. 2017). The second explanation is that corporate boards in companies with 
a high ownership concentration are composed of members who represent the interests 
of shareholders and managers, therefore, “being unable to deal with the specific agency 
problem adequately” (Lefort & Urzúa 2008, p. 615). Another explanation is that, in 
developing countries, outside directors are more likely not to be truly independent 
(Barako et al. 2006). In Jordan, there is a requirement that all directors should be 
shareholders, which ignores the concept of independence altogether. Yet another 
explanation is that, in the context of Jordan, even if the company board is composed 
of new outsider directors, they are elected to those positions by the insider board 
directors. Thus, there are close associations between family shareholders and outside 
directors, in which case outside and inside directors may act on a system of ‘give and 
take’ (Singh et al. 2018). 
For Tobin’s Q measure, the results also document that there is a significant 
negative association between board independence and market-based measure using 
Tobin’s Q. This result is a line with prior research, such as that of Sakawa and 
Watanabel (2017), Rashid (2018) and Singh et al. (2018). This study’s findings did not 
support the prevailing belief that board independence is positively associated with 
Tobin’s Q. It can be said that, in order to apply market-based measures to measure 
company performance, these have to reflect the real value of the firm (Lindenberg & 
Ross 1981). Hence, such measures may not be effective in developing countries as, on 
one hand, the capital market is not well developed (Lindenberg & Ross 1981; Joh 
2003). As well, as Bacidore et al. (1997, p. 11) have argued, market-based measures 
“may not be an efficient contracting parameter because they are driven by many factors 
beyond the control of the firm’s executives”. Jordan is no exception to this. The 
Companies Control Department in Jordan has pointed out that the Jordanian market 
witnessed during the period from 2000 to 2011, 44 bankruptcy cases in Jordanian 
firms, including 26 cases in the industrial sector (Zureigat et al. 2014). Claessens and 
Djankov (1999, p. 502) asserted that employing the market-based measures may “lead 
to a downward bias in the relationship between concentrated ownership and firms’ 
valuation” in countries with weak protection of minority shareholders such as Jordan.  
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However, these results do not rebuff the predictions of agency theory for the 
following three key reasons. Firstly, it is argued that the mechanisms of CG are an 
integrated system. It can be said that companies may use numerous tools to capture 
firm’s agency cost, board independence being one among several. Furthermore, 
outside independent directors "may still be in a position to perform some oversight 
monitoring role, and outside directors’ inability to monitor may be captured by the 
insider ownership" (Rashid 2015, p. 193). Secondly, in some developed countries, 
these independent directors failed to add any value for companies, such as in various 
high profile United State cases (Singh & Davidson 2003). Finally, it may be argued 
that inside directors are more effective due to their having adequate knowledge and 
information about the company, more so than outside directors. As Nicholson and Kiel 
(2007, p. 588) argue, “inside (or executive) directors spend their working lives in the 
company they govern, they understand the businesses better than outside directors, and 
so can make superior decisions”. Therefore, the results of this research are not 
surprising.   
 
8.2 Implications 
The results of this study present valuable implications for policy makers, 
regulatory authorities, practitioners and non-financial sector management, in 
developing countries including Jordan. Firstly, policy makers should formulate 
regulations and rules regarding the CG of industrial and services-related firms. 
Regulations and rules that promote the adoption of outside independent directors are 
important. There is a need to apply the true meaning of the ‘independent members’, as 
is the need to clearly define the members who serve as independent directors on the 
board of directors. Indeed, the importance of this research for related parties is that it 
has strong implications for the present reform movement of CG practices in Jordan. 
Secondly, it is important to support companies not to have very large boards. It is 
argued that large board’s members are easier for the CEO to control (Jensen 1993). 
Finally, firm age, FCF and firm growth, are becoming important control mechanisms 
that can add value to the firm. These play an important role in mitigating firm’s agency 
cost; therefore, having a positive impact on firm efficiency.  
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8.4 Limitations and future research 
This study has some limitations that might warrant future investigations. Firstly, 
this research investigated the influence of board independence in the form of 
representation of ‘outside independent directors’ on firm performance and efficiency. 
The requirement of appointing outside independent members in the Jordanian 
boardrooms, was mandatory only from 2009. Hence, there were no independent 
directors before 2009 and that may have influenced the results of this study. Secondly, 
the research’s data relating to the CG variables, was manually collected from firm 
annual reports, to carry out quantitative analysis, however, annual reports may not be 
accurate. Therefore, future research may support this research’s evidence by using 
qualitative research methods, such as conducting face-to-face interviews. A third 
limitation is the inclusion of only one board characteristic, i.e. board composition, 
however, it is suggested that a future research direction would be to explore the effect 
of various other company board characteristics on firm performance and efficiency or 
agency cost. Forthly, the current study excluded financial firms, because these are 
managed by different rules and instructions, thus the sample size was decreased from 
224 firms to 80, which is a limited number. Finally, the empirical analyses of this 
research are based on a single country setting. Future study can examine CG across 
different Arab countries with similarly shared cultures, economies, institutional 
settings and financial infrastructure. Additional future research may find that outside 
independent directors are considered an important resource to the firm in that they may 
provide advice, legitimacy and counsel, which enhance performance. Therefore, future 
research could use resource dependence theory by investigating certain board 
characteristics, such as gender, age, experience and qualifications, which may improve 
firm performance and mitigate agency cost. This study addressees the importance CG 
mechanisms within the industrial and services sector in Jordan, and provides a basis 
for other related research.  
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Board Gender Diversity, Firm Performance and Efficiency in 
Jordanian Boardrooms: A Revisit of Resource Dependence Theory 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study aims to examine the impact of board gender diversity in the form 
of the representation of ‘women on the board of directors’ on firm performance and 
efficiency, also termed firm’s agency cost, in the context of a developing country, by 
considering Jordan as a case study and taking the data from that nation’s listed firms. 
Design/methodology/approach – By utilising data from 880 firm-year observations 
of non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for the period of 2006-
2016, and by employing two measures each for firm performance (return on assets and 
Tobin’s Q), and firm’s agency cost or firm efficiency (asset utilization and expense 
ratio), this study uses a regression model to test its hypotheses.  
Findings – The results of the estimation of random effect regression indicate a non-
significant and positive relationship between the number of women on the board of 
directors and the return on assets, Tobin’s Q and asset utilization. The random effect 
regression also produces weak evidence (significant in one of four measures) that there 
is a significant and negative link between board gender diversity and firm efficiency 
in terms of the expense ratio. These findings have passed many robustness checks. 
Therefore, the results do not support the predictions of resource dependence theory.  
Research limitations/implications – The study’s data relating to the corporate 
governance variables, were manually collected from company annual reports to 
conduct a quantitative analysis, however annual reports may not be accurate.  
Practical implications – The empirical evidence of this study does not support the 
gender quota law to increase the percentage of women on companies’ boards. Thus, 
the decision to appoint females to a company’s board should not be based on the view 
that gender diversity on corporate boards will promote the performance and efficiency 
of firms.  
Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on the practices of 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as board gender diversity in the context of 
developing countries, by considering Jordan as a case study. 
Keywords Resource dependence theory, corporate governance, agency cost, firm 
efficiency, firm performance, board gender diversity, Jordan.  
Paper type- Research paper 
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Board Gender Diversity, Firm Performance and Efficiency in 
Jordanian Boardrooms: A Revisit of Resource Dependence Theory 
  
1 Introduction  
In modern companies, the separation of ownership and control leads to problems 
associated with this situation: so-called agency problems (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). 
Drawing on agency theory, company managers have the tendency to use the firm’s 
resources for their own benefit, not that of company owners (Jensen 1986). That is, 
whilste shareholders are interested in increasing their returns, managers are concerned 
with growing their wealth at owners’ expense (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Nazir & 
Afza 2018). Agency costs consist of the sacrifice of wealth by the shareholders and 
the potential costs associated with monitoring the managers (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). As well, information asymmetry is another cause of these agency conflicts, 
where managers have more information than owners (Jurkus et al. 2011). Therefore, 
the appearance of agency problems in corporations, hinders firm performance by 
increasing the firm’s agency cost.  
Interestingly, there are mechanisms in place, such as the board of directors, 
which can mitigate the non-convergence of interests (Brickley et al. 1994). Worldwide, 
the vast majority of firms are governed and managed by a board of directors (Hermalin 
& Weisbach 2003). The composition of the company board is a vital tool within the 
corporate governance (CG) structure. The company’s board is the most important 
internal control mechanism seeking to monitor corporate management activities to 
hinder managers from opportunistic behaviour (Fama & Jensen 1983).  
The value added by the board of directors of a firm is twofold. Firstly, board 
members are expected to fulfil a variety of roles that include the monitoring of 
managers to reduce the company’s agency cost (Jensen 1993). It is argued that the 
“board of directors is only one of many institutional arrangements that have been 
invented for controlling agency cost” (Baysinger & Butler 1985, p. 120). Secondly, it 
may provide new external resources to companies (Pfeffer 1972). It is confirmed that 
boards of directors function “as vehicles for co-opting important external organisations 
with which they are interdependent” (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, p. 167). Therefore, the 
board of directors can serve as monitors of a corporation’s management; they also 
serve as a vital device to provide external resources to the firm (Hillman et al. 2000).  
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 However, the financial crisis of 2008 and company scandals such as the 
bankruptcies of WorldCom and Enron in the United States, and HIH, Ansett and 
OneTel in Australias have led to rising shareholders’ concerns about the effectiveness 
of CG practices in organisations. As a consequence, there has been growing attention 
about promoting the effectiveness of the board of directors, especially ways of 
‘cleaning up’ the firm boardroom (Liu et al. 2014; Wahid 2018).  
Amongst these is the issue of board gender diversity. To maximise owner’s 
wealth, reports on CG (e.g., Higgs Report, 2003, Cadbury Report 1992, Sarbanes-Oxly 
Act 2002, Smith Report 2003 and Ramsay Report 2001) support many boardroom 
reforms (Rashid 2018), such as the participation of women on the board of directors 
(Ahmadi et al. 2018). For instance, the Higgs Report in the United Kingdom suggested 
females be included on firms’ boards (Adams & Ferreira 2009) specifically, in an 
effort to enhance the effectiveness of boards. Furthermore, these reforms have been 
promoted by many advocacy organisations, such as Catalyst (Marquardt & Wiedman 
2016). Reforms to increase the number of women on the board of directors have 
extensively been adopted. Increasing efforts for gender diversity equality have led to 
a spread of laws and regulations that plan to increase women’s representation on 
companies’ boards across the world (Dale-Olsen et al. 2013; Bianco et al. 2015). It has 
been argued that these laws and regulations provide guidelines on board gender 
diversity, which make it obligatory upon firms to comply with laws and regulations 
(Saeed et al. 2016). For example, many countries have adopted specific legalisation to 
promote gender diversity in the corporate boardrooms (Francoeur et al. 2008; 
Armstrong et al. 2010). Botero et al. (2004) supported the presence of employment 
protection laws. In many countries around the world, the board of directors must now 
comprise 30-50% of females according to gender quotas (Hillman 2015).  
In 2003, Norway introduced a gender quota law to increase the percentage of 
females on companies’ boards from 9% to 40% by 2005 (Ahern & Dittmar 2012). 
Until recently, Spain and France have followed Norway to support a gender quota law 
for a rise to 40% by 2015 and 2017, respectively (Adams & Ferreira 2009). In a similar 
move in Italy, women must take on 33% of Italian companies’ board positions by 2015 
(Chapple & Humphrey 2014). The Netherlands has supported the idea of a gender 
quota law (Bøhren & Strøm 2010). Other countries, such as Australia, Canada and the 
United Kingdom, have issued soft laws based on ‘the comply or explain principle’, to 
encourage gender diversity in the corporate boardrooms (Kumar & Zattoni 2016). The 
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reason behind the increasing participation of women on corporate boards is premised 
upon the idea that this has a positive influence on CG, and ultimately, on firm value 
(Green & Homroy 2018).  
However, developing countries such as Jordan remain unregulated in terms of 
company board gender diversity. This is due to the fact that CG regulations, laws and 
rules are less developed and enforced (World Bank 2005; European Bank 2017). 
Regulations and rules that require increased board independence may lead to creating 
new opportunities for females to serve on firms’ boards. More recently, there has been 
a heated debate on the concept of board diversity in the CG literature, including how 
board gender affects firm performance and efficiency (e.g., Smith et al. 2006; 
Brammer et al. 2007; Rose 2007; Triana et al. 2013; Nguyen et al. 2015; Sila et al. 
2016; Ahmadi et al. 2018; Green & Homroy 2018). The reasons behind the preference 
for board gender diversity can be categorised into two principal groups: firstly, social 
and individual justice and secondly, the business case. According to social justice 
principles, it is argued that as women constitute approximately half of the total 
population, they should hold half of the corporate board seats. Similarly, as claimed 
by proponents of individual justice, there should be support for the concept of the equal 
treatment of individuals (Kumar & Zattoni 2016). Drawing on business case 
justifications, gender diversity on firms’ boards is conducive to an increase in a firm’s 
number of options, and therefore, may make a positive mark on its creativity and the 
efficiency of its collective decision-making (Hillman 2015). This third justification is 
elaborated on at the end of Section 2. 
This study tests whether board gender diversity lowers agency cost that in turn, 
ultimately improves firm performance in the context of a developing country by 
considering Jordan as a case study. The current study is noteworthy for the following 
four key reasons. Firstly, investigating firm efficiency or agency cost is interesting in 
that it may be argued that the company’s performance is enormously correlated with 
its agency costs (Bruton et al. 2002), and the CG literature has provided evidence that 
board gender diversity can reduce a firm’s agency cost (Jurkus et al. 2011).  
Secondly, most of the earlier studies on gender diversity were using data from 
developed economies with firms featuring diffuse ownership, such as in Australia 
(Kang et al. 2007), Canada (Ben-Amar et al. 2013), Italy (Zona et al. 2013), and the 
United States (Carter et al. 2003; Hillman et al. 2002). Unfortunately, much less 
attention has been given to gender diversity issues in developing countries, such as 
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Jordan (Wellalage & Locke 2013; Adams et al. 2015; Nguyen et al. 2015; Saeed et al. 
2016). Therefore, there is not enough information or knowledge about the 
determinants of gender diversity in countries with different institutional, regulatory 
and legal systems. This study provides new insight into practices of CG in the context 
of a far less examined kind of institutional setting. The legal institutions in Jordan 
regarding CG, investor protections and accounting standards, are much less developed 
than those in developed countries.  
Thirdly, with a unique ownership structure that differs from the developed 
markets, Jordan offers an exciting setting for the study of board gender diversity. A 
high level of ownership concentration is a distinct feature of the Jordanian firms sector. 
It has been asserted that 90 % of Jordanian firms are owned and controlled by families 
(Al-Azzam et al. 2015). By contrast, listed firms in developed countries are 
characterised by a high level of dispersed ownership.  
Fourthly, unlike in developed countries, Jordanian firms are distinguished by an 
insider structure of CG. In Jordan, significant shareholders control most of the 
company’s decision-making as well as the appointment of board members. Therefore, 
gender diversity on boards may well be useful for countries such as Jordan, in which 
practices of CG are weak. It is argued that weakly governed firms may benefit from 
including more females on their boards, thus enhancing firm value. Gul et al. (2011, 
p. 314) pointed out that the gender diversity of a board “could act as a substitute 
mechanism for corporate governance that would be otherwise weak”. 
 Finally, with a unique culture that differs from Anglo-American ideologies, 
Jordan has a distinct cultural setting. It is argued that cultural differences can affect 
management actions, leadership and individuals’ behaviour. Furthermore, company 
management philosophies ordinarily develop in synchrony with the national culture 
(Wellalage & Locke 2013). It is timely to shed light on the notion of board gender 
diversity in the agency relationship, in the particular context of Jordan. Therefore, this 
study aims at examining the influence of board gender diversity on firm performance 
and efficiency, also known as agency cost, in 80 non-financial listed firms in Jordan, 
over an eleven-year period from 2006 to 2016.  
The study proceeds as follows. In Section 2, corporate governance, firm 
performance and board gender diversity are discussed. In Section 3, board gender 
diversity in Jordan is explained. Selected previous studies on board gender diversity, 
firm performance and efficiency, are reviewed in Section 4, followed by a justification 
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for the theoretical foundation of this study, in Section 5. In Section 6 the hypotheses 
for this research are developed. In Section 7, the research method is described. Section 
8 deals with the presentation and discussion of the results. The final section offers a 
conclusion, the study’s limitations and its implications. 
 
2 Good corporate governance, firm performance and board gender diversity 
CG is a general concept that includes many aspects related to specific issues, 
including both theories and the actual board practices of executive and non-executive 
directors (Maassen 2002). Daily et al. (2003) describe governance as the mechanism 
board members use, firstly, to determine which organisational resources will be 
deployed, and secondly, to establish the resolution of conflicts of interest among the 
related parties in a company. The idea that the board of directors must include outside 
directors, with independence from company management, is not a new phenomenon. 
Chandler (1975, p. 75) stated: “If it is true that the board must steadfastly represent the 
stockholders in making a continuous evaluation of the chief executive officer’s (CEO) 
performance, then a board of predominantly (even overwhelmingly) outsiders 
logically follows”. Therefore, many of the earlier studies addressed a single question 
regarding the board of directors: does having more outside directors improve firm 
performance?  
The structure of the board is closely related to the quality of CG mechanisms. 
From a review of the literature, it appears that weak governance practices and an 
inadequate protection of shareholder rights may lead to more agency problems. Hence, 
the presence of an active board of directors can avoid the opportunistic behaviour of 
directors, and determine the alignment of their aims with those of the firms’ 
shareholders (Rubino et al. 2017). Good CG attempts to effect the improvement of 
practices and systems, which make certain the accountability of managers (agents) and 
promote better firm performance. Recent proposals for CG reforms have emphasised 
the effectiveness of board gender diversity in the corporate boardrooms, for ultimately 
better CG (Brammer et al. 2007; Adams & Ferreira 2004).  
Walt and Ingley (2003) define ‘board diversity’, from the point of view of CG, 
as the composition of the board and the commixture of characteristics, attributes, 
expertise, qualities and expertise, contributed by board members about corporate board 
processes and other decision-making. Pelled (1996) pointed out that there are two 
categories of diversity. The first set is demographic diversity, such as gender, academic 
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level and race. The second set is non-visible attributes (e.g., skills, knowledge and 
individual capacities).  
This study focuses on board gender diversity for many reasons. Firstly, there is 
growing attention paid to board gender diversity through legislation, such as for gender 
quotas, in many countries around the world (e.g., Spain, Norway, France, Canada and 
the Netherlands). Secondly, gender diversity is the most easily distinguished 
demographic characteristic in comparison to culture, ethnicity, religion and age, for 
instance. Finally, this study aims to support the idea of board gender diversity in 
Jordan, which is a setting where gender diversity is very low, external mechanisms of 
CG are ineffective, and ownership is concentrated. Furthermore, there are obstacles 
for women in the labour market, such as more female unemployment and lower wages.  
Business case related arguments for gender diversity on boards, have been 
supported by research in a number of ways. Two main rationales are presented here. It 
has been confirmed that gender diversity plays a vital role in improving board 
monitoring, and women board members tend to take their tasks very seriously in such 
companies, which can lead to better CG, enhancing firm performance and reducing 
agency costs (Liu et al. 2014; Low et al. 2015). Singh (2007, p. 2131) has indicated 
that such corporations show that “they are responding to calls for increased diversity 
for better governance or better use of available talent”. Empirical studies by Liu et al. 
(2014) and Adams and Ferreira (2009), revealed that women managers tend to be more 
efficient in controlling activities, which may lead to more audit and management 
accountability. Hence, the findings of previous studies have noted that the increased 
diversity of the gender on corporate boards, is linked to better performance. In 
addition, the presence of females may develop management team performance, due to 
more gender diversity potentially leading to the exchange of a broader range of ideas, 
and therefore achieving better decision-making. These decisions can eventually lead 
to higher performance (Burgess & Tharenou 2002). Thus, gender diversity is a pivotal 
dimension of CG practices.  
 
3 Board gender diversity in Jordanian boardrooms 
Gender diversity is a relatively recent phenomenon in the CG literature (Gopalan 
& Watson 2015). Although  CG practices have gained increasing international 
importance, as has improving government laws, regulations and rules to exercise more 
pressure on publicly listed firms to increase the number of more diverse boards (Wahid 
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2018), Jordan has made no progress on the subject of gender diversity. Females 
represent approximately 49% of the total population in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) (OECD 2017). However, the rate of women’s participation in the 
labour force was only 13.96% in Jordan by the end of 2017 (Global Economy 2018). 
Therfore, the rate of the labor force participation of females in Jordan, is one of the 
lowest in world (Assaad et al. 2012). In contrast, information indicates that Jordanian 
women are outperforming in the field of education (World Bank 2016). Thus, there is 
a striking gap in Jordan, where women have a higher performance in all grades and 
subjects, combined with low rates of women’s participation in the workforce (OECD 
2017). Gender disparities may be due to a number of issues, such as a history of 
inequality, and poverty, and the dynamics of the Jordanian labour market. 
Consequently, women in the MENA region, including Jordan, remain an untapped 
resource for promoting an economy. Indeed, it is high time to explore the effect of 
board gender diversity on firm performance efficiency in developing countries, with a 
specific focus on Jordan.  
Unlike most developed countries, the social structure in Arab countries like 
Jordan differs from other countries. It has been confirmed that families tend to be the 
dominant element in society rather than individuals (Singh 2009). These families 
support sons rather than daughters, regarding their career. Furthermore, it is argued 
that the cultural and social barriers to female labour persist, despite some increase in 
the participation of women at work (Miles 2002). Generally, female behaviour is 
restricted and paid labour has not been considered part of women’s role in Arab 
societies. In fact, unemployment is a significant problem faced by Jordanian women 
(Ibrahim & Hanefah 2016). Therefore, the lack of female representation on corporate 
boards in Jordan, becomes a vital issue that needs to be addressed because of the 
benefits which have been established as deriving from board gender diversity.   
To improve the practices of Jordanian CG, Jordan has issued four codes that 
addressed CG issues. These codes are the CG code for the banks, the CG code for 
listed firms, the CG instructions for insurance companies and the CG code for the 
privately held firms. More recently, Jordan also issued a new directive concerning CG 
for shareholding listed firms on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), which came into 
effect on 22 May 2017. In addition, other legislation, regulations and rules, influence 
the implementation of Jordanian CG, such as Company Law No. 22, 1997 (and its 
amendments), and those concerning the functions of the Central Bank, Insurance 
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Commission, Securities Commission and Companies’ Control Department. This 
legislation and all these codes, regulations and rules, address issues related to the board 
of directors, for instance, the board of directors’ responsibilities, tasks and appointment 
(Jordan Institute of Directors 2014). However, the latest issue of 2017 of the Jordanian 
Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) for shareholding firms listed on the ASE, did not 
yet include an article about the subject of board gender diversity. 
Despite CG reforms in Jordan, the calls for more independent directors do not 
seem to contain a call for more women in Jordanian companies, whether financial or 
non-financial. The structure of Jordanian CG has been designed to work against the 
appointment of women on corporate boards. According to the World Bank (2005, 
P.13) and the European Bank (2017, p. 8), the practice that “directors must be 
shareholders” as a requirement, is not consistent with the best practices of the concept 
of independent directors. Yet this is the case generally in Jordan. Hence, only wealthy 
women have the opportunity to hold positions on corporate boards. Furthermore, 
according to a report by the Jordan Institute of Directors in partnership with the IFC, 
the requirements for qualifications and a diversity of composition under the CG code 
for listed firms, specify that board members should be qualified with adequate 
experience and knowledge (Jordan Institute of Directors 2014). Therefore, an element 
of diversity is restricted through an optimal mix of ages, skills and experience. 
Moreover, the lack of outside directors on boards, means that professional women do 
not have more opportunities for firms’ board membership.  
It is confirmed that only two amongst the ten largest listed firms on the ASE, 
disclose having independent directors on their boards (European Bank 2017). On the 
other hand, there are six women out of 112 board members (European Bank 2017). 
Furthermore, in the ten largest Jordanian listed companies, the female representation 
rate on their boards is 6.46% (European Bank 2017). Additionally, 78% of Jordanian 
listed companies, have no women in their boardrooms. Therefore, gender diversity in 
Jordanian companies’ boards is indeed very low.  
Interestingly, the importance of board gender diversity on the global agenda is 
increasing, specifically, with a growing demand from shareholders, stakeholders and 
consumers. For instance, there are calls from Apple’s shareholders to make changes to 
gender diversify its board, which Apple has vowed to consider (Satariano 2014). In 
addition, other companies, such as Facebook and Twitter have been criticised because 
they have no women on their boards (Satariano 2014). The International Finance 
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Corporation (IFC) has strongly supported the idea of gender diversity in Jordanian 
boardrooms. It is claimed that gender diversity can add value to Jordanian firms 
(World Bank 2016). As a response to these national and international opinions, this 
study attempts to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance, and its ability to mitigate agency cost in Jordan. 
 
4 Literature review  
As mentioned previously, there has been ongoing, extensive debate in the CG 
literature about the representation of women on corporations’ board. It is argued that 
the diversity of skills and characteristics in both sexes, can bring benefits and unique 
perspectives to the company through expertise and unique resources. The existence of 
women on the board of directors, has been referred to as is a pivotal aspect of corporate 
boards’ diversity (Carter et al. 2003; Wachudi & Mboya 2012; Boulouta 2013).  A 
review of the CG literature reveals that gender diversity plays an important role in 
improving board monitoring and women tend to assume their roles in companies with 
probity, which can lead to better CG, enhancing firm performance and reducing agency 
costs (Liu et al. 2014; Low et al. 2015). On the other hand, more gender diversity 
increases the independence of companies’ boards because females may ask questions 
that would not come from male directors (Carter et al. 2002; Bennouri et al. 2018). 
Therefore, the presence of women on corporate boards is assumed to provide a positive 
consequence on the effectiveness of boards.  
 Further, gender diversity has been found to improve performance by the support 
of decision-making capacity (Erhardt et al. 2003), the expression of new ideas (Triana 
et al. 2013), and through added creativity and innovation (Carter et al. 2010).  In terms 
of female managers in general, studies by Liu et al. (2014) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) reveal that women managers tend to be more efficient in controlling activities, 
which may lead to more audit and management accountability. Nonetheless, based on 
the assumption that women are fundamentally different from men, there is an argument 
against gender diversity on corporation boards in that it may mitigate firm performance 
by increasing conflict through differing opinions, and that this may cause a higher cost 
for decision-making in boardrooms, with resulting negative influences for 
performance (Carter et al. 2010; Dezsö & Ross 2012; Julizaerma & Sori 2012; Triana 
et al. 2013; Conyon & He 2017).  
130 
 
Several earlier studies have been carried out to provide insight on board gender 
diversity and its relation to firm performance. Jurkus et al. (2008) used a sample of the 
top directors of Fortune 500 United State corporations, and examined the influence of 
board gender diversity on agency costs of the firm. The authors indicated that 
corporations with a higher proportion of women officers may lead to lower agency 
costs, as measured by Q*FCF and dividend payout ratio, but that the negative 
association is not robust when considering the endogeneity of diversity. By using a 
sample of 100 large firms listed on the Bourse Istanbul for 2006, Ararat et al. (2015) 
documented that demographic diversity, such as gender and age, have a positive 
influence on firm performance. Liu et al. (2014) explored the effect of women directors 
on firm performance in China, using a panel data set of China’s firms listed over the 
period 1999-2011. Interestingly, that study documented that performance was affected 
by the extent of board gender diversity. To be specific, a board with three or more 
women directors had a greater influence on performance, than a board with two or 
fewer women directors. Supporting this argument Terjesen et al. (2016) indicated that 
more women directors on a board was correlated with a higher performance, as 
measured by return on asset (ROA) and Tobin's Q. That study used a sample of 3,876 
firms in 47 countries in 2010. Similar results were found by Ahmadi et al. (2017), 
Conyon and He (2017), García-Meca et al. (2015) and Vafaei et al. (2015).  
 Low et al. (2015) highlighted the influence of board gender diversity on 
performance in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, based on a sample 
of 5,503 observations of firms for the period 2012 to 2013, and using pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares. The results suggested that increasing 
numbers of women on the company board has a positive impact on performance, as 
measured by ROA. Wiley and Monllor-Tormos (2018) used a sample of Fortune 500 
firms, for the period 2007–2013. They observed a positive effect of board gender 
diversity on firm performance, which increases when there is at least a ‘critical mass’ 
of 30% of women in boardrooms. Based on a sample of 125 non-financial companies 
listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange for the period 2005- 2009, Reguera-Alvarado et 
al. (2017) reached the conclusion that the increase in the number of females on the 
corporate boards, is positively related to higher firm performance results. In Jordan, 
Ibrahim and Hanefah (2016) reported a positive relationship between board gender 
diversity and the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Also in Jordan, Al-
Rahahleh (2017) pointed out that board gender diversity has a positive impact on a 
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company’s dividend policy. Hence, the findings of previous studies have noted that 
increasing diversity of the gender on boards is linked to better firm performance 
(Chapple & Humphrey 2014). In spite of high efforts to improve the proportion of 
women's presence on companies’ boards, males still dominate firms’ boards (Adams 
& Ferreira 2009; Labelle et al. 2015; Pletzer et al. 2015; Terjesen et al. 2016).  
However, in United State companies, Shrader et al. (1997) found a negative 
correlation between gender diversity and performance. With a sample of 200 United 
States firms for the financial year of 1992, they found that the increased percentage of 
female directors had a negative effect on firm performance, as measured by ROA, 
return on sales, return on equity and return on investment.  By using a sample of 248 
listed Norwegian companies for the period 2001–2009, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) 
found that the inclusion of female directors was negatively related to firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found a negative board gender 
diversity impact on firm performance, in a sample of US companies from 1996 to 2003 
by using ROA and Tobin’s measures. Shehata et al. (2017) in an empirical United 
Kingdom study, found a significant negative relationship between gender diversity and 
company performance, represented by ROA and Tobin’s Q. In addition, Wellalage and 
Locke (2013) conducted a study on non-financial listed firms on the Colombo Stock 
Exchange in Sri Lanka for 2006 to 2010, and found a significant negative association 
between the percentage of women on companies’ boards and company value, along 
with an increase in firm’s agency cost, as measured by Q* free cash flow (FCF).  
On the other hand, some research could not find any association between board 
gender diversity and firm performance. Pletzer et al. (2015), used data in a meta-
analysis of 20 studies on 3,097 firms published in peer review academic journals. 
Results suggested that a higher representation of women is neither related to an 
increase, nor to a decrease in firm performance. Similarly, Rose (2007) employed 
Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance for a sample of all Danish companies listed 
on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange for the period 1998-2001, in a cross-sectional 
analysis. The author found no relationship between the representation of women on 
boards and firm performance. Supporting this view, Carter et al. (2010) used a sample 
of main United States companies, with findings indicating no significant relationship, 
as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. Using panel data consisting of the top 200 listed 
Indian firms between 2010 and 2014, Kagzi and Guha (2018) examined the 
relationship between board demographic diversity (age, board gender tenure, and 
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education) and firm performance. That study confirmed that gender diversity does not 
significantly influence firm performance. Similar findings appeared in Australia 
(Chapple and Humphrey, 2014).  
In a nutshell, it seems that there is inconclusive evidence about the effects of 
board gender diversity on firm performance and efficiency (Bennouri et al. 2018; Skała 
& Weill 2018). The conflicting findings may be due to the various estimation methods 
applied by the numerous studies. For instance, in some research, no controls were 
made for other variables (e.g., leverage, board size and firm size) which affect 
performance (Adams et al. 2015). Additionally, some of the conflicting results may be 
due to the failure to address issues of unobserved firm heterogeneity and endogeneity 
(Vafaei et al. 2015). Therefore, the mixed results of earlier studies provide an 
opportunity for conducting this research. 
From this review, it seems that previous research on board gender diversity and 
its influence on firm performance and agency cost, has some limitations. Firstly, it was 
found that most previous research employed accounting measures or market measures. 
It is confirmed that these are noisy measures of company performance, and accounting 
profit could be simply manipulated (Pham et al. 2011). Secondly, many of the prior 
studies that addressed the issues of gender diversity were conducted in developed 
countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and so this issue has not 
been sufficiently covered in developing countries, with only a few studies to date. 
Finally, some prior research was carried out within a single year, such as that of Ararat 
et al. (2015). It has been confirmed that single year data may not be acceptable for 
obtaining empirical evidence (e.g. see Fosberg 1989). Overall, these limitations give 
an opportunity for conducting this research, by employing different measures to fill 
the gap in investigating the influence of gender diversity on firm performance and 
agency cost on non-financial companies listed on the ASE.  
This research differs from the previous studies in some ways. Firstly, this study 
constructs two proxies for firm efficiency or firm’s agency cost (i.e., asset utilization 
ratio (AUR) and expense ratio (ER)), as additional measures to ROA and Tobin’s Q, 
to capture the effectiveness of board gender diversity in mitigating a firm’s agency 
cost. Secondly, this research provides the empirical evidence of board gender diversity 
in developing countries with weak CG practices. Thirdly, in some earlier studies, no 
controls were made for variables such as leverage, firm size, FCF and research and 
development expenditure (R&D), which are known to influence firm performance and 
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firm’s agency cost. Finally, to capture other unobserved variables which affect firm 
performance and efficiency, this study employs the panel data for eleven years. It is 
argued that panel data provides a more reliable insight than that resulting from cross-
sectional research or time series research (Campbell & Minguez-vera 2008). To 
capture the effectiveness of board gender diversity in Jordan, the current research 
addresses these limitations identified in earlier studies into the influence of board 
gender diversity on firm performance and efficiency/or firm’s agency cost. 
 
5 Theoretical background 
In order to obtain a reasonable answer about whether board gender diversity adds 
value to the corporation by improving firm performance and ameliorating agency cost, 
researchers have extensively relied on certain theories, the most common being 
resource dependence theory and agency theory, with mixed results. As a consequence, 
this has attracted the attention of researchers and professionals from different 
disciplines (finance, management, economies and even law) (Hillman & Dalziel 
2003). A brief outline of these theoretical foundations follows. 
 The board of directors has several main functions. The monitoring role, also 
known as a ‘control role’, relates to the capacity of a board to monitor or control 
managers on behalf of owners (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). The theoretical basis of the 
monitoring function of a board of directors, stems from agency theory, which describes 
the possible agency problems that may arise from the separation of ownership and 
control in corporations (Fama & Jensen 1983). Drawing on agency theory, the board’s 
main function is to monitor the activities of company managers by ensuring that they 
act in the interests of shareholders (Bennouri et al. 2018). Hence, proponents of agency 
theory argue that managers and shareholders are more likely to have conflicting aims, 
and then describe the mechanisms of CG that limit the managers’ behaviour of self-
service (Eisenhardt 1989). Therefore, these proponents argue that the board is one of 
several mechanisms for the internal control of corporations (Walsh & Seward 1990). 
Thus, the main function of the board of directors is to diminish the agency costs 
resulting from the delegation of strategic decision-making to executives and managers 
by exercising ‘decision control’, which includes monitoring managerial decision-
making and performance (Westphal 1999). Therefore, outside directors, who are not 
employees of the firms or unaffiliated with the firms (independent directors) can 
provide monitoring roles in attempting to resolve the agency conflicts between owners 
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and managers (Che & Langli 2015). Hence, boards with a high percentage of outside 
directors, will protect the owners’ rights and will contribute to the reduction of a firm’s 
agency costs (Zahra & Pearce 1989; Daily et al. 2003).  
Agency theorists argue that the diversity of the board may act as a better internal 
control. It is confirmed that a broader range of ideas and opinions improves the board 
independence, therefore gender diversity can serve as a mechanism to alleviate firm’s 
agency conflict (Lückerath-Rovers 2013; Reguera-Alvarado et al. 2017). Carter et al. 
(2003), Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Liu et al. (2014), support the idea that more 
board diversity leads to better exercise monitoring function of management. Hence, 
the diversity on a corporate board helps lower agency cost of firms. Thus, this approach 
improves the value of the firm.  
Agency conflicts in most developed countries are principal-agent conflicts. 
However, Ahmad et al. (2017) have asserted that companies with high ownership 
concentration are experiencing the problem of principal-principal agency conflict. 
This conflict arises because majority shareholders can disregard the interests of 
minority shareholders (Dharwadkar et al. 2000). This is the situation in Jordan and 
some other developing countries. Firm ownership concentration causes dynamics quite 
distinct from those in companies with diffused ownership, which is the norm in 
developed countries, i.e., the countries in which most studies of the phenomenon of 
interest have been conducted. 
Importantly, as noted by Zahra and Pearce 1989, there are two roles for the board 
of directors beyond the monitoring and controlling of managers: strategy and service 
roles. According to Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 292), “the service role involves 
enhancing company reputation, establishing contacts with the external environment”. 
Likewise, according to Johnson et al. (1996, p. 411), the “board as a means for 
facilitating the acquisition of resources (is) critical to the firm’s success”. Johnson et 
al. (1996) suggest that there are three primary functions of the board of directors (i.e., 
control, service and resource dependence functions).  
Thus for these researchers, the latter two functions approximate to the service 
function as delineated by Zahra and Pearce (1989). This perspective has been adopted 
by many scholars, such as (Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Boyd 
1990; Daily & Dalton 1994a, 1994b; Hillman et al. 2000). Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer 
(1973) define the board of directors as the most important of mechanisms that can be 
employed in dealing with the corporations in its environment. The function of 
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providing resources relates directly to the capacity of a board of directors to bring new 
external resources to companies. Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) describes the provision of 
resources as “anything that could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given 
firm”.  
The theoretical basis of the monitoring function of a board of directors, stems 
from resource dependence theory which indicates that the corporate board can provide 
various types  benefits to the firm (i.e., the human capital of board members, 
legitimacy, advice and counsel, and access to external resources) (Liu et al. 2014).  
As argued by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 163), “when an organisation 
appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the 
organisation, will concern himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, 
and will try to aid it”. From a resource dependence theory perspective, those outside 
directors are a crucial link for a corporate board with its external environment (Daily 
& Dalton 1994b). Johnson et al. (1996) asserted that outside directors could bring to 
the boardrooms a diversity of expertise and perspectives that the company can draw 
upon in implementing the company’s strategy. Thus, the provision of resources may 
alleviate uncertainty problems for the companies (Pfeffer 1972), and protect the firms 
from a financial crisis (Zahra & Pearce 1989). Therefore, the provision of the resources 
function is linked to firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel 2003), and ultimately, the 
firm’s success (Johnson et al. 1996).  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) summarised the benefits of the link between a firm 
and its environment.  Board members may provide useful information, a channel for 
communication and obtain commitments of support from important related external 
parties that aid in the company’s survival and its performance and legitimising 
organisation. Therefore, by connecting it to the external environment, this reduces 
uncertainty for the company (Siciliano 1996). Thus, this link is necessary for good 
corporate performance.  
Hillman et al. (2007) pointed out that amongst the various characteristics of 
board diversity, such as education, tenure and age, gender diversity is the most 
valuable. It has been confirmed that board gender diversity has the capacity to provide 
an enhanced resource function. Resource dependence theory suggests that the role of 
resources provided is directly linked to firm performance and efficiency. It may be 
argued that such resources assist in alleviating dependency between company and 
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external contingencies (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). Therefore, resource dependency 
theory suggests that increased diversity benefits firm performance and efficiency.    
The traditional idea of a board of directors is that it is homogeneous with similar 
professional experience, education, culture and backgrounds, and hence the same 
opinions and views on business which may support decision-making (Farag et al. 
2014; Reguera-Alvarado et al. 2017). However, nowadays, firms are facing political 
and technological challenges and tough economic conditions that require board 
members in a multicultural environment to include a pool of skilled and talented 
managers (Chambers et al. 1998). Furthermore, agency theory focuses on the board’s 
function as an independent internal control device. Hillman et al. (2000) noted that 
many of the earlier studies on company boards had investigated board composition, 
employing agency theory for classifying directors, such as delineating how any 
independent directors had board positions.  
In contrast, the literature on boards from a resources perspective, focuses on 
directors’ role in proving ongoing advice and counsel to top management, and resource 
and supplies legitimacy (Carpenter & Westphal 2001). Agency perspectives are not 
informative with regard to the director’s resource, strategy and service functions (Daily 
et al. 2003). Moreover, Walsh and Kosnik (1993, p. 696) indicated that researchers 
“need to be alert to the possibility that the hypothesised effects may be much more 
narrowly circumscribed than the theory's proponents might argue”. In support, Davis 
et al. (1997, p. 20) noted that “exclusive reliance upon agency theory is undesirable, 
because the complexities of organisational life are ignored”.  
  This study is based on the assumption that different types of directors will 
provide different beneficial resources to the firm. It has been confirmed that, e.g., to 
access proper external financing, firms should have a higher percentage of outside 
directors on their boardrooms (Pfeffer 1972). As a result, a more diverse board will 
provide more valuable resources, which should produce better firm performance and 
efficiency (Hillman et al. 2000). This study investigates whether the gender diversity 
of a board improves firm performance and efficiency - it relies on resource dependence 
theory, rather than agency theory. 
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6 Research hypotheses 
Overall, resource dependence theory supports board diversity on the basis that a 
diverse board acts to alleviate agency costs, facilitates access to untapped resources 
and networks, and improves performance (Kakabadse et al. 2015).  
The links among good CG, gender diversity, firm performance and efficiency, 
have a long history in the CG literature, with most previously concentrated on 
profitability, and so far, mixed results on the relationship between female participation 
on boards and firm efficiency (Gregory‐Smith et al. 2014). From the resource 
dependence view, Farag and Mallin (2016) found a bi-directional relationship between 
the proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors, and firm 
performance. Reguera-Alvarado et al. (2017) supported the idea that gender diversity 
on boards should be incremented, because of the proportion of women in the 
boardrooms is positively linked to higher economic outcomes. In addition, Lückerath-
Rovers (2013) showed that companies with a high percentage of female directors 
perform better than companies without a female on their boards. Therefore, the 
relevant hypothesis has been developed: 
H 1a: There is a positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance.  
In an empirical study, Abad et al. (2017) provided a negative association 
between board gender diversity and the level of information asymmetry. It has been 
argued that the differences in gender will very probably provide unique information 
that is available to managers for better decision-making (Carter et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, gender diversity on boards helps in mitigating financial reporting 
mistakes, and eventually, less fraud (Wahid 2018). Overall, resource dependence 
theory support that increasing gender diversity enhances firm performance and 
efficiency. As argued by Jurkus et al. (2011), that board diversity mitigates agency 
costs of companies, which in turn, enhance firm efficiency, especially for those 
companies with a weak CG structure. Ahmadi et al. (2018) claimed that gender 
diversity plays a pivotal role in alleviating the firm’s agency cost, by aligning the 
interests between managers and shareholders.  Accordingly, the hypothesis has been 
formulated:  
H 1b: Board gender diversity will reduce agency costs. 
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7 Research method 
7.1 Sample selection  
This research considers the panel data gathered from various companies over ten 
years from a sample of 80 non-financial firms listed on the ASE over the period from 
2006 to 2016. There were 224 listed firms on the ASE as of 31st December 2016. From 
these, 224 were not listed for the whole study period, and so were excluded. In 
addition, the companies which had insufficient data in terms of the study’s purposes, 
have also been excluded. Furthermore, consistent with other studies, such as Rose 
(2005) and Peasnell et al. (2005), this study excluded firms in the financial sector as 
they have unique CG characteristics and a different regulatory structure. Therefore, 
the total number of company-year observations reached was 880. The data associated 
with the CG variables was manually gathered from company annual reports. The 
Bloomberg database was the basis for obtaining the firm’s accounting data. The 
sample is composed of a variety of industries as per the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS). Table 1 displays industry classification of the sampled Jordanian 
companies, according to GICS. 
 Table 1: Industry classification of the sample 
 
7.2 Definition of variables 
7.2.1 Dependent variables 
A heated debate exists about the appropriate financial measures of performance 
(Johnson et al. 1996). As a result, multiple performance measures have appeared 
(Daily & Dalton 1993). As noted by Ghalayini and Noble (1996), there are two types 
of firm performance measurement: accounting-based measures and market-based 
measures.  
It has been confirmed that accounting information offers a central source of 
independently verified information about the performance of management in 
Industries Number of firms in 
the sample 
Observed firm years 
Consumer Discretionary 19 209 
Consumer Staples 9 99 
Energy 1 11 
Health Care 3 33 
Industrials 19 209 
Materials 26 286 
Telecommunication Services 1 11 
Utilities 2 22 
Total 80 880 
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mitigating principle-agent conflicts (Sloan 2001). Moreover, such information and 
data also display relatively reliable financial information to stakeholders (Dai et al. 
2013). Therefore, this aids owners to understand the firm’s activities and thus reduces 
the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Dai et al. 2013), and 
finally, decreases agency conflicts. Accounting-based measures, such as ROA, are 
employed as a proxy for firm performance in much related research (e.g., Erhardt et 
al. 2003; Liu et al. 2014; Green & Homroy 2018). Likewise, some previous studies 
used only market measures, such as Tobin’s Q (e.g., Nguyen et al. 2015). In contrast, 
both accounting and market measures have been adopted in many studies (e.g., Carter 
et al. 2010; García-Meca et al. 2015; Conyon & He 2017).  
Therefore, this study uses both accounting-based and market-based measures, 
i.e., ROA and Tobin’s Q. According to Mangena et al. (2012), Julizaerma and Sori 
(2012) and Rashid (2018), ROA is defined as the ratio of profit (before interest and 
tax) scaled by total assets. For Tobin’s Q, consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Conyon and He (2017) and Rashid (2018), this is defined as the ratio of the 
market value of the corporate to the replacement cost of its average total assets. 
However, problems also exist with employing both accounting measures and 
market measures (Dalton & Dalton 2011; Pham et al. 2011). Firstly, accounting profits 
can be readily manipulated (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Pham et al. 2011; Nazir & Afza 
2018). It is argued that these are prepared within the managers’ guidelines, and 
managers are likely to employ particular accounting methods to enhance performance 
(Barth et al. 2005). Furthermore, it may be contended that the accounting profit may 
be high with the existence of the firm’s agency cost (Nicholson & Kiel 2007). 
Furthermore, as noted by Wiwattanakantang, “not all agency costs are reflected in the 
accounting measures” (2001, p. 334).  
Secondly, to use market measures to measure company performance, these have 
to reflect the actual value of the company (Lindenberg & Ross 1981). Hence, such 
measures may not be effective in developing markets, as on the one hand, the capital 
market is not well developed, and on the other, it is very hard to obtain related financial 
information in these countries (Lindenberg & Ross 1981; Joh 2003). As well, Bacidore 
et al. (1997, p. 11) have argued market measures “may not be an efficient contracting 
parameter, because they are driven by many factors beyond the control of the firm’s 
executives”. Claessens and Djankov (1999, p. 502) indicated that using market 
measures may “lead to a downward bias in the relationship between concentrated 
140 
 
ownership and firms’ valuation”, in economies with a weak protection of minority 
shareholders, as is the case in Jordan.  
To address these concerns, this research constructs AUR and ER as reliable 
proxies for firm’s agency cost, in addition to the firm performance-based measures of 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. Ang et al. (2000) have had a prominent role in developing these 
firm efficiency measures. Subsequently, many studies (e.g., Singh & Davidson 2003; 
Florackis 2008; Wellalage & Locke 2012; Rashid 2015) addressing the issues of board 
practices, have employed them.  
According to Ang et al. (2000, p. 82), AUR is the “proxy for the loss in revenues 
attributable to inefficient asset utilisation”, and is defined as the ratio of annual sales 
to total assets. Put another way, it measures management’s capacity to use assets 
efficaciously (Singh & Davidson 2003). Studies that have addressed firm efficiency 
have used AUR as a reliable proxy for it (Ang et al. 2000; Singh & Davidson 2003; 
McKnight & Weir 2009). A low AUR has been interpreted to mean  “that management 
is using assets in non-cash flow generating and probably value destroying ventures” 
(Singh & Davidson 2003, p. 799), and vice versa.  
ER is well known as a direct, reliable proxy for firm efficiency or agency cost. 
It is calculated as the ratio of operating expenses to total annual sales, and refers to 
how effectively a firm’s management controls operating costs. This has been very 
frankly described by Ang et al. (2000, p. 82): “this measure captures excessive 
expenses including perk consumption”. A low ER indicates that the company 
management is controlling the operating expenses. Therefore, a low ER should reflect 
lower firm agency costs (Singh & Davidson 2003). 
As evidence of the mitigation of agency costs, it is likely that there will be a 
negative association between board gender diversity and a firm’s agency cost, as 
positively indicated by ER. Likewise, a positive relationship between board gender 
diversity and a firm’s agency cost is probable, using a positive association with AUR. 
 
7.2.2 Independent variable 
In this study, the independent variable refers to the number of women as a 
percentage of the total number of board of directors (BGDIV), which is in line with 
prior studies such as Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), Carter et al. (2010), 
Wellalage and Locke (2013), Low et al. (2015), Liao et al. (2015), Conyon and He 
(2017) and Wahid (2018).  
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7.2.3 Control variables  
As argued by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), the ambiguous and mixed 
results on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance, could 
be attributed to other missing variables that influence such performance. For that 
reason, and consistent with previous studies that have employed a relatively integrated 
group of control variables (e.g., Anderson & Reeb 2003; Adams & Ferreira 2009), a 
range of CG variables and other firm related characteristics that are widely used, are 
employed as control variables that are deemed to have an influence on the dependent 
variables of this study. These are board independence, ownership structure, board size, 
firm age, firm size, leverage, liquidity, sales growth, R&D, FCF, years of operation 
and industry.   
Board independence (BDIND) is proxied by the ratio of outside independent 
directors to the total number of directors. Resource dependence theory suggests that 
firms’ boards are a device for managing external dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), and mitigating the transaction costs related to environmental interdependency 
(Hillman et al. 2000). Furthermore, it is argued that the outside directors bring valued 
resources (Daily & Dalton 1994b). Therefore, it is expected that board independence 
may have a positive impact on gender diversity. Hence, female participation on a 
company’s board improves its independence, promotes its efficiency and reduces 
agency conflict. However, results associating board independence and firm 
performance are not conclusive. It is argued that independent directors could lack 
information about the company’s strategies (Bennouri et al. 2018). Accordingly, this 
study uses BDIND as a control variable consistent with earlier research (e.g., Abad et 
al. 2017; Ahmed & Ali 2017; Saeed & Sameer 2017; Galbreath 2018; Wiley & 
Monllor-Tormos 2018). 
The structure of ownership has witnessed evident theoretical development by the 
work of Demsetz (1983). Ownership structure is described as “an endogenous outcome 
of competitive selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages are 
balanced to arrive at an equilibrium organisation of the firm” (Demsetz 1983, p. 384). 
Shareholders with significant ownership positions have both the power to bring about 
changes they feel will be helpful to the corporation, and the incentive to monitor the 
management team (Daily et al. 2003). Moreover, large shareholders could affect 
corporate strategies and plans through exercising their voting rights and control of 
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power (Hoang et al. 2017). Therefore, they can alleviate the problems arising from the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers (Rashid 2016), and improve firm performance 
and efficiency in countries in which the protection of investors is weak (Ma et al. 
2010). Hence, concentrated ownership can be one effective tool to resolve agency 
problems. However, the possible influence of ownership concentration on firm 
performance and efficiency, has been a pivotal question in research on CG practices, 
with decidedly contradictory and mixed empirical evidence on the nature of the 
association. 
Drawing on resource dependence theory, improving financial performance and 
efficiency requires specific and valuable resources. Individual organisations usually 
do not have sufficient resources for enhancing firm performance and efficiency (Choi 
et al. 2012). Consequently, this researcher expects that more resource-rich 
shareholders can bring in necessary external resources, resulting in better firm 
performance and efficiency. Consistent with this argument, three ownership control 
variables are used in this research (i.e., largest block holding ownership, institution 
ownership and director ownership). Following previous studies, such as Nguyen et al. 
(2015) and Gordini and Rancati (2017), in this study, block-holder ownership 
(LBOWN) is used as a control variable, and this is defined as the percentage of shares 
held by the three largest block holders.  
Institutional ownership is a form of ownership concentration (Wei et al. 2005) 
that helps in alleviating agency costs and enhancing company performance. It is argued 
that institutional investors, unlike other types of owners (i.e., individual owners), have 
incentives and the ability to control and discipline company managers (Wahal & 
McConnell 2000). In developing countries, the prevailing belief is that the main banks 
are the institutional shareholders, a view which is supported in this study. Banks play 
a pivotal role in designing strategic directions and allocating corporate resources, 
which significantly affects the investment process. Consistent with earlier research 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2016; Conyon & He 2017; Wahid 2018), institutional ownership 
(INSOWN) in included as a control variable, calculated as the proportion of stocks 
owned by financial institutions.  
Many of the earlier studies, such as McConnell and Servaes 1990 and Rashid 
2016, have identified that insider ownership positively influences performance by 
diminishing the firm's agency cost in terms of ownership by directors. Such managers 
might be able to exert their professional knowledge in making strategic decisions 
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concerning the company’s development and survival. For example, insider 
shareholders, such as directors, are more likely to invest in long-term projects of 
research and development, for the improvement of a firm’s reputation and its stable 
competitive position. In line with prior studies (Carter et al. 2010; Liao et al. 2015; 
Abad et al. 2017), director’s ownership (DIROWN) is a control variable and measured 
as the ratio of shares held by directors.  
Board size (BDSIZE) is measured as the total number of members on the board 
of directors. It has been argued that “the greater the need for effective external linkage, 
the larger the board should be” (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, p. 172). For instance, Pfeffer 
(1972, 1973), supported the view that board size is linked with a corporation’s ability 
to secure significant resources, such as external leverage from an environment and an 
amount of the budget. Hence, under resource dependence theory, the argument for a 
positive relationship between board size and firm value is that large company boards 
will offer an increased range of resources and expertise to companies (Dalton et al. 
1999). This variable is also significant as a control variable, because large boards play 
an important role in increasing gender diversity on boards. As a result, following the 
prior research of Joecks et al. (2013); Liao et al. (2015); Marquardt and Wiedman 
(2016) and Ahmadi et al. (2018), this study uses board size as a control variable, 
measured directly as the number of members on a board.  
Many other variables are more likely to have an effect in determining firm 
performance, including firm size (Van der Walt et al. 2006). Resource dependence 
theory suggests “that the need for environmental linkage will increase as a direct 
function of firm size” (Boyd 1990, p. 422). This may be because large companies have 
more impact on their environments than smaller companies (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). 
Furthermore, it is noted that CEOs are less constrained by appropriate governance 
structures in small firms, hindering firm performance (Daily & Dalton 1992). As noted 
by Perryman et al. (2016), as company size increases, the risk linked with companies 
decreases. Therefore, firm size (SIZE) is considered a control variable in this study, 
and is defined as the natural logarithm of the total assets (Dwyer et al. 2003; Jurkus et 
al. 2011; Abad et al. 2017). 
A firm’s age may affect the performance of a company either negatively or 
positively; old firms have been found more likely to be more effective than younger 
ones (Ang et al. 2000). It is noted that an old firm may have a greater network of 
connections, which can assist the firm to access external resources (Bonn et al. 2004). 
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Ahmed and Ali (2017) indicated that young companies are more likely to be linked 
with higher information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, therefore 
jeopardising firms’ performance and efficiency. However, it is claimed that an old firm 
may have a stricter organisational structure, which can adversely affect firm efficiency 
(Bonn et al. 2004). Accordingly, in line with the earlier research, such as Perryman et 
al. (2016), Ahmed  and Ali (2017) and Wiley and Monllor-Tormos (2018), firm age 
(AGE) is included as a control variable, defined as the natural logarithm of the number 
of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange. Leverage is argued to be a tool 
that potentially contributes to the firm’s agency cost reduction (Ang et al. 2000). As 
noted by Ahmed and Ali (2017), more leveraged companies exercise more 
transparency to alleviate the higher monitoring cost. However, Sila et al. (2016) 
pointed out that higher leverage can be considered risky. The control variable of 
leverage (LEV) is determined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Ararat et al. 2015; Gordini & Rancati 2017).  
Globally speaking, companies with high liquidity are less prone to default or 
bankruptcy.  It has been proved that liquidity assists identify firm-specific 
characteristics “since the ability to manage working capital and acquire a greater 
quantity of cash balances relative to current liabilities, reflects superior skills” 
(Majumdar & Chhibber 1999, p. 296). However, it may increase the agency cost of 
FCF (Rashid 2015). In line with Miller and Triana (2009), liquidity (LIQ) is defined 
by using the current ratio, scaling current assets by current liabilities. Florackis (2008) 
supported the idea that the effectiveness of CG mechanisms in mitigating agency 
conflict, is dependent on a company’s growth opportunities. It has been confirmed that 
firms with growing sales are likely to grow as compared to firms with no growth in 
sales (Durnev & Kim 2005). Thus, this has been treated as a control variable. 
Therefore, the sales growth rate may refer to future firm performance and efficiency. 
According to Bennouri et al. (2018), sales growth (GROWTH) is measured as the ratio 
of the annual change in sales.  
It is argued that firms with high R&D expenses are more likely to be high growth firms 
and may have a large valuation (Durnev & Kim 2005). Furthermore, R&D in 
production processes and technologies, may help in enhancing a firm’s performance 
and efficiency (Akbar et al. 2016). The control variable of R&D in this study, is 
measured as a percentage of total expenditure to total sales (Dezsö & Ross 2012; 
Bennouri et al. 2018). 
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Agency problems within a corporation are associated with FCF (Florackis 2008). 
FCF describes the cash that the corporation is able to create after laying out all positive 
net present value projects when discounted relative to the cost of capital (Wellalage & 
Lock 2013). Jurkus et al. (2011) claimed that the higher the FCF, have the higher the 
agency costs. Agency problems including FCFs are more likely to be prevalent in low-
growth corporations (Jurkus et al. 2011). Due to FCFs, managers may invest in projects 
which are unnecessary or not economically feasible (Jensen 1986).  
By contrast, high growth corporations are not likely to be subject to the problem 
of FCF, because they do not have sufficient cash after utilising internal funds for new 
projects, and they depend on outside financing (Jurkus et al. 2011). This justifies its 
inclusion as a control variable. Following prior studies (e.g., Doukas et al. 2000; 
McKnight & Weir 2009), FCF is calculated as the operating income before 
depreciation minus the sum of taxes plus interest expenses and dividends paid, scaled 
by the total assets. Earlier studies, such as Jurkus et al. (2011), Lam et al. (2013), 
Perryman et al. (2016), Farag and Mallin (2016) and Saeed and Sameer (2017), have 
controlled for industry effects and year effects.  
Elsayed (2007, p. 1207) claimed that industry consequences could assist in 
knowing “unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level”. Performance measures can 
vary amongst the industries and to capture such industry effects and time specific 
effects not captured by the independent (or explanatory) variables), year dummies and 
nine industry dummies were created for inclusion as dummy variables, using the value 
of (1) if the company is in the industry, or (0) otherwise. In addition, regression 
equations control for the time effect. This is done by adding ‘time dummies’ for the 
year in which the observations are made. 
 
7.3 Regression model  
The regression equation was used in destemming the statistical association 
between the board gender diversity of the non-financial listed firms used in the 
research. Since this research uses panel data, a series of control variables were entered 
into the regression equation. The model as formulated is: 
Yi,t=α+ β1BGDIVi,t +β2BDINDi,t+ β3DIROWNi,t +β4LBOWNi,t+β5INSTOWNi,t 
+β6BDSIZEi,t +β7SIZEi,t + β8AGEi,t+ β9GROWTHi,t+ β10LIQi,t+β11LEVi,t + 
β12FCFi,t + β13R&Di,t + ɛi,t 
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Where Yi,t comprises the overall measures of performance, including agency 
cost, namely, ROA, Tobin’s Q, AUR and ER. BGDIV is the percentage of women out 
of the total number of directors on the board. BDIND is the proportion of independent 
directors to the total number on the of directors on the board. DIROWN is the 
percentage of shares owned by directors.  LBOWN is the percentage of shares owned 
by the three largest block holders. INSTOWN is the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions. BDSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of board members. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of years a firm has been listed on the stock exchange. GROWTH is the 
changes in sales. LIQ is the liquidity. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets. FCF 
is measured as operating income before depreciation, minus the sum of taxes plus 
interest expenses and dividends paid, scaled by total assets. R&D is calculated as 
R&D’s cost as a percentage of sales. α is the intercept, β is the regression coefficient 
and ɛ is the error term. 
To obtain an accurate statistical analysis, there is a need to meet statistical 
analysis assumptions, such as normality, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. The 
assumption of normality requires that all observations should be distributed normally 
in the population of the study. It is argued that the normality violations are of little 
concern when the size of the study sample is high (>30) (Coaks & Steed 2001). In 
addition, the Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test of the regression model, 
provided a bell shape, conforming to data normality.      
Multicollinearity refers to the high correlations among the independent or 
explanatory variables. In other words, when the independent variables are significantly 
correlated with one other. When there is a high degree of correlation between two or 
more independent variables, these independent variables must be removed.  Table 3 
illustrates that there is no correlation amongst the independent variables due to the 
correlation coefficients being either less than 75% or negative values. Furthermore, 
based on Table 3, the variance inflation factors of all the variables of this research are 
less than four, whilst it is pointed out that the variance inflation factor of <10, is an 
indication of multicollinearity (Gujarati 2003). 
According to the assumption of heteroscedasticity, the variance of the error is 
constant across observations (all levels of explanatory or independent variables), or 
residuals of the dependent variables of the research are almost equal/constant. That is, 
the plot of standardized residuals ZRESID against the standardized predicted value 
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ZPRED of all the research’s models, resemble a curve shape, indicating the existence 
of heteroscedasticity. The chi-square statistics and a corresponding p-value of the 
Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, indicate that heteroscedasticity is existing in the 
regression model, which is adjusted using a correction technique for unknown 
heteroscedasticity as recommended by White (1980).  
 
8 Empirical results 
8.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the investigated variables are presented in Table 2. The 
descriptive statistics comprise the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation. The table reports that the averages of company performances regarding 
ROA and Tobin’s Q, are 5% and 110% respectively. It also reveals that the averages 
of the firm’s agency costs in terms of AUR and ER, are 57% and 41% respectively. 
These outcomes for agency cost are consistent with an expected high AUR and a 
comparatively lower ER.  
On average, 52 percent of board members are independent, and these range from 0% 
(no independence) to 100% of total directors. This number is consistent with the JCGC 
that mentioned that at least one third of board members should be independent. 
Moreover, this number is relatively close to thestandards of some Anglo-American 
countries. As noted by Yermack (1996), the average rate of outside members in the 
largest United States, public firms, is 54%. Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) pointed out that 
the average of outside independent directors is 41.2% in the Middle East and North 
African region, which includes Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia, 
the UAE, Qatar and Egypt. However, this is low compared to Australian companies 
where the average percentage of outside independent directors is 71.0% (Krishnamurti 
& Velayutham 2017). Based on Table 2, the mean percentage of women on Jordanian 
boards of directors is 3%. This is consistent with earlier studies in Jordan, such as those 
of Ibrahim and Hanefah (2016), Al-Rahahleh (2017) and the European Bank (2017), 
which recorded the percentage of women on company boards as 2.7 %, 4.3% and 
6.46%, respectively. These are lower than the numbers documented for the United 
States market. For instance, Carter et al. (2003) and Farrell and Hersch (2005), 
documented values of 9.6% and 10.2%, respectively. Further, Liu et al. (2014) 
observed that the percentage of women on boards is 10.2% in China. Ahmed and Ali 
(2017) noted an increase in the rate of women board members from 4.51% in 2008 to 
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7.64% in 2013, for Australian firms. For Malaysian companies, Julizaerma and Sori 
(2012) reported the percentage of women directors to be 10.62%. Drawing on Table 
2, the mean board size is 8.47 members, with a minimum of 3 members and a 
maximum of 14. This is lower than the mean recorded for large United States 
companies. Yermack (1996), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Pathan (2009), provided 
the corresponding means of 12.25, 12.3 and 12.92, respectively. In addition, Green 
and Homroy (2018) observed that the mean number of directors in the Euro Top 100 
companies was much higher, at 16.963. However, the mean board size of Jordanian 
listed firms is closer to that of the Australian figure of 8.63, as documented by 
Krishnamurti and Velayutham (2017). Likewise, Germain et al. (2014) calculated the 
mean number of directors as between 7.5 and 7.8 in Malaysia. In Jordan, the average 
percentages of director ownership, largest block holders and institutional ownership, 
are 49, 53 and 9, respectively. Table 2 also displays an average of the mean debt ratio 
and R&D measures, of approximately 32% and 3%, respectively.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample  
N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Dev. 
ROA 880 0.05 0.05 0.36 -0.28 0.10 
Tobin’s Q 880 1.10 0.86 4.45 0.21 0.82 
AUR 880 0.57 0.52 4.43 0.01 0.44 
ERN 880 0.41 0.25 4.65 0.03 0.61 
BDGDIV 880 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.07 
BDIND 880 0.52 0.55 1.00 0.00 0.23 
DIROWN 880 0.49 0.47 0.99 0.01 0.27 
LBOWN 880 0.53 0.51 0.99 0.09 0.22 
INSTOWN 880 0.09 0.03 0.64 0.00 0.12 
BDSIZE 880 8.47 9.00 14.00 3.00 2.36 
SIZE 880 17.01 16.92 21.31 12.89 1.46 
LNAGE 880 2.72 2.83 3.66 0.00 0.75 
GROWTH 880 0.12 0.03 5.02 -0.82 0.69 
LIQ 880 2.81 1.69 29.04 0.07 3.99 
LEV 880 0.32 0.29 0.93 0.00 0.21 
FCF 880 -0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.33 0.07 
R&D 880 0.03 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.06 
 
In this study, regression model analysis was employed to measure the effects of 
board gender diversity on firm performance and efficiency or firm’s agency cost. 
Different models were constructed to examine board gender diversity as an 
independent variable with ROA, Tobin’s Q, AUR and ER, as the dependent variables. 
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                Table 3: Correlation coefficients  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
VIF 
1 BDGDIV 1.00 
                        
1.07 
2 BDIND 
-0.13*** 1.00                       1.49 
3 DIROWN 
0.13*** -0.53*** 1.00                     3.64 
4 LBOWN 
0.11*** -0.38*** 0.66*** 1.00                   2.66 
5 INSTOWN 
-0.10*** 0.27*** -0.45*** -0.03 1.00                 1.58 
6 BDSIZE 
-0.05 0.07* 0.12*** -0.22*** -0.11*** 1.00               1.64 
7 SIZE 
0.01 -0.17*** 0.23*** 0.07* -0.06* 0.46*** 1.00             1.97 
8 LNAGE 
  -0.13*** 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.07* 0.11*** 0.14*** 1.00           1.14 
9 GROWTH 
0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.08* -0.04 -0.06* -0.19*** 1.00         1.07 
10 LIQ 
0.01 0.04 0.10*** 0.09* -0.06 -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.19*** 0.11*** 1.00       1.39 
11 LEV 
-0.16*** 0.07* -0.15*** -0.01 0.16*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.23** -0.01 -0.44*** 1.00     1.67 
12 FCF 
0.09*** -0.10*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.04 0.07* 0.32*** -0.08* 0.06* 0.04 -0.21*** 1.00   1.32 
13 R&D 
-0.02 0.08* 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.09** 0.07* 0.07* -0.03 -0.14*** 0.27*** -0.13*** 1.00 1.12 
                                   The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively. 
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The results of the regression analysis of the influence of board gender diversity on 
firm performance and efficiency of non-financial Jordanian firms, are shown in Tables 
4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively. The regressions of coefficients of the relationship between 
board gender diversity and firm performance, are displayed in Panels A of Tables 4 
and 5. Based on Panels A of Tables 4 and 5, it is noted that there is a significant positive 
relationship between BDGDIV and ROA as a measure of firm performance, and a 
significant positive relationship between BDGDIV and Tobin’s Q, as a measure of 
firm performance. 
Table 4: Board gender diversity and firm performance (regression results). 
 Table 4 shows the summary of results of the effects of board gender diversity 
on firm performance, as measured by ROA. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses. 
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept -0.1980 
(-4.86)*** 
-0.2027 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.1300 
(-1.44) 
BDGDIV 0.0772 
(2.23)* 
0.0852 
(2.37)* 
0.0370 
(0.87) 
BDIND 0.0309 
(2.85)** 
0.0405 
(3.34)*** 
0.0281 
(1.70)* 
DIROWN 0.0468 
(3.57)*** 
0.0337 
(2.50)* 
0.0200 
(0.86) 
LBOWN -0.0243 
(-1.84)* 
-0.0281 
(-2.11)* 
-0.0307 
(-1.31) 
INSTOWN -0.0037 
(-0.20) 
-0.0045 
(-0.24) 
-0.0195 
(-0.75) 
BDSIZE -0.0015 
(-1.32) 
-0.0020 
(-1.54) 
-0.0032 
(-1.60) 
SIZE 0.0138 
(5.35)*** 
0.0131 
(4.41)*** 
0.0131 
(3.06)** 
LNAGE 0.0085 
(2.70)** 
0.0106 
(3.32)*** 
0.0101 
(1.67)* 
GROWTH 0.0034 
(0.90) 
0.0028 
(0.73) 
0.0042 
(1.43) 
LIQ 0.0006 
(0.90) 
0.0007 
(0.98) 
0.0004 
(0.42) 
LEV -0.0604 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.0507 
(-3.23)* 
-0.1010 
(-4.90)*** 
FCF 0.7793 
(11.41)*** 
0.7928 
(11.71)*** 
0.7524 
(19.50)*** 
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R&D -0.1433 
(-5.24)*** 
-0.1421 
(-4.36)*** 
-0.0273 
(-0.67) 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.4645 0.4787 0.4310 
F-Statistics 43.13 20.44 22.38 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
The results also indicate that BDIND, SIZE, LNAGE, GROWTH, LEV and FCF, had 
a significant positive relationship with ROA. In contrast, R&D had a significant 
negative relationship with firm performance of ROA. As well, DIROWN, INSTOWN, 
BDSIZE, LIQ, had a significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, whilst SIZE, 
LNAGE and LEV, had a significant negative relationship with firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
   Table 5: Board gender diversity and firm performance (regression results) 
 Table 5 shows the summary of results of the effects of board gender diversity 
on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. The t-tests are displayed in 
parentheses.  
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 1.664 
(3.23)** 
1.645 
(2.25)* 
6.130 
(6.5)*** 
BDGDIV 1.046 
(2.72)** 
0.9022 
(2.64)** 
0.1055 
(0.27) 
BDIND -0.0220 
(-0.182) 
0.0823 
(0.65) 
-0.2993 
(-2.00)* 
DIROWN 0.7824 
(4.76)*** 
0.7106 
(4.11)*** 
0.0912 
(0.42) 
LBOWN 0.1175 
(0.80) 
0.2473 
(1.54) 
0.3146 
(1.44) 
INSTOWN 0.7055 
(3.40)*** 
0.4700 
(2.35)* 
0.2181 
(1.00) 
BDSIZE 0.0367 
(2.41)* 
0.0182 
(1.14) 
0.0105 
(0.55) 
SIZE -0.0621 
(-1.82)* 
-0.0661 
(-1.65)* 
-0.2764 
(-6.33)*** 
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LNAGE -0.0673 
(-1.73)* 
0.0157 
(0.40) 
-0.0606 
(-1.01)* 
GROWTH 0.0446 
(0.87) 
0.0296 
(0.58) 
0.0212 
(0.80) 
LIQ 0.0207 
(1.95)* 
0.0246 
(2.50)* 
0.0186 
(2.00) * 
LEV -0.7545 
(-4.60)*** 
-0.6704 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.1834 
(-1.00) 
FCF -0.6256 
(-1.00) 
-0.6095 
(-1.00) 
0.4611 
(1.33) 
R&D 0.4658 
(1.27) 
0.8889 
(2.43)* 
1.007 
(2.70) ** 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.1755 0.2133 0.4310 
F-Statistics 20.00 18.61 22.38 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
The regressions of coefficients of the relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm efficiency/firm’s agency cost, are displayed in Panel A of Tables 6 
and 7. Panel A of Tables 6 and 7 reveal that there is a significant negative association 
between BDGDIV and firm’s agency cost of AUR, and a non-significant negative 
relationship between BDGDIV and firm’s ER as a measure of firm efficiency. As well, 
it is noted that BDIND, SIZE, LNAGE, GROWTH, LEV and FCF, had a significant 
positive association with firm of AUR, whilst R&D had a significant negative one with 
AUR. The findings also indicate that BDSIZE, SIZE, LNAGE, GROWTH and FCF, 
had a significant negative association with firm ER as a measure of firm efficiency. In 
contrast, DIROWN and R&D had a significant positive association with ER. 
Therefore, it can be said that firm size, firm age, firm’s growth and FCF, act as 
mechanisms to alleviate the firm’s agency cost. Therefore, these variables may be a 
substitute for other control mechanisms to promote firm value 
Table 6: Board gender diversity and agency cost (regression results) 
Table 6 shows the summary of results of the effects of board gender diversity on 
firm efficiency for AUR. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses.  
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Model Panel A 
(before controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept -0.8204 
(-3.10)** 
0.4793 
(2.24)* 
0.6117 
(1.60) 
BDGDIV -0.3070 
(-1.80)* 
-0.4191 
(-2.16)* 
0.0731 
(0.46) 
BDIND 0.1405 
(2.07)* 
0.0507 
(0.92) 
0.1083 
(1.74)* 
DIROWN -0.0574 
(-0.67) 
-0.0309 
(-0.45) 
0.1074 
(1.22) 
LBOWN -0.1210 
(-1.22) 
-0.1654 
(-2.15)* 
-0.1023 
(-1.16) 
INSTOWN 0.1716 
(1.36) 
0.1852 
(1.65)* 
0.0812 
(0.84) 
BDSIZE -0.0054 
(-0.72) 
-0.0015 
(-0.21) 
-0.0067 
(-0.86) 
SIZE 0.0564 
(3.64)*** 
0.0030 
(0.23) 
-0.0152 
(-0.86) 
LNAGE 0.0914 
(6.08)*** 
0.0644 
(4.75)*** 
0.1217 
(5.04)*** 
GROWTH 0.0366 
(1.92)* 
0.0388 
(1.91)* 
0.0596 
(5.60) *** 
LIQ 0.0144 
(-0.87) 
0.0028 
(0.74) 
-0.0020 
(-0.51) 
LEV 0.7933 
(6.64)*** 
0.3043 
(3.06)** 
0.2987 
(3.90) *** 
FCF 1.103 
(5.00)*** 
1.302 
(6.14)*** 
0.7730 
(5.55) *** 
R&D -1.812 
(-9.00)*** 
-0.8717 
(-5.03)*** 
-0.1480 
(-1.01) 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.2848 0..5268 0.2002 
F-Statistics 13.02 23.62 8.05 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Board gender diversity and agency cost (regression results) 
Table 7 shows the summary of results of the effects of board gender diversity on 
firm efficiency, when measured by ER. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses. 
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Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 1.833 
(6.17)*** 
2.143 
(5.25)*** 
3.553 
(5.60) *** 
BDGDIV -0.0800 
(-0.40) 
-0.0878 
(-0.42) 
-0.7237 
(-2.20) *** 
BDIND 0.0125 
(0.15) 
 
-0.0226 
(-0.27) 
0.0715 
(0.56) 
DIROWN 0.3085 
(2.83)** 
0.1893 
(1.86)* 
0.3050 
(1.73) * 
LBOWN -0.1510 
(-1.44) 
-0.0712 
(-0.70) 
-0.0586 
(-0.31) 
INSTOWN 0.3446 
(1.55) 
0.2417 
(1.08) 
0.4380 
(2.14) * 
BDSIZE -0.0230 
(-2.38)* 
-0.0250 
(-2.60)** 
-0.0256 
(-1.70) * 
SIZE -0.0636 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.0645 
(-3.36)*** 
-0.1396 
(-4.53) *** 
LNAGE -0.1096 
(-3.50)*** 
-0.1072 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.1858 
(-4.17)*** 
GROWTH -0.1123 
(-3.11)** 
-0.1111 
(-3.05)** 
-0.1524 
(-6.40) *** 
LIQ -0.0151 
(-1.24) 
-0.0072 
(-0.54) 
0.0014 
(0.20) 
LEV 
 
-0.1693 
(-1.54) 
-0.2278 
(-1.45) 
-0.0373 
(-0.23) 
FCF -2.471 
(-4.16)*** 
-2.481 
(-4.24)*** 
-2.088 
(-6.84) *** 
R&D 1.561 
(3.17)** 
1.401 
(2.83)** 
0.7954 
(2.48) * 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.2068 0.2400 0.1814 
F-Statistics 7.42 10.57 7.28 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
It is argued that the industry dummies control for environmental effects, because 
gender diversity may vary by industry. In other words, the sources of gender diversity 
disparities may vary across firms and industries (Graham & Hotchkiss 2003). 
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Therefore, the associations among board gender diversity, firm performance and 
agency cost may be industry or time specific. For instance, gender diversity may occur 
to coincide with industries that have various financial or operating characteristics, and 
these variations may lead to the correlation amongst agency costs, firm performance 
and gender diversity (Jurkus et al. 2011). 
Following this argument, the above model is modified. This was done by adding 
INDUSTRY dummies and TIME dummies. Industries are created based on the GICS 
codes- industry classification which relate to the sector to which the corporation 
belongs, and for the year for which the observation was made. Therefore, the following 
model has been developed: 
Yi,t=α+ β1BGDIVi,t +β2BDINDi,t+ β3DIROWNi,t 
+β4LBOWNi,t+β5INSTOWNi,t+ 
β6BDSIZEi,t +β7SIZEi,t + β8AGEi,t+ β9GROWTHi,t+ β10LIQi,t+β11LEVi,t 
+ β12FCFi,t + β13R&Di,t + ɛi,t + ΩYEAR+ γINDUSTRY+ ɛi,t 
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the revised findings of the regression coefficients.  
Many coefficients of variables altered from negative to positive, and vice versa. 
Likewise, many coefficients of variables changed from a significant influence to a non-
significant influence, and vice versa.  
 
8.2 Endogeneity test 
Generally speaking, there are very few empirical works on CG which have 
addressed the issue of endogeneity between board characteristics and firm 
performance (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003). Endogeneity is the relationship between 
any of the independent variables with the error term (Gippel et al. 2015; Rashid 2015). 
It is important that endogeneity is taken into account, as the pointing out of an 
unobserved influence is more likely to lead to a degree of correlation between the error 
term and independent variables. Carter et al. (2003) showed that problems arise with 
OLS if two or more variables are jointly endogenous. Therefore, employing OLS 
regression can provide biased coefficient estimates. In case where it exists, the OLS is 
inconsistent.  
To deal with the endogeneity problem, instrumental variable techniques (IVs) 
are employed. As suggested by Carter et al. (2003), and consistent with the prior 
studies such as those of Jurkus et al. (2011), Saeed and Sameer (2017) and Galbreath 
(2018), the F-test for the predicted value of board independence was not significant.  
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Specifically, tests were performed using ROA as a proxy for firm performance, F= 
0.32 (P = 0.5682), and Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance, F = 0.0001 (P = 
0.9977), AUR as a proxy for firm’s agency cost, F = 2.01 (P = 0.1582), and ER as a 
proxy for firm’s agency cost, F = 0.1974 (P = 0.6569). These findings indicate that 
there are no signs of a potential endogeneity problem among board gender diversity, 
firm performance and firm’s agency cost, suggesting both IVs and OLS are consistent. 
Following earlier studies, such as that of Al-Najjar (2014), this study adopts the lag 
board gender diversity as IVs.  
 
8.3 Robustness check 
As an unbalanced set of panel data was used in this research (because there were 
not 80 corporations listed in all years), this may lead to some unobserved 
heterogeneity. In other words, there may be variation within a company and across the 
companies or to capture the company specific characteristics. To this end, the above 
model was run again by using a fixed effect model or random effect model, also known 
as panel data modelling. A Hausman test was employed to test the significance of the 
difference between the fixed effect and the random effect estimates.  
The coefficient of the Hausman test indicated that the random effect model is 
consistent. The regression coefficients of the association among board gender 
diversity, firm performance and efficiency under the random effect model, are shown 
in Panel C of Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively. The revised findings of the regression 
coefficients indicate that many coefficients of variables altered from positive to 
negative, and vice versa. Likewise, many coefficients of variables altered from a 
significant influence to a non-significant influence, and vice versa. Interestingly, it is 
noted that the signs of the coefficients of BDGDIV are changed from significantly 
positive to non-significantly positive, using ROA and Tobin’s Q as measures of firm 
performance. The results also point out that the coefficients of BDGDIV are modified 
from significantly negative to non-significantly positive, using AUR as a measure of 
a firm’s agency cost. In addition, it is noted that the coefficients of BDGDIV are 
transformed from non-significantly negative to significantly negative using ER as a 
measure of a firm’s agency cost. Thus, it can be said that the variation across 
companies has an influence on board gender diversity, firm performance and firm’s 
agency cost.  
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9 Conclusion, implications and limitations   
9.1 Conclusions  
The current research aims to empirically investigate one of the more critical 
suggestions in the CG theory. The CG theory suggests that the structure of the 
company board has a substantial impact on the actions of the board of directors and 
management that eventually influence firm performance and efficiency (Kim et al. 
2009). The suggestion is that the diversity of the boardrooms is one dimension of the 
structure of the corporate board that matters (Carter et al. 2010).  
The results of the estimation of random effect regression indicate a non-
significant and positive relationship between the number of women on the board of 
directors and the ROA and Tobin’s Q. When AUR is employed as the measure of 
firm’s agency cost, the results also reveal a non-significant and positive relationship 
to female board representation. Therefore, the results of this research do not find any 
significant relationship between firm performance as measured by ROA and Tobin’s 
Q, and firm efficiency as measured by AUR. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Rose (2007), Carter (2010), Chapple and Humphrey (2014), Pletzer et al. 
(2015) and Kagzi and Guha (2018). In contrast, the findings from the random effect 
regression give weak evidence (significant in one of four measures) that there is a 
significant and negative link between board gender diversity and firm efficiency, as 
measured by the ER. 
The hypotheses tested were developed in this study from resource dependence 
theory, a theory which presents the most support for a positive relationship between 
gender diversity and firm performance. However, the results of random effect 
estimations broadly support the prevailing belief that “there are reasonable theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence that suggest either no effect of board diversity on 
firm performance, or a detrimental effect” (Carter et al. 2010, p. 410).  
The first plausible explanation for this can be issues, such as the culture, 
economic situation and legal environment, which can influence the board gender 
composition of corporations (Saeed et al. 2016). Julizaerma and Sori (2012) and 
Iannotta et al. (2016) claimed that cultural attitudes are one of the main reasons for the 
low participation of women on the board of directors. Unlike most developed 
countries, Jordan has a cultural setting that appears strongly resistant to gender 
equality. In the context of Jordan, the social structure differs from most developed 
countries. As argued by Singh (2009), Jordanian families tend to function as the 
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dominant unit in society, rather than individuals. Furthermore, Jordanian families 
support males in the labour market rather than females (Singh 2009). Therefore, there 
are other factors preventing women from participating in the labour market, such as 
limited resources, poverty, women’s behaviours are restricted, and paid work is not 
considered part of women’s role in Jordanian society. As a consequence, there are very 
few females on Jordanian companies’ boards, and this small number does not have the 
adequate ability to influence firm performance and efficiency. Only 3% of women are 
present on the Jordanian firms' boards.  
The second possible explanation can be that, in the context of companies with a 
high ownership concentration, such as the Jordanian case, the nature of agency 
problems may be different from agency problems in Anglo-American countries. In the 
Anglo-American context, there is a conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers, whereas countries with a high concentration of ownership may face another 
type of agency conflict, that is, a conflict of interest between minority shareholders 
and majority shareholders (Sun et al. 2017).  
A third explanation is that boards in firms with a high ownership concentration, 
are composed of members who represent the interests of owners and managers, thus 
“being unable to deal with the specific agency problem adequately” (Lefort & Urzúa 
2008, p. 615). 
Another explanation is that gender diversity in boardrooms may bring costs to 
the company due to communications problems and interpersonal conflicts. Although 
gender diversity on company boards may be useful, it has also been contended that the 
gender diversity of a board may have a reverse effect on the firm performance of well-
governed companies, due to excessive monitoring (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Erhardt 
et al. (2003) indicated that diversity both improves performance by increasing 
decision-making ability but reduces firm group performance by increasing conflict. 
Treichler (1995) argued that diversity on corporate boards requires higher costs due to 
increased initiatives and coordination to provide for the needs of various kinds of 
employees. Further, Triana et al. (2013) stated that diversity leads to conflict, which 
could impede the capacity of the company to make a strategic change, particularly in 
times when the company performance is low.  
Yet another explanation is that increasing gender diversity does not mitigate 
agency cost for all companies. As noted by Jurkus et al. (2011), increasing the number 
of women in boardrooms may lead to improvements in the performance of companies 
159 
 
and alleviate agency cost in some, but not all, companies. Therefore, the results of this 
study do not support the resource dependence theory.  
 
9.2 Implications  
The critical implications of this study are twofold. Firstly, its empirical evidence 
does not support the gender quota law to increase the percentage of women on 
companies’ boards. Thus, the decision to appoint females to a company’s board should 
not be based on the notion that gender diversity on corporate boards will promote the 
performance and efficiency of firms. Because the overall results of gender diversity do 
not seem to have a negative link with firm performance and firm’s agency cost, gender 
diversity should be enhanced for ethical reasons to improve fairness.  
Secondly, the results of this study will assist companies to find a ‘board-
performance’ fit that will ensure the high performance and efficiency of Jordanian 
companies. Overall, this study documents a non-significant and positive influence of 
board gender diversity on firm performance and efficiency. Therefore, these results 
will assist firms in designing their boards.  
 
9.3 Limitations and future research  
Just like any other research, this one also suffers from some limitations, which 
opens the way for potentially fruitful future study opportunities. Firstly, the study’s 
data related to the CG variables were manually collected from company annual reports 
in order to conduct the quantitative analysis. However, annual reports may not be 
accurate. Therefore, future research may complement this research’s evidence by using 
qualitative research methods, such as conducting face-to-face interviews.  
Secondly, this study has been limited to examining the inclusion of only one 
board characteristic, i.e. gender diversity. However, it is suggested that a future 
research direction would be to explore the effect of various other types of company 
board diversity, such as age, experience, years and level of education, on firm 
performance and agency cost.  
A third limitation is that the use of other methods or financial measures may 
produce a more conclusive result. Also, the current study excluded financial firms 
because these are managed by unique rules and instructions, thus the sample size was 
reduced from 224 firms to 80, which is a limited number. Lastly, the empirical analyses 
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of this study are based on one special national context. Further research should 
examine the phenomena of interest in corporations across countries. It is argued that 
the cultural and institutional context may be of importance when investigating board 
gender diversity and its effects (Grosvold et al. 2007).  
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CEO Duality and Agency Cost and Performance: Evidence from Jordan 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study aims to investigate the influence of CEO duality as a proxy for 
board leadership structure, on firm performance and firm efficiency, also known as 
‘firm’s agency cost’, amongst non-financial listed firms in the context of a less 
developed country by considering Jordan as a case study. 
Design/methodology/approach – By using data from 880 firm-year observations of 
non-financial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange over the period of 2006-
2016, and by using two measures each for firm performance (return on assets and 
Tobin’s Q), and firm efficiency or firm’s agency cost (asset utilization and expense 
ratio), this study uses a regression model to test its hypotheses.  
Findings – The empirical results show that CEO duality has a significant positive 
impact on firm performance as indicated by the return on assets and a significant 
positive impact on firm efficiency as indicated by the asset utilization ratio. The 
findings also reveal that CEO duality has a significant negative relationship with firm 
agency cost (in other words, efficiency) as shown by the expense ratio. These findings 
have been shown to be robust by various kinds of robustness checks. Therefore, the 
results of this study document that CEO duality helps in ameliorating the firm’s agency 
cost and promoting firm performance. These results seem to corroborate the 
stewardship theory.  
Research limitations/implications – Although the derived findings are specific to the 
Jordanian context, the governance model in Jordan shares a similarity with those of 
other developing countries. Thus, an extended examination of this phenomenon in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the Middle East and North Africa region is 
recommended. 
Practical implications – The implication of this study is that CEO duality is becoming 
an important control mechanism that can add value to the firm by mitigating firm 
agency cost and enhancing firm performance.  
Originality/value – This study contributes to the governance literature on the practices 
of corporate governance mechanisms, specifically CEO duality, in the context of 
developing countries. 
Keywords – Agency theory, corporate governance, firm performance, firm efficiency, 
firm’s agency cost, CEO duality, Jordan. 
 Paper type – Research paper 
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CEO Duality and Agency Cost and Performance: Evidence from Jordan 
1 Introduction 
The separation of ownership and management characterises most large firms in 
modern markets. This situation is termed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as an agency 
relationship and described as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent), to perform some service on their 
behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (p. 
308). Consequently, they argued that the managers (agents) would increase their 
wealth at the expense of owners’ wealth. Thus, the owners need to incur special costs 
which are known as an ‘agency cost’ to monitor the managers’ activities, to guarantee 
that a conflict of interest between managers and owners is mitigated. 
In the governance literature, the mechanisms for corporate governance (CG) are 
considered to be crucial devices in ameliorating agency conflicts between shareholders 
and management. Supporting this, the prevailing belief, Mallin (2001) indicated that 
in firms without good CG, shareholders’ wealth and performance might be at risk. 
Hence, this leads to less transparency and accountability, and ultimately more 
opportunity for managers to engage in actions which may have detrimental effects. 
Therefore, CG has increased in significance. 
Interestingly, there is a heated debate about the role of the board of directors in 
disciplining and monitoring the senior management. The company board is the primary 
line of defence against the misconduct of its chief executive officer (CEO) (Barka & 
Legendre 2017). Thus, it plays a pivotal role in firm performance and is considered to 
be a vital device for protecting owners from self-interested managers (Kim & Ozdemir 
2014). Furthermore, it is argued that the board of directors is responsible for assuring 
the implementation of CG and ethical accounting practices (Katti & Raithatha 2018). 
Therefore, the board of directors plays a critical role in the success of CG 
implementation.  
The ability of corporate boards to exercise the functions of CG relies on a 
number of board characteristics. Research has shown these to be, for example, the 
distribution of responsibilities and duties between CEO and board chair (Pearce & 
Zahra 1991; Hermalin & Weisbach 2003); the ability of the corporate board to appoint 
the CEO based on attributes of real leaders, such as providing meaning and integrity, 
communicating values and generating trust (Bennis & O'Toole 2000); board 
independence (Bhagat et al. 2008; Dalton & Dalton 2011; Cladera & Fuster 2014) and 
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board size (Chaganti et al. 1985; Eisenberg et al. 1998; Mak & Kusnadi 2005; Guest 
2009; Ciftci et al. 2019).  
However, after the accounting scandals and financial collapses that have 
happened in modern firms, such as Maxwell Communications and Enron (Iyengar & 
Zampelli 2009; Fuzi et al. 2016), shareholders’ confidence has crumbled due to firm 
failures and questionable accounting practices (Kang & Zardkoohi 2005). These 
events and the reaction to them are related to a lack of transparency and accountability, 
particular institutional settings and the avoidance of responsibility on the part of 
corporation boards and top management. As noted by Brick et al. (2006, p. 421) “the 
Enron debacle and the Global Crossing bankruptcy have renewed concerns about the 
effectiveness of board monitoring”.  
One of the most important causes of these accounting scandals has been that 
there was no split of roles between the CEO and board chair. Consequently, there have 
been recommendations focusing on reforms of company boards. Among these is the 
structural independence of the board. For board best practice, Cadbury (1992, p. 22) 
suggests “there should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of 
a company, which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one 
individual has unfettered powers of decision”. Therefore, the Cadbury code 
recommends what is known as the splitting of responsibilities and duties of CEO and 
board chair which is also termed ‘CEO non-duality’. Supporting these reforms is 
Aguilera (2005, p. 39) who claims that these reforms help to bring more balance of 
power within the company “particularly reining in over-mighty chief executives” so 
that no single person has unlimited decision-making power. The issue of splitting the 
two positions between two different people has been addressed in many countries (eg., 
France, The Netherlands, Japan), which require listed firms to separate the roles of 
CEO and board chairman (Kakabadse et al. 2006; Yang & Zhao 2014). As part of this 
trend, the same division of roles was adopted in Jordan. 
This study examines whether CEO duality lowers firm’s agency cost to 
eventually enhance firm performance in the context of a less developed country, by 
considering the case of Jordan. Jordan is an interesting setting to study CEO duality 
and its effects on firm efficiency (agency cost) and firm performance for two key 
reasons. Firstly, while most prior research has been performed in the context of listed 
corporations featuring highly dispersed ownership, Jordanian listed firms feature a 
high concentration. Al-Azzam et al. (2015) indicated that more than 90% of Jordanian 
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firms are controlled, owned and managed by families. Secondly, there are some 
institutional variations of CG practices in Jordan, for instance, great insider 
representation in company boardrooms, CEO duality, and Jordan’s legal, financial, 
regulatory and political systems, as well as the system of internal controls within a 
company. It has been argued that institutional differences between countries are a vital 
factor affecting firms’ agency costs due to the separation of ownership from 
management (Ahmed et al. 2006). The current study endeavours to contribute to the 
heated debate in the literature about CEO duality and its effects on firm efficiency and 
firm performance.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: in Section 2 board leadership 
structure is discussed whilst in Section 3, board characteristics in Jordan are described. 
A literature review and the theoretical background of this study are presented in 
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The hypothesis development is presented in Section 6. 
In Section 7, the study method is described. Empirical results are provided in Section 
8, whilst conclusions, implications, limitations and future research, are set out in 
Section 9.  
 
2 CEO duality  
The corporate board has been described as “at the apex of the internal control 
system, and has the final responsibility for the functioning of the firm” (Jensen 1993, 
p. 862). However, opponents of CEO duality argue that when the CEO and the 
chairman of the company board is the same person, the effectiveness of the board to 
monitor top management is decreased, because of a conflict of interest and a lack of 
board independence, eventually hindering the firm’s performance (Heracleous 2001; 
Kang & Zardkoohi 2005; Peng et al. 2007). This situation has been explained by 
Abdullah (2004), who stated that the rationale behind favouring the splitting of the 
roles is that when both the monitoring role (board chairperson) and implementation 
role (CEO) are vested in a single manager, the monitoring of the company board will 
be diminished.   
There are many reasons why CEO duality is problematic. It makes it difficult for 
a corporate board to remove poorly performing directors (Goyal & Park 2002). The 
question that arises when firms practice CEO duality is “who monitors the 
management?” (Abdullah 2004). Consequently, in a firm that is dominated by one 
person as the CEO and board chair, there is no separation between decision control 
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and decision management (Fama & Jensen 1983). Furthermore, when the company 
board gives the final responsibility for monitoring to the individual manager (i.e., the 
CEO), this structure is more likely to foster a board whose role is that of a “rubber 
stamp” (Rechner 1989). Therefore, the presence of one group of managers monitoring 
another group in the same company board, may cause problems for the corporations. 
Accordingly, the board may be unable to protect the interests of shareholders. Splitting 
the roles of board chairperson and CEO, lessens the likelihood of the CEO using the 
opportunistic behaviour, which will in turn, permit the board to exercise its monitoring 
role effectively (Daily & Dalton 1994a).  
However, opponents of CEO non-duality argue for the need for CEO duality, 
reasoning that this promotes firm performance and enhances conformity (Tricker 
1994). Such duality makes it easier to quickly respond to antagonistic external 
conditions (Boyd 1995). Furthermore, it is argued that duality is necessary for 
controlling corporate operations and making swift decisions (Finkelstein & Hambrick 
1996). As the CEO provides particular knowledge and experience about the firm, this 
is claimed to improve firm efficiency (Jensen & Heckling 1995; Brickley et al. 1997), 
most especially when CEOs have complete power and both functions are vested in one 
individual manager (Donaldson & Davis 1991).  
 
2.1 The costs and benefits of CEO duality  
As argued by Brickley et al. (1997) and Elsayed (2007), there is no one optimal 
leadership structure, as both CEO duality and CEO non-duality may have benefits and 
costs. In other words, CEO non-duality will benefit some companies while duality is 
likely to be a cost for others. For example, when a CEO imposes duality on a board to 
reinforce his/her authority in the company, it is logical to expect an increase in a firm’s 
agency costs, one that will negatively affect firm performance. In contrast, if a CEO 
adopts duality to provide strong leadership and increase the speed of strategic decision-
making, without doubt, there will be a positive influence on firm performance. There 
is research support and recognition of the benefits of CEO duality (Brickley et al. 1997; 
Elsayed 2010; Yang & Zhao 2014; Tang 2017), just as there is research advocating the 
opposite (Rechner 1989; Donaldson & Davis 1991). 
Elsayed (2010) summarised the benefits and costs of CEO non-duality and CEO 
duality, by inspecting the previous literature, reporting four benefits for each. For CEO 
non-duality benefits, Elsayed (2010) found firstly, that it reduced a firm’s agency cost. 
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Secondly, it split decision control from decision management. Thirdly, it improved 
decision-making authority efficiency as a result of more discussion. Finally, it 
mitigated the problem of the managerial entrenchment. In contrast, that study 
documented sic costs related to CEO non-duality: increasing the firm’s agency cost of 
monitoring the conduct of a non-CEO chairperson, deficient information flow between 
the chairperson and CEO, extra pay to compensate an outside director, the existence 
of conflict leading to inconsistency in the process of the decision-making, the presence 
of two spokespeople leading to confusion, inadequate knowledge of the chairperson 
about routine activities, and the non-CEO chairpersons’ limited ability to face 
environmental changes.  
As for Elsayed’s (2010) benefits of CEO duality, firstly, this offers a fast 
response to the external environment. Secondly, quick and effective decisions can be 
made. Thirdly, duality allows for more complete knowledge about routine actions. 
Finally, there is an enhanced and more informed ability to formulate and apply 
strategies. In terms of the costs of CEO duality, the study identified four: increasing 
the problem of managerial entrenchment, a weak company board monitoring function, 
the existence of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, and the 
ineffectiveness of individual decisions.  
A key debate in the CG research is the influence of CEO duality (employed as a 
proxy of board leadership structure) on a firm’s agency cost and firm performance. 
The main motivation for this research is the fact that, although duality is very common 
in Jordan, there are no studies on CEO duality, firms’ agency cost, and firm 
performance. Therefore, this study examines if duality operates positively in a less 
developed country such as Jordan.   
 
3 Board characteristics: the Jordanian case 
In the Jordanian context, CG has been seen as an increasingly important issue. 
Examples of recent CG developments in this country include the execution of a joint 
project between international donor agencies, such as the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank, to benchmark the practices of CG in Jordan 
against the principles of CG in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, namely, the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the role of stakeholders in CG, disclosure and transparency, and the 
responsibility of the company board. Supporting this is the establishment of three new 
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institutions, (i.e., the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), and the Securities Depository Centre (SDC)), all of which have 
contributed to the development of the country’s regulatory environment (Jaafar & El-
Shawa 2009).  
Supporting this, the Jordanian Institute of Directors (JIoD) was set up in 2012. 
The JIoD is registered as a non-profit limited liability company. It is the first of its 
kind in Jordan and constitutes the Jordanian centre for CG training, tasked with 
creating proper CG awareness amongst Jordanian firms, and emphasising the roles and 
functions of the board of directors in achieving corporate goals. The IFC is considered 
the JIoD’s main partner for providing the necessary expertise for it to achieve its 
mission.  
Due to the increased interest in CG practices in Jordan, various CG reforms have 
become increasingly significant agenda items in Jordan’s pursuit of sustainable and 
strengthened economic growth. These are outlined in the final part of this section. 
Recently, the Jordanian market has reformed to reflect CG practices, such as 
complying with new regulations, rules, and laws. As a result, the number of listed firms 
on the ASE increased from 163 with a market capitalisation of $ 4,944 million in 2000, 
to 194 with a market capitalisation of $16,963 million in 2015. However, the number 
of listed firms decreased from 224 in 2016 to 194 at the end of 2017 (ASE 2018).  
CEO non-duality or unitary board leadership, which refers to separating the 
monitoring function of the board from its executive function, is very common in a two-
tier board. Such boards are prevalent in European countries (e.g., Germany and 
Finland) (Maassen 2002). In this system, the management role of the firm board mostly 
oversees the operational functions, and this is supervised by the CEO. Whereas the 
supervisory role of the board monitors the top management, and this is overseen by a 
non-executive manager as chairperson (Solomon 2007).    
As mentioned above, CEO duality or dual board leadership indicates a situation 
where an executive manager also serves as the board chairman or one single manager 
holds the positions of both board chairman and CEO (Elsayed 2007; Mutlu et al. 2018). 
CEO duality is a popular concept in Anglo-American countries (e.g., the United States 
and Canada) in which boards have a one-tier structure (Maassen 2002). Therefore, 
there may not be any separation between the executive role and the monitoring role of 
the board (van Veen & Elbertsen 2008). 
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In the Jordanian context, non-financial firms are characterised by a one-tier 
board system, whilst the banking sector is required to be organised under a two-tier 
board system (European Bank 2017). In Jordanian non-financial firms’ one-tier board 
system, CEO duality is very common. This is largely because of the centralised 
ownership within the typical Jordanian corporation. In essence, shareholders who 
belong to one family heavily dominate Jordanian boardrooms. Due to the massive 
clout of one family on these firms’ boards, it is complicated to split the management 
and monitoring functions of boards.  
However, as alluded to above, in recent years, the Jordanian governance 
environment has witnessed a wave of reforms. The JSC announced Circular No. 
12/1/4659 about its Jordanian CG code for shareholding firms listed on the ASE, which 
came into effect on 1 January 2009. Special provisions were made for the banking 
sector. In addition, Jordan also issued new CG directives for companies listed on the 
ASE, which came into effect on 22 May 2017. Among various requirements, it was 
suggested that it is not permissable for a single manager to hold the positions of 
chairperson of the board and an executive role in the corporation at the same time. As 
well, it was recommended that at least one-third of company board members should 
be independent members (SDC 2018).  
However, there is a requirement that all directors should be shareholders, which 
ignores the notion of board member independence altogether. Therefore, the main 
problem in Jordanian boardrooms remains - board members are more likely not to be 
really independent. As a result,  there exists a need to apply the true meaning of the 
term  ‘independent board members’, and to clearly define what it means to be an 
independent director on a company board.  
 
4 Literature review  
CEO duality and its influence on a firm’s agency cost and performance, is a 
heated debate in the literature with non-conclusive or mixed evidence. In modern 
corporations, the implications of the separation of ownership from management are 
the subject of different opinions concerning the associations of CEO duality with firm 
efficiency and performance.  
According to agency theory, in this arrangement, the executive managers will be 
engaged in self-interested actions. Thus, it has been suggested that external and 
internal monitoring tools need to be used to reduce the divergence in interests between 
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owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). Corroborating 
the agency theory, many of the earlier studies (e.g., Rechner & Dalton 1991; Desai et 
al. 2003; Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis 2012; Gohar & Batool 2015; Duru et al. 2016; 
Mohd et al. 2016; Tang 2017; Abdulsamad et al. 2018; Dang A et al. 2018; Nazar 
2018; Singh et al. 2018) reported a significant negative effect of CEO duality, on firm’s 
agency cost and firm performance. Therefore, these results imply that CEO duality 
(i.e., a dual leadership structure) is not desirable for company performance.   
However, underscoring the benefits of CEO duality and supporting the 
stewardship theory, some other studies argue against the predictions of agency theory. 
Authors of these papers documented a positive effect of CEO duality on firm 
performance and firm efficiency  (e.g., Donaldson & Davis 1991; Ramdani & 
Witteloostuijn 2010; Guillet et al. 2013; Goh & Rasli 2014; Peni 2014; Yang & Zhao 
2014; Mamatzakis & Bermpei 2015; Ahmadi et al. 2018; Katti & Raithatha 2018; 
Nguyen et al. 2018). Consequently, these findings imply that CEO duality is fruitful 
for firm performance. Additionally, the other research indicated a non-significant 
correlation between CEO duality and both firm efficiency and firm performance (e.g., 
Daily & Dalton 1992, 1993, 1994b; Baliga et al. 1996; Daily & Dalton 1997; Dalton 
et al. 1998; Abdullah 2004; Elsayed 2007; Lam  & Lee 2008; Iyengar & Zampelli 
2009; Rashid 2010, 2013; Gafoor et al. 2018).  
It is worth noting that some of the prior studies addressed the issue of CEO 
duality and its effect on firm performance based on the contingency theory. For 
instance, Boyd (1995) claimed that under various circumstances, both theoretical 
frameworks are beneficial. Thus duality may be positively correlated with firm 
performance in some conditions, but adversely related in others. Inconsistent with this 
argument, Peng et al. (2007) supported the contingency theory to determine particular 
conditions (e.g., environmental dynamism and resource scarcity), in which duality can 
be specifically valuable.  
Further, Brickley et al. (1997) pointed out that the leadership structure varies 
across companies. Elsayed (2007) examined the industry specific influence of CEO 
duality and company performance, proposing that CEO duality and financial 
performance are contingent and differ across industries. In a similar vein, Rhoades et 
al. (2001) reported that the independence of the leadership structure has a significant 
impact on firm performance, but this association varies depending on the context of 
the study. Rashid (2010) documented that the relationship between CEO duality and 
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performance is contingent. In summation, there is no one optimal leadership structure 
that is universal, as investigations have shown that both dual leadership structure and 
unitary board leadership have benefits and costs.  
Previous studies can be criticised in different ways. Firstly, most of the earlier 
research used several performance measures, such as return on asset (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), return on investment (ROI), return on capital, 
total share return, operational self-sufficiency, portfolio yield, market-to-book ratio 
and Tobin's Q, to capture the effectiveness of financial performance (Dalton & Dalton 
2011). However, it can be said that, to some degree, accounting and marketing based 
measures are noisy measures of financial performance (Pham et al. 2011). Secondly, 
the problem of endogeneity among CEO duality, firm efficiency and firm 
performance, is a significant one that needs to be taken into account in a study such as 
this. However, it is argued that there are very few works on CG which have taken into 
account the issue of endogeneity between company board characteristics and firm 
performance (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003). Thirdly, many of the prior studies focused 
on a single industry with few works controlling for industry effects and other variables 
of CG as moderating variables. For these reasons, the association between CEO duality 
and firm efficiency have been confounded.  
The central question that has received attention in the governance literature is 
whether there is a link between CEO duality and firms’ agency cost, or CEO duality 
and firm performance. In other words, which is better: to have a single manager to 
fulfil the chairperson of the board and the CEO positions at the same time (CEO 
duality), or separating two positions to different managers (CEO non-duality)?  
In response, to revisit the notion of CEO duality in the unique setting of the 
agency relationship in the context of Jordan, the current study endeavours to make a 
number of key contributions to the literature on CEO duality. First of all, this study 
adds to the existing global debate on CEO duality research in developing countries. 
Most of the prior CEO duality studies focused on developed economies. This is 
corroborated by Judge et al. (2003) and Peng et al. (2010), who claimed that the 
previous studies have seldom focused on the data from emerging markets. Fan et al. 
(2011, p. 211) support this by arguing that “until now, we still do not know much about 
how managers of emerging market firms are paid and promoted, and factors that 
influence these decisions”. Furthermore, Doidge et al. (2007) suggested that because 
of the institutional settings, CG practices may vary broadly across corporations and 
172 
 
countries. Secondly, this research employs two different proxies of a firm’s agency 
cost (i.e., asset utilization ratio (AUR) and expense ratio (ER)), as additional measures 
to ROA and Tobin’s Q of firm performance. In other words, this study combines 
measures of a firm’s agency cost and firm performance. It can be said that the firm 
performance is strongly linked with its agency cost (Bruton et al. 2002). Thirdly, this 
study explores if CEO duality mitigates a firm’s agency cost in the context of a less 
developed country, by using a sample of non-financial Jordanian companies, which 
characteristically feature highly concentrated ownership. Fourthly, in this empirical 
study, some effort is allocated to consider tests for industry and time effects, and the 
issue of the endogeneity. Finally, it provides the most contemporary analysis in the 
Jordanian context using a recent and large panel that covers all publicly listed non-
financial firms in Jordan over the period 2006–2016. It is argued that panel data is 
more dependable than those resulting from cross-sectional or time series studies 
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera 2008). This study uses many robustness checks to provide 
complementary evidence on the role of CEO duality by investigating how CEO duality 
and other board attributes affect a firm’s ability to protect owners’ interests by 
ameliorating agency cost and promoting firm performance in the listed firms in Jordan. 
 
5 Theoretical background 
Globally speaking, there are two views so far seen in the governance literature 
in illustrating the relationships between CEO duality and firm efficiency, and CEO 
duality and firm performance. These are agency theory and stewardship theory. The 
two views drawn from these theories are in direct contradiction with each other.  
Proponents of the agency theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; 
Eisenhardt 1989), argue that there is a conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers, drawing on that theory’s assumption that managers are opportunistic and 
self-interested, rather than concerned, as the major priority, with the overall benefit for 
the company. It follows from this that managers will act to increase their wealth, more 
likely at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Supporting this view, Solomon (2007), 
Qiao et al. (2017) and Lew et al. (2017), claim that CEO duality (i.e., a dual leadership 
structure) contributes to the aggregation of executive authority and power, which may 
help the incursion of the CEO by mitigating the effectiveness of the board of directors’ 
monitoring role. Elsayed (2007) indicates that CEO duality has a negative effect on 
firm performance by reducing the monitoring function of the board of directors.  
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Moreover, Sheikh et al. (2018), McKnight and Weir (2009) and Lin et al. (2014), note 
that this duality lessens the board’s independence and boosts the executive’s powers 
over decision control. Inferentially, CEOs will conduct self-interested activities that 
could be hindrances to the economic welfare of shareholders unless they are restricted 
in some way (Deegan 2006). Thus, CEO duality is considered as an indication of 
inefficient CG, according to the agency theory.  
By contrast, proponents of the stewardship theory, such as Davis et al. (1997, p. 
21) argue that “managers are not motivated by individual goals, rather (they) are 
stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals”. Hence, 
managers (agents) are motivated to act in the interests of shareholders (Donaldson & 
Davis 1991). Accordingly, the stewardship theory proposes the aggregation of 
executive authority and power. Put another way, the stewardship function can be 
exercised when the roles of the chair of the board and CEO are both fulfilled by the 
same individual (Donaldson & Davis 1991). Therefore, proponents of stewardship 
theory refer to the positive effects of CEO duality on firm efficiency and firm 
performance (Boyd 1995). Thus, CEO duality is considered as a positive indication of 
effective CG practices, from the perspective of the stewardship theory.  
The current research is based on the assumption that the separation of ownership 
and control may lead to agents engaging in self-interested activities. Agency theory 
argues that the primary function of the board of directors, is monitoring the operations 
of managers (agents), to protect the interest of owners (principals) (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Hillman & Daiziel 2003). Drawing on agency theory, that CEO duality hinders the 
company performance, likening it to the same person marking her/his “own 
examination papers” (Wan and Ong 2005, p. 278). As a corollary, this research 
examines whether CEO duality decreases firm efficiency and firm performance, as 
defenders of the agency theory would contend.  
 
6 Research hypothesis 
Thus the key research question is whether the dual leadership structure decreases 
firm performance and increases firm agency cost. Duality provides prodigious power 
to the CEO, which tends to impede the internal control system of corporations (Jensen 
1993) and mitigates the balances and checks made by the company board (Tricker 
1994). It is argued that, in essence, the CEO does not substantially own the companies 
and thus may pursue her/his self-service at the expense of owners (Tang 2017). It 
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follows that in this situation, the CEO is not likely to aspire to there being an active 
company board as this might challenge the CEO’s power and authority. Inevitably 
therefore, the CEO may resist board members’ increased interest and engagement in 
important issues (e.g., strategic issues) (Zahra 1990). Most importantly, according to 
the agency theory, the CEO cannot simultaneously serve the interests of both the 
management and shareholders (Rechner & Dalton 1991). To improve firm 
performance, opponents of duality pressure for the structural independence of the 
board, with the positions of chairman and CEO compulsorily separated (Duru et al. 
2016). Hence, this hypothesis has been posed: 
H 1a: CEO duality is negatively associated with firm performance.  
Ideally, corporate boards contribute to mitigating the firm’s agency cost and protecting 
the interests of its owners (Zahra & Pearce 1989). However, the presence of CEO 
duality may create a conflict of interest due to it permitting the CEO to control the 
information exposed to board members (Detthamrong et al. 2017). Thus, CEO duality 
is detrimental to the monitoring function. “CEO/Chair duality concentrates power with 
the CEO, potentially making disagreement on the part of outsiders costlier, which can 
exacerbate potential conflicts of interest” (Cornett et al. 2007, p. 1775).  Rashid (2018) 
focused on such duality’s effect on firm efficiency, claiming the CEO’s direction of 
information mitigates independent directors’ decision-making. 
Thus, duality increases the level of agency problems within companies and ultimately 
enhances agency cost as noted by Fama and Jensen (1983). CEO non-duality has been 
suggested to diminish agency cost by researchers such as Chen et al., 2008; while 
Jensen (1993) argued that it would eventually alleviate agency cost by improving the 
board’s effectiveness. Consistent with the monitoring role of the board, this research 
argues that if the board chair also serves as CEO (CEO duality), it will increase firm’s 
agency cost. Therefore, the second hypothesis has been formulated:   
H 1b: CEO duality is positively associated with firm agency cost. 
 
7 Research method 
7.1 Sample selection  
The sample period is 2006-2016. According to the ASE, there were 224 
companies listed on it as of 31st December 2016. Following the earlier studies of 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), McKnight and Weir (2009), Peni (2014) and Ahmadi 
et al. (2018), this research was restricted to non-financial firms, and therefore ignored 
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financial institutions (e.g., insurance firms and banks) because these have different CG 
disclosure rules  and a different regulatory structure. As well, companies with 
inadequate data were eliminated. The remaining 80 companies represented 35.71% of 
the total population of listed firms. After adjustments, the panel dataset provided 880 
firm observations from these 80 firms. The company specific data was collected from 
the Bloomberg database (for accounting information such as assets, liabilities and 
operating expenses), and firms’ annual reports were used to manually collect CG 
information. The sample is composed of a variety of industries as per the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Table 1 presents the industry classifications 
of the sampled Jordanian firms, according to this standard.  
Table 1: Industry classification of the sample 
 
7.2 Definition of variables 
7.2.1 Dependent variables 
The main dependent variables in this study are the firm’s agency cost (i.e., firm 
efficiency) and firm performance. Authors in the CG literature have adopted two 
approaches for measuring firm performance. The first set has applied accounting-
based measures of performance:  ROA, ROE, ROS, and ROI. The second set has used 
market-based measures, most especially the Tobin’s Q ratio (Muth & Donaldson 1998; 
Erhardt et al. 2003; Dalton & Dalton 2011).  
However, both accounting and market performance measures have been 
criticised as untrustworthy and easily subject to manipulation by a firm’s management 
Industries Number of firms in the 
sample 
Observed firm years 
Consumer Discretionary 19 209 
Consumer Staples 9 99 
Energy 1 11 
Health Care 3 33 
Industrials 19 209 
Materials 26 286 
Telecommunication Services 1 11 
Utilities 2 22 
Total 80 880 
176 
 
(Muth & Donaldson 1998; Pham et al. 2011; Nazir & Afza 2018). Notwithstanding 
this, these indicators have been utilised widely in management studies, specifically in 
CG research. It is recommended therefore that multiple measures of profitability 
should be used due to the inherent limitations in any one financial indicator (Muth & 
Donaldson 1998). Furthermore, Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggested that such 
multiple measures provide a more accurate picture of a firm’s performance. Therefore, 
in an attempt to mitigate the possible confounding due to a single kind of measure, the 
present research used both accounting and market measures (i.e., ROA and Tobin’s 
Q). According to Arosa et al. (2013), Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010), Rashid 
(2015) and Shaukat and Trojanowski (2018), ROA is defined as the ratio of profit 
(before interest and tax) scaled by total assets. Following prior studies such as Terjesen 
et al. (2016), Nguyen et al. (2018), Singh et al. (2018) and Pillai and Al-Malkawi 
(2018), Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement cost of its average total assets. 
Unfortunately, as Nicholson and Kiel (2007) argue, the accounting profit may 
be high even with the presence of agency cost. Furthermore, “not all agency costs are 
reflected in the accounting measures” (Wiwattanakantang 2001, p. 334). To avoid 
these concerns, this study constructs AUR and ER as reliable proxies for firm agency 
cost (i.e., firm efficiency) in addition to the accounting and market measures of ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. These proxy measures are well accepted in the governance literature 
(see e.g., Ang et al. 2000; Singh & Davidson 2003; McKnight & Weir 2009; Henry 
2010; Rashid 2013, 2015; Allam 2018; Katti & Raithatha 2018). Ang et al. (2000, p. 
82) refer to AURs as the “proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset 
utilization”, and it is calculated as the ratio of annual sales scaled by total assets. Put 
another way, it measures management’s capacity to employ assets dynamically (Singh 
& Davidson 2003). A low AUR has been described by Singh and Davidson (2003, p. 
799) as indicating “that management is using assets in non-cash flow generating and 
probably value destroying ventures”, and vice versa. ER is well known as a direct 
reliable proxy for firm efficiency. It is measured as the ratio of operating expenses to 
total annual sales, and refers to how efficaciously a firm’s management controls its 
operating costs. This has been very forthrightly interpreted by Ang et al. (2000, p. 82): 
“this measure captures excessive expenses including perk consumption”. A low ER 
means that the management is controlling the operating expenses well. Thus, a low ER 
indicator should reflect lower firm agency costs (Singh & Davidson 2003). Therefore, 
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as evidence of the alleviation of a firm’s agency costs, it is expected that there will be 
a negative association between CEO duality and ER, and a positive association 
between CEO and AUR.  
 
7.2.2 Key independent variable 
The key independent variable in this research is CEO duality (i.e., a dual 
leadership structure). A binary variable is employed as a proxy for CEO duality 
(CEOD). The binary variable is one (1) if the CEO holds a dual role as the board chair, 
and (0) zero otherwise.  
 
7.2.3 Other control variables  
This study has controlled for other variables like ownership structure, board 
independence, board size, firm size, firm age, firm growth, liquidity, leverage, free 
cash flow (FCF), research and development expenditure (R&D), and industry and year 
effects. The selection of control variables is motivated by earlier governance literature.   
It is argued that an insider ownership structure has a prominent role in 
monitoring and disciplining a company’s management. A number of ownership 
structures are controlled in this study, namely institution ownership (INSOWN), 
director ownership (DIROWN), and largest block holding ownership (LBOWN). 
Following previous research (e.g., Elsayed 2007; Henry 2010; Terjesen et al. 2016), 
INSOWN is measured as the percentage of shares owned by financial institutions. 
Consistent with Nguyen et al. (2018) and Guerrero-Villegas et al. (2018), DIROWN 
is calculated as the percentage of shares held by directors. LBOWN is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by the three largest block holders (Wu et al. 2018).  
As asserted by proponents of the agency theory, boardrooms with independent 
members are more likely to perform their monitoring function compared to 
boardrooms with non-independent members (Fama & Jensen 1983). This study used 
board independence (BDIND), proxied by the percentage of independent outside 
directors on the board (Peng et al. 2010; Chang et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2018). It is 
confirmed that the board’s size (BDSIZE) may impact the capacity of boards to 
perform efficiently. According to García-Ramos et al. (2017), Tang (2017), and 
Shaukat and Trojanowski (2018), BDSIZE is employed as the natural logarithm of the 
total number of directors on the board. Firm size (SIZE) is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the total assets (Guillet et al. 2013; Deman et al. 2018; Pillai & Al-
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Malkawi 2018). Concerning firm age (AGE), Ang et al. (2000) claimed that older firms 
have been found more likely to be more effective and efficient than younger firms, and 
is thus included as a control variable. In line with prior studies, AGE is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the total number of years a company has been listed on the 
stock exchange (Tang 2017; Katti & Raithatha 2018). Firm growth (GROWTH) is 
calculated as the proportion of current year sales minus previous year sales, divided 
by previous year sales (Rashid 2013; Chang et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2018).  
According to Majumdar and Chhibber (1999, p. 296),  “since the ability to 
manage working capital and acquire a greater quantity of cash balances relative to 
current liabilities, reflects superior skills”. Following previous research (Rashid 2013, 
2015), liquidity (LIQ) is defined by using the current ratio, dividing current assets by 
current liabilities. Debt ratio may also be considered as a tool to indicate CG as higher 
debt levels assist in mitigating the firm’s agency cost of free cash flows. Thus (LEV) 
is included, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets (Henry 2010; Guillet et 
al. 2013; Nazar 2018).  
Agency problems within a company are associated with FCF. Due to managers’ 
extensive FCF, they may invest in projects which are unnecessary or not economically 
feasible. FCF is defined as the operating income before depreciation, minus the sum 
of taxes plus interest expenses and dividends paid, scaled by the total assets (McKnight 
& Weir 2009). R&D may promote firm performance and is calculated as a ratio of 
total expenditure to total sales (Peni 2014; Duru et al. 2016; Tang 2017). In line with 
prior research (e.g., García-Ramos et al. 2017; Nguyen et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2018), 
this study also controlled for industry and time specific effects. Nine industry dummy 
variables were constructed to represent the different industry groups identified by the 
GICS. Likewise, the current study used a year dummy variable to control for the 
influence of variation across years.  
 
7.3 Model estimation 
The following equation was devised to test the panel data sample.  
Yi,t=α+ β1CEODi,t +β2BDINDi,t+ β3DIROWNi,t +β4LBOWNi,t+ 
β5INSTOWNi,t+β6BDSIZEi,t +β7SIZEi,t + β8AGEi,t+ β9GROWTHi,t+ 
β10LIQi,t+β11LEVi,t + β12FCFi,t + β13R&Di,t + ɛi,t 
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Where, Yi,t comprises the overall measures of performance, including agency 
cost/firm efficiency, namely, ROA, Tobin’s Q, AUR and ER. CEODi,t refers to CEO 
duality. BDIND is the proportion of independent directors to the total number of board 
directors. DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by directors.  LBOWN is the 
percentage of shares owned by the three largest block holders. INSTOWN is the 
percentage of shares owned by institutions. BDSIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of board members. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. AGE 
is the natural logarithm of the total number of years a firm has been listed on the stock 
exchange. GROWTH is the changes in sales. LIQ is defined by dividing current assets 
by current liabilities. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets. FCF is measured as 
operating income before depreciation, minus the sum of taxes plus interest expenses 
and dividends paid, scaled by total assets. R&D is calculated as R&D’s percentage to 
sales. α is the intercept, β is the regression coefficient and ɛ is the error term. 
To attain an accurate statistical analysis, there is a need to meet statistical 
analysis assumptions, such as heteroscedasticity, normality, and multicollinearity. The 
assumption of normality requires that all observations should be distributed normally 
in the population study. It is confirmed that the normality violations are of little 
concern when the size of the study sample is high (>30) (Coaks & Steed 2001). 
Likewise, the residual test, also known as the histogram normality test, of the model, 
provided a bell shape, conforming to data normality.      
Multicollinearity indicates any high levels of association amongst the 
independent variables. In other words, it shows when the independent variables are 
significantly related with one other. In such circumstances, these independent 
variables must be eliminated.  Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of all the company‐
specific and governance‐related variables under consideration of panel data analysis. 
The table illustrates that there is no correlation amongst the independent variables, 
because the correlation coefficients are either less than 75% or negative values. 
Multicollinearity was not found between any independent variables because the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) were within the permissible range (less than 4). It is 
argued that VIFs of higher than ten are an indication of multicollinearity (Gujarati 
2003). 
Drawing on the assumption of heteroscedasticity, the variance of the error is 
constant across observations (at all levels of independent variables), or residuals of the 
dependent variables of the study are almost equal/constant. That is, the plot of 
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standardized residuals ZRESID against the standardized predicted value ZPRED of 
the all research’s models, resembles a curve, indicating the existence of 
heteroscedasticity. The chi-square statistics and a corresponding p-value of the 
Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, show that heteroscedasticity is existing in the model 
estimation, which is adjusted using a correction technique for unknown 
heteroscedasticity, as presented by White (1980).  
 
8 Empirical results 
8.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the preceding variables are presented in Table 2. The 
descriptive statistics indicate that the average firm performance expressed by ROA is 
5% for the sample companies, and by Tobin’s Q is 110%. As well, the parameters that 
reveal the proxy measure of firm agency cost, found an average of 57% for AUR and 
41% for ER. These results are consistent with an expected high AUR and low ER.  
CEO duality was present in approximately 20% of the sample. This figure is 
much higher compared with previous studies in other contexts. For example, 
McKnight and Weir (2009) report that duality decreased from 10% to 6% in the United 
Kingdom; it represented 18% of the sample in Henry’s Review (2010) of the 
Australian context. Likewise, this is much lower compared with other studies. There 
is a 33% incidence of duality in India (Katti & Raithatha 2018), which is below 46.7% 
in Rashid’s (2013) study in Bangladesh; duality rates of 78.2% and 79% were found 
in Elsayed’s Egyptian research for 2007 and 2011, respectively. In the United States, 
Chang et al. (2018) reveal a 61% incidence of CEO duality; 59 % in France (Ahmadi 
et al. 2018); 36% in Vietnamese stock exchanges (Dang et al. 2018); and 34% in 
Pakistan (Sheikh et al. 2018).  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variables N Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Std. 
Dev. 
ROA 880 0.05 0.05 0.36 -0.28 0.10 
Tobin’s Q 880 1.10 0.86 4.45 0.21 0.82 
AUR 880 0.57 0.52 4.43 0.01 0.44 
ERN 880 0.41 0.25 4.65 0.03 0.61 
CEOD 880 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 
BDIND 880 0.52 0.55 1.00 0.00 0.23 
DIROWN 880 0.49 0.47 0.99 0.01 0.27 
LBOWN 880 0.53 0.51 0.99 0.09 0.22 
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INSTOWN 880 0.09 0.03 0.64 0.00 0.12 
BDSIZE 880 8.47 9.00 14.00 3.00 2.36 
SIZE 880 17.01 16.92 21.31 12.89 1.46 
AGE 880 2.72 2.83 3.66 0.00 0.75 
GROWTH 880 0.12 0.03 5.02 -0.82 0.69 
LIQ 880 2.81 1.69 29.04 0.07 3.99 
LEV 880 0.32 0.29 0.93 0.00 0.21 
FCF 880 -0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.33 0.07 
R&D 880 0.03 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.06 
 
The mean value of the proportion of outside directors is found to be 52%, which 
is as expected due to the regulatory compliance that firms had been undertaking, 
whereas the Jordanian CG code recommended at least one-third of board members 
should be independent. Director ownership and large shareholding on average are 
observed to be 49% and 53%, respectively. These figures, therefore illustrate that there 
is a domination of ownership by directors and large shareholders, who are originally 
family based owners. On average, the institutional ownership is 9% which is much 
lower compared with some countries like Australia (McKnight & Weir 2009; Henry 
2010), Bangladesh (Rashid 2013), and Egypt (Elsayed 2007). The average board size 
of Jordanian non-financial firms is observed to be around 8.47 and ranges from a 
minimum of three members to a maximum of 14. This is lower than the mean 
documented board size for large United States public companies (Yermack 1996; 
Pathan 2009).  
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, show the regression results identifying the effect of CEO 
duality and other governance variables in determining firm performance and firm 
agency cost/efficiency. Panel A of Table 4 presents firm performance as a dependent 
variable in the form of ROA. In this study, the impact of CEO duality on the firm 
performance expressed by ROA, was tested before controlling for industry and time 
specific effects. The results indicate a significant positive relationship between CEO 
duality and ROA. However, it is noted that the signs of the CEO duality coefficients 
are not in the expected directions. Hence, it can be said that the CEO duality enhances 
firm performance by controlling ROA. In terms of the control variables, Table 4 
reveals that the BDIND, DIROWN, SIZE, AGE, and FCF, have a positive explanatory 
power in influencing firm performance in terms of the ROA measure, whereas LEV 
and R&D have a significant negative explanatory power.  
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                        Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
VIF 
1 CEOD 
1.00                         
1.05 
2 BDIND 
0.06 1.00                       
1.49 
3 DIROWN 
-0.05 -0.53** 1.00                     
3.65 
4 LBOWN 
-0.12** -0.38** 0.66** 1.00                   
2.68 
5 INSTOWN 
-0.02 0.27** -0.45** -0.03 1.00                 
1.57 
6 BDSIZE 
-0.010 0.07 0.12** -0.22** -0.11** 1.00               
1.64 
7 SIZE 
-0.04 -0.17** 0.23** 0.07* -0.06 .463** 1.00             
1.97 
8 LNAGE 
-0.10** 0.002 -0.01 0.05 0.07* .114** 0.14** 1.00           
1.14 
9 GROWTH 
0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.08* -0.037 -0.06 -0.19** 1.00         
1.07 
10 LIQ 
0.09** 0.04 0.10** 0.09** -0.06 -.116** -0.34** -0.19** 0.11** 1.00       
1.39 
11 LEV 
-0.11** 0.07* -0.150* -0.01 0.16** 0.023 0.29** 0.23** -0.01 -0.44** 1.00     
1.64 
12 FCF 
0.09* -0.10** 0.13** 0.10** 0.04 .069* 0.32** -0.08* 0.06 0.04 -0.21** 1.00   
1.32 
13 R&D 
-0.06 0.08* 0.03 0.002 -0.01 .091** 0.07* 0.07* -0.03 -0.14** 0.27** -0.13** 1.00 
1.12 
                                The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels respectively. 
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Table 5 provides the results for testing the influence of CEO duality on firm 
performance as expressed by Tobin’s Q. According to Panel A, the results document 
that there is a non-significant relationship before controlling for industries and years. 
Noteworthy is that the signs of the CEO duality coefficients are not in the expected 
directions. The results also show that DIROWN, INSTOWN, BDSIZE, and LIQ, have 
a significant positive influence on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. In 
contrast, SIZE, AGE, and LEV, have a significant negative influence. 
 
Table 4: CEO duality and firm performance (regression results) 
 Table 4 shows the summary of results of the effects of CEO duality on firm 
performance, as measured by ROA. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses.  
Model Panel A 
(before controlling for 
industry and time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling for 
industry and time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 
-0.2024 
(-4.91)*** 
-0.1883 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.1365 
(-1.51) 
CEOD 
0.0224 
(3.14)** 
0.0257 
(3.55)*** 
0.0245 
(3.11)** 
BDIND 
0.0278 
(2.54)* 
0.0357 
(2.95)** 
0.0293 
(1.80)* 
DIROWN 
0.0441 
(3.40)*** 
0.0297 
(2.23)* 
0.0192 
(0.83) 
LBOWN 
-0.0152 
(-1.15) 
-0.0163 
(-1.24) 
-0.0260 
(-1.11) 
INSTOWN 
-0.0063 
(-0.32) 
-0.0084 
(-0.44) 
-0.0175 
(-0.67) 
BDSIZE 
-0.0014 
(-1.26) 
-0.0018 
(-1.45) 
-0.0033 
(-1.66) * 
SIZE 
0.0140 
(5.42)*** 
0.0127 
(4.30)*** 
0.0135 
(3.15)** 
LNAGE 
0.0085 
(2.72)** 
0.0102 
(3.26)** 
0.0091 
(1.51) 
GROWTH 
0.0034 
(0.91) 
0.0030 
(0.77) 
0.0043 
(1.47) 
LIQ 
0.0003 
(0.50) 
0.0002 
(0.31) 
0.0003 
(0.31) 
LEV 
-0.0633 
(-5.32)*** 
-0.0595 
(-3.91)*** 
-0.1004 
(-4.90)*** 
FCF 
0.7711 
(11.19)*** 
0.7829 
(11.50)*** 
0.7533 
(20.00)*** 
R&D 
-0.1364 
(-5.08)*** 
-0.1283 
(-4.03)*** 
-0.0234 
(-0.58) 
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Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-
squared 0.4701 
0.4860 0.4358 
F-Statistics 45.74 22.96 23.00 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
 
Table 5: CEO duality and firm performance (regression results) 
 Table 5 shows the summary of results of the effects of CEO duality on firm 
performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses.  
Model Panel A 
(before 
controlling for 
industry and 
time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling 
for industry and 
time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 
1.694 
(3.20)** 
1.760 
(2.40)* 
6.138 
(6.47) *** 
CEOD 
0.0757 
(1.22) 
0.0630 
(0.94) 
0.1066 
(1.45) 
BDIND 
-0.0473 
(-0.38) 
0.0587 
(0.47) 
-0.2933 
(-1.91)* 
DIROWN 
0.7662 
(4.66)*** 
0.7030 
(4.03)*** 
0.0845 
(0.39) 
LBOWN 
0.1728 
(1.16) 
0.3024 
(1.90)* 
0.3321 
(1.52) 
INSTOWN 
0.66.63 
(3.23)** 
0.4243 
(2.12)* 
0.2282 
(1.00) 
BDSIZE 
0.0360 
(2.38)* 
0.0173 
(1.08) 
0.0100 
(0.52) 
SIZE 
-0.0604 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0674 
(-1.68)* 
-0.2765 
(-6.30) *** 
LNAGE 
-0.0743 
(-1.90)* 
0.0098 
(0.24) 
-0.0668 
(-1.11) 
GROWTH 
0.0466 
(0.90) 
0.0320 
(0.60) 
0.0216 
(0.82) 
LIQ 
0.0188 
(1.74)* 
0.0223 
(2.00)* 
0.0183 
(2.00) * 
LEV 
-0.8093 
(-5.06)*** 
-0.7406 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.1741 
(-1.00) 
FCF 
-0.6268 
(-0.95) 
-0.6116 
(-1.00) 
0.4704 
(1.36)*** 
R&D 
0.5169 
(1.40) 
0.9616 
(2.62)** 
1.002 
(2.73) ** 
Year No Yes Yes 
185 
 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.1696 0.2090 0.1311 
F-Statistics 21.96 18.90 5.28 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
    In Tables 6 and 7, the present study shows the regression results of the dependent 
variables of AUR and ER, as measures of firm agency cost. In Table 6, the results of 
Panel A indicate a negative association between CEO duality and firm agency cost as 
AUR before controlling for industries and years. This finding is contrary to 
expectations (with a higher AUR reflecting a firm’s lower agency cost). Thus, it can 
be noted that CEO duality does not promote firm efficiency by best utilising the 
company’s resources. Concerning the control variables, it is revealed that BDIND, 
SIZE, AGE, GROWTH, LIQ, LEV and FCF, all have positive relationships with AUR. 
These findings imply that they serve as tools to enhance firm efficiency. Therefore, 
these variables may be a substitute for other control tools to mitigate firm agency cost. 
Also, t results indicate that R&D has an adverse effect on firm efficiency.  
Table 6: CEO duality and firm performance (regression results) 
 Table 6 shows the summary of results of the effects of CEO duality on firm’s 
agency cost, as measured by AUR. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses.  
Model Panel A 
(before controlling for 
industry and time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling for 
industry and time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 
-0.8245 
(-3.15)** 
0.4326 
(2.00)* 
0.5798 
(1.50) 
CEOD 
-0.0326 
(-1.20) 
0.0022 
(0.10) 
0.0786 
(2.65) ** 
BDIND 
0.1486 
(2.20)* 
0.0576 
(1.06) 
0.1138 
(1.84)* 
DIROWN 
-0.0519 
(-0.60) 
-0.0266 
(-0.40) 
0.1062 
(1.21) 
LBOWN 
-0.1400 
(-1.40) 
-0.1805 
(-2.35)* 
-0.0898 
(-1.02) 
INSTOWN 
0.1826 
(1.44) 
0.2071 
(1.83)* 
0.0897 
(1.00) 
BDSIZE 
-0.0053 
(-0.71) 
-0.0006 
(-0.10) 
-0.0070 
(-1.00) 
SIZE 
0.0560 
(3.62)*** 
0.0032 
(0.25) 
-0.0135 
(-0.76) 
LNAGE 
0.0930 
(6.05)*** 
0.0674 
(4.90)*** 
0.1178 
(4.90) *** 
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GROWTH 
0.0361 
(1.88)* 
0.0375 
(1.80)* 
0.0609 
(5.65) *** 
LIQ 
0.0151 
(3.18)** 
0.0034 
(0.90) 
-0.0022 
(-0.60) 
LEV 
0.8081 
(7.00)*** 
 
0.3335 
(3.30)** 
0.3035 
(3.60) *** 
FCF 
1.110 
(5.00)*** 
1.277 
(6.12)*** 
0.7775 
(5.60)*** 
R&D 
-1.830 
(-9.02)*** 
-0.9043 
(-5.15)*** 
-0.1382 
(-1.00) 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-
squared 0.2837 
0..5228 0.2044 
F-Statistics 13.04 23.78 8.28 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
The findings reported in Table 7 suggest that CEO duality is positively 
associated with ER as a measure of firm efficiency. However, these results are not 
significant and are contrary to expectations (with a lower ER reflecting the alleviation 
of a firm’s agency cost). Thus, it can be concluded that CEO duality does not reduce 
firm agency cost by controlling company discretionary expenses. Table 7 also presents 
the findings for other control variables, documenting that BDSIZE, SIZE, AGE, 
GROWTH, and FCF, have a negative correlation with ER. These results imply that 
the variables serve as tools to improve firm efficiency. Therefore, they may be a 
substitute for other control tools to alleviate firm agency cost. In contrast, DIROWN 
and R&D are positively related to ER.  
Table 7: CEO duality and firm performance (regression results) 
 Table 7 shows the summary of results of the effects of CEO duality on firm’s 
agency cost as measured by ER. The t-tests are displayed in parentheses.  
Model Panel A 
(before controlling for 
industry and time) 
Panel B 
(after controlling for 
industry and time) 
Panel C 
(random effect 
model) 
Intercept 
1.821 
(6.07)*** 
2.142 
(5.27)*** 
3.527 
(5.60) *** 
CEOD 
0.0182 
(0.40) 
0.0480 
(1.10) 
-0.1253 
(-2.10) * 
BDIND 
0.0125 
(0.14) 
-0.0271 
(-0.322) 
0.0589 
(0.47) 
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DIROWN 
0.3076 
(2.80)** 
0.1844 
(1.80)* 
0.3033 
(1.73) * 
LBOWN 
-0.1500 
(-1.36) 
-0.0586 
(-0.55) 
-0.0924 
(-0.52) 
INSTOWN 
0.3481 
(1.57) 
0.2474 
(1.10) 
0.4405 
(2.17) * 
BDSIZE 
-0.0226 
(-2.36)* 
-0.0241 
(-2.52)** 
-0.0235 
(-1.58) 
SIZE 
-0.0638 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.0652 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.1396 
(-4.60) *** 
LNAGE 
-0.1083 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.1063 
(-3.67)*** 
-0.1790 
(-4.05) *** 
GROWTH 
-0.1126 
(-3.13)** 
-0.1117 
(-3.10)** 
-0.1527 
(-6.42) *** 
LIQ 
-0.0152 
(-1.25) 
-0.0067 
(-0.50) 
0.0042 
(0.32) 
LEV 
-0.1635 
(-1.48) 
-0.2269 
(-1.44) 
-0.0293 
(-0.18) 
FCF 
-2.482 
(-4.15)*** 
-2.50 
(-4.30)*** 
-2.120 
(-7.00)*** 
R&D 
1.562 
(3.18)** 
1.413 
(2.86)** 
0.7642 
(2.40) * 
Year No Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.2068 0.24 0.1812 
F-Statistics 8.04 10.51 7.27 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 880 880 880 
The t-statistics asterisks indicate significance at P < 0.001 (***), P < 0.01 (**), and P < 0.10 (*) levels 
respectively. 
 
It is confirmed that CEO duality, firm performance, and firm agency cost, are 
contingent, and this may mean there is better firm performance and efficiency in some 
conditions and worse in other conditions. As argued by Elsayed (2010), a suitable 
board leadership structure promoting high firm performance and efficiency, is likely 
to vary across countries, industries, and firms. Furthermore, Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) consider that the extent of any confounding of board structure impacts by 
industry influences, is unknown. For these reasons, steps were taken in an attempt to 
control for industry variance and variation across years.  
Following previous studies such as those of Elsayed (2007), Rashid (2013), 
García-Ramos et al. (2017), Nguyen et al. (2018) and Wu et al. (2018), the above 
model estimation has been altered by adding INDUSTRY dummies to control for 
differences across industries in terms of the GICS codes. This produced nine industry 
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classifications. In accordance with the earlier governance literature, this study 
employed a dummy year variable to control for the influence of variation across years 
(Wu et al. 2018). Therefore, the following regression equation is suggested:  
Yi,t=α+ β1CEODi,t +β2BDINDi,t+ β3DIROWNi,t +β4LBOWNi,t+ 
β5INSTOWNi,t+β6BDSIZEi,t +β7SIZEi,t + β8AGEi,t+ β9GROWTHi,t+ 
β10LIQi,t+β11LEVi,t + β12FCFi,t + β13R&Di,t + γINDUSTRY+ ΩYEAR+ ɛi,t 
The results after adding these industry and year dummies are presented in Panel 
B of Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. The revised results of the regression coefficients mean that 
many coefficients of variables altered from positive to negative signs, and vice versa. 
As well, many variable coefficients moved from a significant to a non-significant 
influence, and vice versa. It is noted that the signs of the coefficients of CEO duality 
are unchanged. Thus, it can be said that CEO duality, firm performance (expressed by 
ROA and Tobin’s Q) and firm agency cost, (expressed by AUR and ER) do not have 
industry and year specific effects. 
 
8.2 Endogeneity test  
Globally speaking, extant literature on CG has recognised that models 
containing CG or ownership structure variables may suffer from issues of endogeneity 
(Himmelberg et al. 1999; Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; Elsayed 2007; McKnight & 
Weir 2009; Coles et al. 2012; Rashid 2013; Tang 2017; Gafoor et al. 2018; Pillai & 
Al-Malkawi 2018). It is confirmed that the expected link between endogenous 
variables and error terms, may lead to inconsistent and biased estimates (Elsayed 2007; 
McKnight & Weir 2009). Thus, using ordinary least square (OLS) regression can 
provide biased coefficient estimates. In such a case, the OLS is inconsistent (Gafoor 
et al. 2018). In addition, it is claimed that the bulk of the existing literature typically 
utilises panel data estimation by applying random effects or fixed models. However, 
these models do not control for endogeneity problems (Sheikh et al. 2018).  
One solution to address this problem of endogeneity is to use instrumental 
variables (IVs) (McKnight & Weir 2009; Tang 2017; Pillai & Al-Malkawi 2018). 
Therefore IVs are used in this study. As well, the lagged values of the endogeneity 
variables are adopted as instruments to overcome endogeneity. Consistent with the 
earlier studies of Elsayed (2011), Rashid (2013) and Pillai and Al-Malkawi (2018), the 
F-test for the predicted value of CEO duality has not been found to be significant.  
Using ROA as a proxy for firm performance, F= 3.55 (P = 0.0610), and using Tobin’s 
189 
 
Q as a proxy for firm performance, F = 0.30 (P = 0.5886). With AUR as a proxy for 
firm agency cost/firm efficiency, F = 0.60 (P = 0.4400), and with ER as a proxy for 
the same construct, F = 01.96 (P = 0.1613). These results indicate that there are no 
signs of potential endogeneity issues among CEO duality, firm performance and firm’s 
agency cost, which suggests that both IVs and OLS are consistent. 
 
8.3 Robustness check 
As this research employed unbalanced panel data (because there are not 80 
companies in all years), it may generate some unobserved heterogeneity. In 
summation, there may be variation within a company and it is not possible to capture 
such company specific characteristics. To this end, the preceding model is run again 
by using a fixed-effect model and a random-effect model. A Hausman test is performed 
to examine the significance of the difference between the fixed effect and the random-
effect estimates.  
Panel C of Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide the results of the Hausman test and 
indicates that the random-effect model is a proper fit. The revised results of the 
regression coefficients indicate that many coefficients of parameters altered from 
positive to negative, and vice versa. Likewise, many coefficients of parameters 
changed from a significant influence to a non-significant influence, and vice versa. 
However again, the signs of the coefficients of CEO duality are unchanged using ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. Thus, it can be argued that the variation across firms has little or no 
influence on CEO duality’s association with firm performance in the form of ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. Conversely, CEO duality moved from a non-significant positive sign to a 
significant positive one using AUR. As well, it altered from a non-significant positive 
sign to a significant negative sign using ER. Thus, it can be confirmed that the variation 
across companies has an influence on CEO duality and firm agency cost/efficiency.  
 
9 Conclusions, implications, and limitations   
9.1 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate to what extent CEOs’ dual roles (as 
chairperson and CEO), can affect firm agency cost and firm performance in Jordan. A 
main motivation for this empirical work was that earlier studies about the influence of 
CEO duality on these two constructs arrived at mixed and inconclusive results, 
indicating variously both a positive and a negative impact.  
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It is claimed that “duality has been blamed for poor performance and slow 
response to change in firms such as General Motors, Digital Equipment Corporation, 
and Goodyear Tire and Rubber” (Boyd 1995, p. 301). Furthermore, it is confirmed that 
the CEOs have engaged in controversial accounting practices that have led to scandals 
in the USA. However, as noted by Kang and Zardkoohi (2005), this does not 
necessarily imply that CEO duality is a poor governance structure. CEO duality might 
be an ideal solution for external environmental difficulties or it might function as a 
reward for a CEO whose firm has a good performance (Kang & Zardkoohi 2005).  
The empirical analysis conducted in this study has indicated that CEO duality in 
developing countries like Jordan is important in improving a firm’s performance 
(expressed by ROA) and in mitigating a firm’s agency cost (as measured as two ratios 
of efficiency AUR and ER). The random-effect regression results indicate that CEO 
duality is positively significant in determining ROA and AUR and negatively 
significant in determining ER. It is noted that CEO duality is concerned with 
employing a company’s assets in a revenue generating venture and controlling the 
operating expenses of the firm. Therefore, the results of this study imply that a dual 
leadership structure promotes the board members’ ability to exercise the function of 
governance in the context of Jordan, which supports the stewardship theory.  
This research provides support for the conclusions of Finkelstein and D’aveni 
(1994) and Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010), that poorly performing companies 
need a strong leadership structure and unity of command to enhance their performance. 
It is argued that averagely performing companies like the majority of Jordanian 
companies in this study, have complex operational and managerial matters that need a 
solid and strong leadership structure (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn 2010). Thus, this 
study is inconsistent with arguments that dual leadership (CEO duality) leads to an 
unambiguous leadership structure. The results also provide support for the argument 
that CEOs with dual roles have more authority, power, and freedom to be more 
decisive, and therefore more positively influence firm efficiency and firm 
performance. In addition, a single leadership structure can effectively respond to the 
firms’ difficulties as they present themselves in their unique environments (Guillet et 
al. 2013). Therefore, the findings may imply that Jordanian firms obtain significant 
benefits from a dual leadership structure. As well, the results of this study support the 
idea that CEO duality may have both benefits and costs (Brickley et al. 1997; Elsayed 
2007; Dey et al. 2011; Tang 2017). In particular, CEO non-duality involves the agency 
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costs of monitoring the behaviour of the board chair and also information costs 
(Brickley et al. 1997). In developing markets like Jordan, the costs of splitting the roles 
of CEO and board chair is higher than the benefits of CEO duality (Katti & Raithatha 
2018).  
 From the random-effect model’s regression coefficients, a positive but non-
significant relationship is revealed between CEO duality and firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. This goes against the prevailing belief that CEO duality is 
negatively associated with Tobin’s Q. Some reflections need to be made to position 
this finding in its context. As argued by Lindenberg and Ross (1981), market-based 
measures should reflect the true value of the corporations. Hence, the stock prices of 
companies should reflect their market values. Yet such measures may not be effective 
in developing economies as the capital market is undeveloped (Joh 2003). As Bouri 
(2015) confirms, the Jordanian market is less developed, it is characterised by thin and 
unregulated trading and probably less well-informed investors.  
Likewise, Bacidore et al. (1997, p. 11) note that market-based measures “may 
not be an efficient contracting parameter because they are driven by many factors 
beyond the control of the firm’s executives”. Jordan is no exception to this. Claessens 
and Djankov (1999, p. 502) indicate that market measures may “lead to a downward 
bias in the relationship between concentrated ownership and firms’ valuation” in 
countries with weak protection of minority shareholders, such as Jordan. Moreover, 
most developing markets count on ‘debt financing’ rather than finance from the share 
market or ‘equity financing’. Thus, market measures do not represent the real profits 
made by the owners on their investments (Kumar 2004). Finally, Pham et al. (2011, p. 
373) indicate that the measurement of Tobin’s Q is “subject to the accounting 
treatment of balance sheet items”, and is thus subject to manipulation in all countries.  
 
9.2 Implications  
The current research contributes to the governance literature by considering an 
aspect of the governance framework (CEO duality) as a determinant of firm agency 
cost/efficiency in less developed countries.  Earlier studies in this context do not 
confirm that a dual leadership structure is to be blamed for weak firm performance 
(Elsayed 2007). In the Jordanian scenario, the evidence of present research supports 
the argument that CEO duality will improve some companies’ performance, whilst 
CEO non-duality may be more beneficial for others.  
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The theoretical implication is that regulatory authorities, practitioners, policy 
makers, and non-financial sector management in Jordan, need to take into account the 
particular features of the country’s economy. Results indicate that the Anglo-American 
system of a dual leadership structure may actually promote firm performance and 
alleviate a firm’s agency costs in Jordan. Consequently, it should be mandatory to 
adopt CE duality through the listed companies at ASE.   
 
9.3 Limitations and future research  
As with all studies, this one is not free from limitations. Firstly, the research’s 
data related to the CG parameters were manually gathered from firms’ annual reports. 
It is argued that the accounting standards are weak in developing markets like Jordan 
(Lins & Servaes 2002; Jara-Bertin et al. 2015). Thus, annual reports may not actually 
portray a true picture. Secondly, the study employed two proxies of agency cost; other 
measures of agency costs (i.e., Q-free cash flow interaction) can be utilised in future 
research. Thirdly, although this research used a comprehensive group of CG variables, 
future studies can extend this study by including more independent variables (e.g., 
other ownership variables and CEO compensation). Finally, although the derived 
findings are specific to the Jordanian context, the similarity of Jordan’s governance 
model with those of other developing countries indicates an extended examination of 
the subject in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the Middle East and North 
Africa region, is recommended. As well, it is confirmed that the dual leadership 
structure relies on some contextual variables (e.g., CEO’s experience, age, and 
qualifications) within the relevant industry, which has also been termed ‘CEO 
charisma’ (Tosi et al. 2004). Thus, future studies can be carried out investigating the 
effects of CEO duality on company performance, by employing ‘CEO charisma’ as a 
moderating factor.  
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Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis has been to provide an insight into practices of 
corporate governance in Jordan, by employing company level data, to empirically 
investigate whether the different corporate mechanisms, such as board independence, 
board gender diversity and CEO duality, influence firm performance and efficiency 
(the latter also known as firm agency cost). Drawing on the theoretical discussions and 
empirical examination, the results and conclusions from this thesis are an attempt to 
inform regulatory bodies in improving and/or framing the best practices and guidelines 
for corporate governance in the Jordanian company sector.  
Chapter 1 of this thesis has presented the history of corporate governance, its 
definition, its best practices and the issues of corporate governance in developed and 
developing countries. As well, this chapter has provided the motivation of this study, 
the statement of the problem, research questions, research significance, the study 
objectives and the contributions of this research to the academic literature. This chapter 
has also offered an outline of the theoretical framework, methodology, research 
method and thesis outline. 
Chapter 2 has provided the overview of the existing system of corporate 
governance in Jordan. It commenced with a detailed discussion of the Jordanian 
economy, its privatisation program, and developments in the Jordanian investment 
environment. This was followed by an overview of the accounting and auditing 
professions in Jordan, the evolution of requirements for practice in these professions 
and the types of disclosure requirements. A general insight into corporate governance 
in Jordan has been given, with an outline of the development of Jordanian corporate 
governance codes for the various Jordanian sectors. Likewise, this chapter has offered 
a discussion on the common models of corporate governance around the world and, in 
comparing them, an explanation of the Jordanian governance model. Based on the 
previous studies and reports, an assessment of the corporate governance in Jordan has 
been made, followed by a detailed description of its legal environment. In this, an 
overview has been given of different legal instruments such as the various company, 
securities and commercial laws. The chapter concludes with a brief idea about the 
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Jordanian capital market, in particular the roles of the ASE, JSC, SDC, CCD, IC and 
CBJ.  
By employing agency theory, Chapter 3, (paper 1), has tried to answer two 
questions: (1) does board independence in the form of the representation of outside 
independent directors influence the firm’s performance, and (2) does board 
independence in the form of the representation of outside independent directors, 
influence the firm efficiency (i.e., firm agency) cost. By using data from 880 firm-year 
observations of non-financial firms listed on the ASE for the period of 2006-2016, and 
by using two measures each for firm performance (return on assets and Tobin’s Q), 
and firm efficiency (asset utilization and expense ratio), in this study a regression 
model was used to test the hypotheses. This paper has described the study period, data 
set and the sources of the data. As well, all the variables relevant to this study were 
illustrated. Moreover, in this paper, many robustness checks have been presented. The 
model specification was tested before controlling for industry and time effects, and 
again, after adding industry and time effects. To overcome the variation across the 
companies and within a company and to capture company specific characteristics, the 
regression model was run again by employing the Hausman Specification Test, also 
known as the ‘random effect’ or ‘fixed-effect’ model. In order to deal with the 
endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques were used, as discussed in the final part 
of this chapter.  
Drawing on the resource dependence theory, Chapter 4, (paper 2), has answered 
two questions: (1) does board gender diversity in the form of the representation of 
women on the board of directors, influence firm performance, and (2) does board 
gender diversity in the form of the representation of women on the board of directors, 
influence firm efficiency (also known as firm agency cost)?  This paper used the same 
data, procedures and measures of analysis as in paper 1, by considering Jordan as a 
case study. Although many countries around the world have adopted specific 
legalisation to encourage gender diversity in the boardrooms (Francoeur et al. 2008; 
Armstrong et al. 2010), including Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, the UK, 
Canada and Spain, this study does not support the resource dependence theory 
predictions concerning gender diversity, as a means to promote firm performance and 
efficiency.  
In Chapter 5 (paper 3), an investigation is presented into the effect of CEO 
duality as a proxy for board leadership structure on firm performance and firm 
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efficiency among non-financial listed firms in the context of a less developed country, 
by considering Jordan as a case study. By adopting the agency theory, this paper used 
the same steps as in paper 1 and paper 2. Although it has been argued elsewhere that 
when the CEO and the board chairperson is the same person, the board’s effectiveness 
to monitor and control the management team is diminished due to a conflict of interest 
and lack of board independence, eventually hindering the firm’s performance (Kang 
& Zardkoohi 2005), this study seems rather to corroborate the stewardship theory.  
The current chapter of this thesis summarises the whole study and presents its 
conclusions. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, a summary of the 
empirical results is offered. Secondly, an explanation of the implications of the 
findings is given as well as some relevant concluding remarks. Thirdly, the results and 
recommendations follow. Finally, the research’s limitations are listed and further 
studies are proposed. 
 
6.1 The results and discussion   
6.1.1 The empirical results  
The empirical results of paper 1, paper 2 and paper 3, are derived by 
investigating whether the specific mechanisms of corporate governance (i.e., board 
independence, board gender diversity and CEO duality) influence firm performance 
and firm agency cost, by considering Jordan as a case study. These papers tested six 
hypotheses by using a regression model. A summary of the empirical results is 
presented below.  
 
6.1.1.1 Board independence, firm performance and firm efficiency 
The empirical results of the relationships between board independence, firm 
performance and firm efficiency/firm agency cost, suggest that board independence in 
the form of the representation of outside independent directors on the board can 
influence firm performance and firm efficiency. Based on this analysis, the relevant 
hypotheses are accepted.  
H 1a: There is a positive relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. 
H 1b: A company board’s independence will mitigate corporate agency costs. 
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6.1.1.2 Board gender diversity, firm performance and firm efficiency 
The empirical results of the relationships between board gender diversity, firm 
performance and firm efficiency/firm agency cost, indicate that board gender diversity 
in the form of the representation of women on the board of directors, does not affect 
firm performance or firm efficiency. Based on this analysis, the following hypotheses 
are rejected.  
H 1a: There is a positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance.  
H 1b: A company board’s gender diversity will reduce corporate agency costs. 
 
6.1.1.3 CEO duality, firm performance and firm efficiency 
The empirical results of the relationships between CEO duality, firm 
performance and firm efficiency/firm agency cost, propose that CEO duality (also 
known as a dual leadership structure) can positively influence firm performance and 
inversely (negatively) influence agency cost. Based on this analysis, the following 
hypotheses are rejected.  
H 1a: CEO duality is negatively related with firm performance. 
H 1b: CEO duality is positively associated with firm agency cost. 
 
6.1.2 The discussion of the results  
Although the results of these papers support a number of prior studies, they could 
not provide conclusive empirical evidence on some issues (e.g., board independence) 
in the form of the representation of outside independent directors. It is argued that due 
to the variations in financing patterns and ownership structure of firms around the 
world, agency conflict may vary. Furthermore, the practices of corporate governance 
may vary broadly at the level of the companies and the countries (Doidge et al. 2007). 
It is confirmed that the mechanisms of governance act well in developed markets. In 
contrast, these mechanisms may not act well in some developing markets (Majumdar 
& Chhibber 1999).  
Overall, agency problems can be categorised into two main groups. The first is 
termed ‘traditional agency problems’ which are prevalent in developed countries. The 
second is known as ‘unique agency problems’ which are common in developing 
countries. Dharwadkar et al. (2000, p. 651) stated that the “traditional agency solutions 
that mitigate agency problems in the strong governance context of developed 
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economies, might not necessarily be effective in the weak governance context 
prevalent in emerging economies”, a finding which is relevant to the empirical results 
of the current study. The problem of corporate governance in developing countries 
such as Jordan, may not resemble those of other countries. Thus, the divergence of 
some of the current study’s results from previous research supports the idea that ‘one 
size does not fit all’, in other words, that one set of governance mechanisms may not 
suit every country. The following sections explain the implications of these three 
papers’ findings.  
 
6.1.3 Board independence, firm performance and firm efficiency  
The aim of paper 1 was to empirically investigate agency theory predictions 
regarding the associations between a board’s independence, a firm’s performance and 
a firm’s agency cost. ROA, Tobin’s Q, AUR and ER, were employed to capture the 
effectiveness of board independence in improving firm performance and reducing its 
agency cost. This study responded to the call of prior research that there have not, as 
yet, been sufficient studies of this nature carried out in the Jordanian context, and 
involved gathering the relevant data for over 80 non-financial listed firms on the ASE.  
The empirical results of this study are that board independence in the form of the 
representation of outside independent directors, can act as a control mechanism to 
improve the firm’s performance and mitigate its agency cost. A significant positive 
association among board independence, ROA and AUR ratios was found. These 
findings are consistent with the results of Al-Najjar (2014) and Rashid (2015). 
However, no significant association was found between board independence and ER 
for firm efficiency, which is consistent with previous research, e.g., Singh and 
Davidson (2003), McKnight and Weir (2009) and Rashid (2015). 
Accordingly, board independence does not fully act as an effective tool to 
identify a firm’s agency cost in general. It is noted that outside directors on corporate 
boards are concerned with the use of a firm’s assets in a revenue generating venture, 
but they are not concerned with controlling s firm’s operating expenses.  
The first possible explanation for this can be that, in the context of firms with a 
high ownership concentration like Jordanian companies, the nature of agency conflict 
may differ from agency conflict in Anglo-American countries. In the context of Anglo-
American countries, there is a conflict of interest between dispersed shareholders and 
corporate management, whilst countries such as Jordan with a high concentration of 
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ownership, may face another type of conflict, that is, a conflict of interest between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Sun et al. 2017). The second 
explanation is that companies’ boards in firms with a high ownership concentration 
are comprised of directors who represent the interests of shareholders and managers, 
hence, “being unable to deal with the specific agency problem adequately” (Lefort & 
Urzúa 2008, p. 615).  
Another explanation is that, in developing markets, outside independent 
directors are probably not really independent (Barako et al. 2006). In Jordan, there is 
a requirement that all directors should be shareholders, which ignores independence 
altogether. Yet another explanation is that, in the Jordanian scenario, even if the firm’s 
board has some new outside independent directors, they are elected to these positions 
by the inside directors. Therefore, there are close associations between family 
shareholders and outside directors, in which case outside and inside directors may 
serve on a system of ‘give and take’ (Singh et al. 2018).  
The empirical findings also indicate a significant negative relationship between 
board independence and Tobin’s Q. This result is in line with previous research, such 
as that of Sakawa and Watanabel (2018), Rashid (2018) and Singh et al. (2018), which 
does not support the common belief that there is a postive influence of board 
independence on Tobin’s Q.  
It can be argued that, to apply market-based measures to measure firm 
performance, these have to reflect the actual value of the firm (Lindenberg & Ross 
1981). Thus, such measures may not be effective in developing economics as the 
capital market is not well developed (Lindenberg & Ross 1981).  
As well, as Bacidore et al. (1997, p. 11) suggested, market-based measures “may 
not be an efficient contracting parameter because they are driven by many factors 
beyond the control of the firm’s executives”. The Jordanian market is no exception to 
this. The CCD in Jordan has indicated that the Jordanian market witnessed over the 
period 2000-2011, 44 bankruptcy cases in its company sector, including 26 cases in 
the industrial sector (Zureigat et al. 2014). Claessens and Djankov (1999, p. 502) 
confirmed that employing market-based measures may “lead to a downward bias in 
the relationship between concentrated ownership and firms’ valuation” in countries 
with weak protection of minority shareholders, such as Jordan.  
However, these findings do not deny the agency theory predictions for the 
following three important reasons. Firstly, it is confirmed that the mechanisms of 
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corporate governance are an integrated system. It can be said that firms may use 
numerous mechanisms to identify firm’s agency cost, board independence being one 
among several. Moreover, outside directors “may still be in a position to perform some 
oversight monitoring role and outside directors’ inability to monitor may be captured 
by the insider ownership” (Rashid 2015, p. 193).  
Secondly, in some developed markets, these independent directors failed to add 
any value for corporations, such as in various high profile U.S. cases (Singh & 
Davidson 2003). Finally, and conversely, it may be argued that inside directors are 
most effective due to their having adequate knowledge, expertise and information 
about the firm, more so than outside directors. As Nicholson and Kiel (2007, p. 588) ) 
argued, “inside (or executive) directors spend their working lives in the firm they 
govern, they understand the businesses better than outside directors, and so can make 
superior decisions”. Therefore, the results of this research are not surprising.   
 
6.1.3.1 Board gender diversity, firm performance and firm efficiency 
The governance literature proposes that the structure of the board is a real impact 
on the actions of the board of directors and top management, which ultimately affects 
firm performance and firm agency cost (Kim et al. 2009). The suggestion is that board 
diversity is one dimension of the structure of the company board that matters (Carter 
et al. 2010). The findings of the random effect regression estimation show non-
significant relationships among board gender diversity in the form of the number of 
women on the board of directors, an accounting based measure (i.e., ROA) and a 
market-based measure (i.e., Tobin’s Q). When AUR is used as the proxy of a firm’s 
agency cost, the findings also report a non-significant relationship to female board 
representation. 
In sum, the empirical findings of this study do not indicate any significant 
relationship between firm performance as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, and firm 
efficiency as measured by AUR, which is in accordance with the results of Rose 
(2007), Carter et al. (2010), Chapple and Humphrey (2014), Pletzer et al. (2015) and 
Kagzi and Guha (2018). However, the results from the random effect regression 
indicate some weak evidence (significant in one of four measures) that there is a 
significant and negative association between board gender diversity and the expense 
ratio.  
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The study’s hypotheses were developed based on resource dependence theory. 
Resource dependence theory shows the most support for a positive relationship 
between board gender diversity and the performance of the firm. However, the 
outcomes of the random effect estimations expansively support the prevailing belief 
that “there are reasonable theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that suggest 
either no effect of board diversity on firm performance or a detrimental effect” (Carter 
et al. 2010, p. 410).  
The first probable explanation for this can be that the culture, the economic 
position and the legal environment can shape the board gender composition of 
corporations (Saeed et al. 2016). Julizaerma and Sori (2012) and Iannotta et al. (2016) 
argued that cultural attitudes are one of the principal reasons for the weak participation 
of women in boardrooms. Unlike most developed markets, Jordan has great resistance 
against gender equality, and in this sense and others, the social structure varies from 
most developed markets. As noted by Singh (2009), in Jordan, families have the desire 
to be the dominant component in society rather than individuals. Furthermore, 
Jordanian families support males in the labour market rather than females (Singh 
2009). Other conditions also operate to prevent women from participating in the labour 
market: poverty, women’s behaviours are restricted, limited resources, unemployment 
and paid labour not being considered part of women’s role in Jordanian society.  As a 
consequence, there is a low percentage of females in Jordanian companies’ 
boardrooms, and this small number does not have sufficient ability to control the firm 
performance and efficiency. Only 3% of women are present on firms’ boards in Jordan.  
The second potential explanation can be that, in the context of firms with a high 
ownership concentration, such as Jordanian firms, the nature of agency problems may 
be different from agency problems in Anglo-American companies. In the latter, there 
is an agency conflict between shareholders and managers whereas companies with a 
high concentration of ownership may face a conflict of interest between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders (Sun et al. 2017).  
A third explanation is that boards in corporations with a high ownership 
concentration, consist of members who represent the interests of shareholders and 
managers, thus, “being unable to deal with the specific agency problem adequately” 
(Lefort & Urzúa 2008, p. 615).  
Another explanation is that, board gender diversity may bring costs to the firm 
because of communications problems and interpersonal conflicts. Erhardt et al. (2003) 
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argued that such diversity both improves performance by increasing decision-making 
ability, but reduces group performance by rising conflict. Treichler (1995) claimed that 
gender diversity on company boards requires higher costs because of expanded 
initiatives and coordination to provide for the needs of different kinds of employees. 
Furthermore, Triana et al. (2013) indicated that diversity leads to conflict, which could 
impede the capacity of the corporation to make strategic changes, in particular in times 
when organisational performance is low.  
Yet another explanation is that rising gender diversity does not decrease agency 
cost for all firms. As argued by Jurkus et al. (2011), increasing the proportion of 
women on company boards may lead to improving their performance and mitigating 
against agency cost in some, but not all firms. Therefore, the outcomes of this research 
do not support the resource dependence theory predictions, and it can be seen that the 
position of Jordanian women is quite limited when compared with Anglo-American 
societies.   
 
6.1.3.2 CEO duality, firm performance and firm efficiency 
A further purpose of this study was to examine whether CEO duality can 
influence firm agency cost and firm performance in Jordanian companies. A main 
motivation for this study was that previous studies on the influence of CEO duality on 
firm agency cost and firm performance, have arrived at inclusive and mixed findings, 
with empirical evidence offered to support the arguments for and against CEO duality.  
Such duality “has been blamed for poor performance and slow response to 
change, in firms such as General Motors, Digital Equipment Corporation, and 
Goodyear Tyre and Rubber” (Boyd 1995, p. 301). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
CEOs engaged in controversial accounting practices that led to severe financial 
collapses in U.S.A. However, as noted by Kang and Zardkoohi (2005), this does not 
necessarily imply that CEO duality constitutes a weak governance system. Conversely, 
duality might be an ideal solution for external environmental difficulties or a reward 
for a CEO’s good firm performance (Kang & Zardkoohi 2005).  
The empirical analysis of this research illustrates that CEO duality in developing 
economies such as Jordan, is important in improving firm performance (expressed by 
ROA) and in diminishing firm agency cost as measured as two ratios of firm efficiency 
(i.e., AUR and ER). The estimation of random effect regression findings show that 
CEO duality as a proxy of a dual leadership structure, is positively significant in 
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determining ROA, and that CEO duality is positively significant in determining AUR 
and negatively significant in determining firm agency cost as measured by ER. It is 
noted that CEO duality is concerned with the use of a corporation’s assets in a revenue 
generating venture and with controlling its operating expenses. Therefore, the results 
of this study imply CEO duality encourages the board of directors’ ability to exercise 
the function of governance in Jordan, which supports stewardship theory predictions.  
The empirical findings of this study provide support for the results of Finkelstein 
and D'aveni (1994) and Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010), that low-performing firms 
need a strong leadership structure and unity of command to promote their performance. 
It is confirmed that in average-performing firms in Jordan,  complex operational and 
managerial matters need a solid and strong leadership structure (Ramdani & 
Witteloostuijn 2010). Hence, this research is inconsistent with arguments that a dual 
leadership structure (CEO duality) leads to an unambiguous leadership structure and 
unity of command. Likewise, the results provide support for the argument that CEOs 
with dual roles (CEO duality) have more authority, power and freedom to make 
numerous decisions, and therefore, more positively affect firm agency cost and firm 
performance. In addition, a single leadership structure can respond to the difficulties 
in a firm’s unique environment effectively (Guillet et al. 2013). Therefore, these results 
may imply that Jordanian firms obtain significant benefits from CEO duality. As well, 
the results of this research support the common belief that CEO duality may have 
benefits and costs (Brickley et al. 1997; Elsayed 2007; Dey et al. 2011; Tang 2017). 
In developing countries like Jordan, the cost of splitting of the CEO and board 
chairman roles is higher than the benefits (Katti & Raithatha 2018). Brickley et al. 
(1997) indicate some costs of CEO non-duality, such as agency costs of monitoring 
the actions of the chairperson, and information costs. Thus, the firm’s agency cost is 
lower for the firms that promote the dual role of CEO and chairperson.  
  From the regression coefficients of the random effect, a non-significant and 
positive relationship is noted between CEO duality and market-based measures (i.e., 
Tobin’s Q). As noted by Lindenberg and Ross (1981), market-based measures such as 
Tobin’s Q should reflect the true value of the firms. Thus, such measures may not be 
effective in less developed markets as the capital market is undeveloped (Joh 2003), 
and this is the case in Jordan (Bouri 2015); it is classified by thin and unregulated 
trading and probably less well-informed investors. Likewise, Bacidore et al. (1997, p. 
11) noted that the market-based measures “may not be an efficient contracting 
203 
 
parameter because they are driven by many factors beyond the control of the firm’s 
executives”. Jordan is no exception to this. Claessens and Djankov (1999) suggested 
that using the market-based measures may “lead to a downward bias in the relationship 
between concentrated ownership and firms’ valuation” in markets with weak 
protection of minority shareholders, such as the Jordanian market. Moreover, most 
developing economies count on debt financing rather than finance from the share 
market (i.e., equity financing); thus, market-based measures do not represent an actual 
gain made by the shareholders on their investments (Kumar 2004). Specifically, Pham 
et al. (2011, p. 373) stated that the measurement of Tobin’s Q is “subject to accounting 
treatment of balance sheet items”. Therefore, the empirical results support the 
prevailing belief that market-based measures do not work well in developing countries.   
 
6.2 Implications of the results  
The results of this thesis have a number of critical implications for policy 
makers, authorities, practitioners, regulators and managers of the non-financial 
companies sector in Jordan. Paper 1 (Chapter 3) has shown that policy makers should 
formulate rules and regulations concerning the corporate governance of industrial and 
services-related companies that boost the adoption of outside independent directors. 
There is, however, a need to apply the right meaning to the term ‘independent 
members’, as also is the need to clearly define the members who serve as independent 
members on a board of directors. Indeed, the importance of this study for related 
parties is that it has strong implications for the current reform movement of corporate 
governance practices in Jordan. Secondly, it is necessary to support firms not to have 
very large boards. It is argued that boards with a large number of members are easier 
for the CEO to control (Jensen 1993). Finally, firm age, free cash flow and firm growth, 
are becoming useful control tools that can add value to the company. These play a vital 
role in reducing a firm’s agency cost; therefore having a positive influence on a firm’s 
efficiency. 
Paper 2 (Chapter 4) indicates that the empirical evidence of this study does not 
support the gender quota law to raise the percentage of women on firms’ boards. Thus, 
the decision to appoint females to a company’s board should not be based on the idea 
that such gender diversity will improve the performance and efficiency of firms. The 
study’s outcomes point to gender diversity not seeming to have a negative link with 
firm performance and firm agency cost; gender diversity should be enhanced for 
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ethical reasons to improve fairness. Secondly, the empirical findings of this study will 
help the corporation to find a ‘board-performance’ fit that will guarantee high 
performance and efficiency of the Jordanian company sector. Overall, this research 
shows a non-significant and positive effect of gender diversity on firm performance 
and efficiency. Therefore, these findings will assist firms in designing their boards.  
Paper 3 (Chapter 5), drawing on the governance literature, holds that prior 
studies do no confirm that CEO duality as a proxy dual leadership structure is to be 
blamed for poor firm performance (Elsayed 2007). In the Jordanian scenario, 
supporting the argument that CEO duality will improve some firms while CEO non-
duality may be of more benefit for other ones, the theoretical implication is that 
regulatory authorities, policy makers, practitioners, and non-financial sector managers 
in Jordan, need to if the system of Anglo-American dual leadership structure may 
promote firm performance and alleviate firm’s agency costs in Jordan, should it 
mandatorily adopt CEO duality (dual leadership structure) through the listed firms at 
the ASE.  
 
6.3 Recommendations of the study 
This thesis has been carried out in the context of Jordan, and has elaborated on 
the evolution of corporate governance in Jordan, highlighting different internal factors 
like its laws and legal institutions and its political and economic environments, all of 
which shape the current structure of corporate governance in Jordan. It is noted that 
although there are many similarities between the developed countries and developing 
countries including Jordan about corporate governance structures, some of Jordan’s 
features are different.  
This thesis makes a critical contribution to the accounting literature and mitigates 
against the scarcity of studies on corporate governance in developing markets. 
Although its empirical results confirm the results of a number of earlier studies, it also 
goes against many previous studies which have focused on developed markets. 
Therefore, the results of this thesis confirm that corporate governance practice is not, 
and cannot be, uniform around the world. 
Based on the empirical evidence and theoretical discussions, it is revealed that 
the practices of corporate governance in Jordan need to be improved. International 
standards of corporate governance may assist in formulating and correcting the 
governance system in any country by adopting the beneficial characteristics of 
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corporate governance which exist in developed countries. Therefore, this thesis makes 
some recommendations relying on the best practices of corporate governance around 
the world, in keeping with the current structure of corporate governance in Jordan and 
the empirical results of papers 1, 2 and 3. These are summarised below:  
1 The current code of corporate governance in Jordan may be continued with a few 
improvements. A few significant inconsistencies were found in the corporate 
governance code for companies and regulations in the company laws. For example:  
A) Instructions of corporate governance for shareholding listed companies for 
the year 2017, state that it is not allowed for the CEO to serve as board 
chairman at the same time. However, Article 152 (C) of the Company Law 
of 1997, states that the CEO of a public shareholding firm can be appointed 
as the general manager of that firm. Therefore, this law allows the existence 
of CEO duality in public shareholding companies.   
B) The requirement for all board members to be shareholders in the same firm 
seems to conflict with best practice of corporate governance and the 
concept of the independence of board members.  
C) To guarantee the effective performance of the board members, it is essential 
to have an annual formal evaluation process. However, instructions 
concerning corporate governance for shareholding listed companies are 
silent on this issue.  
D) The instructions of corporate governance for shareholding listed companies 
and the Jordanian corporate governance code for non-listed companies, 
have different definitions of an independent director. 
E) There is no specific requirement to disclose information on the 
corporation’s website.  
2 The theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 (paper 1) includes the statement that 
outside independent directors can be good monitors; the empirical results in this 
study also recommend that outside independent directors in the context of Jordan 
are good monitors as board independence in the form of the representation of 
outside independent directors positively influences the firm’s performance and 
reduces its agency cost. Therefore, the regulatory bodies, such as ASE and JSC in 
Jordan, may consider promoting the effectiveness of boardrooms by increasing the 
number of independent directors who will become a part of the group of non-
executive directors. By way of comparison, the Higgs report for 2003, which 
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makes recommendations for companies, indicated that at least half the board 
members should be independent directors (non-executive directors).  
3 As mentioned above, the code of corporate governance for shareholdings firms 
listed on the ASE does not allow both non-executive and executive directors to 
conduct their duties and responsibilities together in one company. However, the 
empirical results of Chapter 5 (paper 3) document that CEO duality (i.e., a dual 
leadership structure) can work well in the context of Jordan. It can improve firm 
performance and mitigate against firm agency cost. Hence, these results support 
the Company Law of 1997.  
4 It is noted that cultural issues can influence board gender diversity in Jordan. 
Unlike most developed countries, Jordan has a cultural setting that appears strongly 
resistant against gender equality. The social structure of Jordanian families 
supports males with respect to the labour market, rather than females. The 
empirical findings of Chapter 4 (paper 2) indicate board gender diversity may not 
work well in Jordan’s context. It may alleviate the ability of the board to exercise 
the functions of governance, and lead to conflict between board members. Such 
conflict may diminish the board’s effectiveness, and therefore create severe 
problems.  
5 The regulatory bodies in Jordan may consider specifying the accountability 
structure of the board members required by the management, and the prevention 
of fraud issues by the management.  
 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
As with all studies, this research is not free from limitations. Firstly, the studies’ 
data related to the corporate governance parameters was manually collected from 
firms’ annual reports. It is argued that the governance arrangements and accounting 
standards are weak in developing markets like Jordan (Lins & Servaes 2002; Jara-
Bertin et al. 2015). Thus, the annual reports may not actually represent all data 
accurately. Secondly, these studies used one set of ownership structures, (director 
ownership, institutional ownership and block holders ownership) as control variables. 
Yet it has been argued that “the use of a single category of ownership may not capture 
all effects of the ownership/performance relationship” (Lukviarman 2004, p. 95). 
Thirdly, this research investigated the influence of board independence in the form of 
the representation of outside independent directors on firm performance and 
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efficiency. The requirement of appointing outside independent members to Jordanian 
boardrooms, was mandatory only from 2009. Hence, the fact that there was no 
requirement for independent directors before 2009 may have influenced the results of 
this study. A fourth limitation is the inclusion of only three board characteristics, i.e. 
board independence, board gender diversity and CEO duality. However, it is suggested 
that a future research direction would be to explore the effect of various other 
governance mechanisms on firm performance and efficiency. Fifthly, the current 
studies excluded financial firms because these are managed by different rules and 
instructions, thus the sample size was decreased from 224 firms to 80, which is a 
limited number. Finally, the empirical analyses of this research are based on a single 
country setting. 
 
6.5 Areas for future research 
Generally speaking, both the term and idea of corporate governance in 
developing countries are relatively new. Therefore, there are broad issues within this 
field of research. Although the derived findings are specific to Jordanian context, their 
similarity with other developing countries’ governance models recommends an 
extended examination into the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the Middle 
East and North Africa region. For example, future research can examine corporate 
governance across different Arab countries with similarly shared cultures, economies, 
institutional settings and financial infrastructures. On the other hand, the studies 
employed two proxies of agency cost; other measures (i.e. Q-free cash flow 
interaction) can be inserted in future research. Additional future research may examine 
if outside independent directors are considered an important resource to the firm in 
that they may provide advice, legitimacy and counsel that enhance performance. 
Therefore, future research could use resource dependence theory by investigating 
certain board characteristics, such as age, experience and qualifications, which may 
improve firm performance and mitigate against agency cost. Likewise, future studies 
can extend these studies by including more independent variables (e.g. other 
ownership variables and CEO compensation). Paper 2 examined only one board 
characteristic, i.e. gender diversity. However, it is suggested that a future research 
direction would be to explore the effects of various other company board diversity 
indicators, such as age, experience in years, and level of education, on firm 
performance and agency cost. Paper 3 addressed CEO duality and its effect on firm 
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performance and firm efficiency. It is confirmed that the dual leadership structure 
relies on some contextual variables (e.g. CEO’s experience, age and qualifications) 
which, within the relevant industries, has also been termed ‘CEO charisma’ (Tosi et 
al. 2004). Therefore, future studies can be carried out investigating the effects of CEO 
duality on company performance, by employing such CEO charisma as a moderating 
factor.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of definitions and measurements of variables 
Panel A: The Variables of Firm Performance (Dependent Variable) 
ROA 
It is return on assets. It is measured as the (EBIT) earning before 
interest and tax, divided by the total assets. 
Tobin’s Q 
It is defined as the replacement of the firm. It is calculated as the 
market value of equity plus total libilities, scaled by the total 
assets. 
Panel B: The Variables of Firm Efficiency/Firm Agency Cost (Dependent 
Variable) 
AUR 
It is the asset utilsation ratio. It is measured as as the ratio of 
annual sales scaled by total assets. 
ER 
It is expense ratio. It is measured as the ratio of operating 
expenses to total annual sales.  
Panel C: Independent Varibles 
BODIND 
It is the board independence. It is defined as the number of 
outside directors as a percentage of the total number of directors 
on the board.  
BGDIV 
It is the board gender diversity. It is calculated as the number of 
women as a percentage of the total number of directors on the 
board.  
CEOD 
It is the CEO duality. It is measured as a binary variable, 
assigning one (1) if the CEO holds a dual role as the board chair, 
otherwise the study assigns (0) zero.  
Panel D: Other Variables 
INSOWN 
It is the institutional ownership. It is measured as the percentage 
of shares owned by financial institutions.  
DIROWN 
It is the directors ownership. It is calculated as the percentage of 
shares held by directors.  
LBOWN 
It is the three largest block holders. It is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by the three largest block holders 
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BDSIZE 
It is the board size. It is employed as the natural logarithm of the 
total number of directors on the board. 
SIZE  
It is the firm size. It is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
total assets.  
AGE 
It is the firm size. It is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total number of years a company has been listed on the stock 
exchange. 
GROWTH 
It is the firm growth. It is calculated as the proportion of current 
year sales minus previous year sales, divided by previous year 
sales.  
LIQ 
It is the current ratio of the firm (liqudity). It is defined by using 
the current ratio, dividing current assets by current liabilities. 
LEV 
It is the debt ratio of the firm. It is measured as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets.  
FCF 
It is the free cash flow of the firm. It is defined as the operating 
income before depreciation, minus the sum of taxes plus interest 
expenses and dividends paid, scaled by the total assets.  
R&D 
It is the research and development expenditure of the firm. It is 
calculated as a ratio of total expenditure to total sales.  
 
Appendix 2: The summary of the studies’ hypotheses 
Board of 
directors 
Hypothese 
Board 
independence 
H 1a: There is a positive relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. 
H 1b: A company board’s independence will mitigate corporate 
agency costs. 
Board gender 
diversity 
H 2a: There is a positive relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm performance. 
H 2b: A company board’s gender diversity will reduce corporate 
agency costs. 
CEO duality 
H 3a: CEO duality is negatively related with firm performance.  
H 3b: CEO duality is positively associated with firm agency cost. 
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Appendix 3:  The volume of the trading, the number of listed companies and 
market capitalisation of the ASE, from 1999-2017 
Source: ASE (2018) 
Appendix 4: The assets and liablities of licensed banks in Jordan from 2013 to 
2017 
Foreign assets 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash in iaults (in foreign 
currencies) 
238.7 210.5 184.2 174.5 201.6 
Balances with foreign 
banks 
3348.1 3289.6 3258.5 3934.9 4,064.8 
Portfolio (non-resident) 508.9 641.9 692.6 716.9 757.2 
Year No. of 
listed 
companies 
No. of shares Trading value 
(JD) 
No. of 
transactions 
Market 
capitalisation 
(JD) 
1999 151 271,100,000 389,430,783 154,600 4,137,711,690 
2000 163 178,300,000 334,724,633 133,100 3,509,640,709 
2001 163 332,400,000 668,652,674 293,200 4,476,364,817 
2002 163 455,600,000 950,272,994 446,400 5,028,953,990 
2003 163 1,008,564620 1,855,176,028 786,208 7,772,750,866 
2004 163 1,338,703,981 3,793,251,050 1,178,163 13,033,833,515 
2005 163 2,581,744,423 16,871,051,948 2,392,509 26,667,097,118 
2006 163 4,104,285,135 14,209,870,592 3,442,558 21,078,237,222 
2007 163 4,479,369,609 12,348,101,910 3,457,915 29,217,202,327 
2008 262 5,442,267,689 20,318,014,547 3,780,934 25,406,265,528 
2009 272 6,022,471,335 9,665,310,642 2,964,610 22,526,919,428 
2010 277 6,988,858,431 6,689,987,155 1,880,219 21,858,181,603 
2011 247 4,072,337,760 2,850,252,628 1,318,278 19,272,757,327 
2012 243 2,384,058,415 1,978,813,878 975,016 19,141,521,210 
2013 240 2,705,796,950 3,027,255,186 1,074,438 18,233,491,417 
2014 236 2,321,802,789 2,263,404,594 955,987 18,082,617,433 
2015 228 2,585,816,584 3,417,079,026 898,982 17,984,673,970 
2016 224 1,836,711,983 2,329,466,130 786,156 17,339,384,851 
2017 194 1,716,744,042 2,926,233,590 717,494 16,962,550,802 
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Credit facilities to private 
sector (non-resident) 
818.0 481.9 477.1 479.8 500.2 
Other foreign assets 238.2 107.2 72.1 138.5 137.9 
Total  5,151.9 4,731.1 4,684.5 5,444.6 5,661.7 
Domestic assets      
Claims on public sector 10,458.8 11,015.4 11,514.1 11,0186.2 10,292.6 
Claims on private sector 
(resident) 
17,201.9 17,830.3 18,681.3 20,567.4 22,502.9 
Claims on financial 
institutions 
90.3 91.1 89.4 182.8 302.9 
Cash in vaults and deposits 
with the CBJ 
6,497.0 7,591.0 7,972.4 6,768.0 6,690.6 
Other assets 3,402.9 3,609.2 4,191.5 4,334.5 3,651.8 
Total 37,650.9 40,137.0 42,448.7 42,938.9 43,440.8 
Liabilities      
Capital, reserves and 
provisions 
6,146.2 6,773.7 7,107.8 7,261.2 7,564.2 
Foreign liabilities 6,716.1 6,738.3 6,671.4 6,430.7 6,799.1 
Central government 
deposits 
744.0 1,380.0 1,293.2 1,130.2 955.9 
Public entities deposits 1,262.4 1,091.2 1,423.8 1,339.9 1,380.3 
Private sector deposits 
(resident) 
22,195.8 23,976.8 25,799.8 26,952.9 26,916.3 
Financial institutions 
deposits 
277.9 360.4 443.2 385.5 309.5 
Credit from the CBJ 842.7 645.6 500.6 499.3 527.4 
Other liabilities 4,617.7 3,902.1 3,893.4 4,383.8 4,649.8 
Total 42,802.8 44,868.1 47,133.2 48,383.5 49,102.5 
Source: CBJ (2018) 
 
